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INTRODUCTION

This Article will discuss the interaction between state family
law and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as
amended ("ERISA").1 There will be a discussion of issues that have
been created or amplified with respect to this interaction by (1)
two major and widely accepted myths about ERISA that have been
reinforced by Supreme Court decisions, and (2) two major myths
that stem from the U.S. Department of Labor ("DOL") actions. By
dispelling these myths, the Court and the DOL may improve the
practice of family law and ERISA.
First, the Court incorrectly asserted that the ERISA family
law provisions enacted by the Retirement Equity Act of 19842
("REACT") provide "enhanced protection to the spouse and
dependent children in the event of divorce or separation, and in
the event of death the surviving spouse."3 This assertion has
encouraged plan administrators and other courts to find that
domestic relations orders govern an excessively broad class of
ERISA pension and life insurance benefits. However, REACT, like
ERISA, was a reaction to the inadequacies of state law and prior
federal law. Thus, it similarly circumscribed the role of state law
and increased substantive protections for ERISA participants and
beneficiaries.
Second, the Court added a gloss to ERISA in non-family law
contexts that emphasizes the importance of limiting the cost
burdens imposed on employers by ERISA, which, if excessive,
would discourage employers from establishing and maintaining
employee benefit plans.4 This gloss has encouraged other courts to
1. The primary focus will be on ERISA §§ 205, 206, 502, 514, 609, 29
U.S.C. §§ 1055, 1056, 1132, 1144, 1169 (2006). These sections set forth the
terms of the interaction between ERISA and the family law provisions of the
fifty states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and various territories.
ERISA § 3(10), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(10).
2. Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426 (1984)
(hereinafter REACT).
3. Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 847 (1997). The Court's surviving spouse
observation is correct.
4. See, e.g., Conkwright v. Frommert, 130 S. Ct. 1640, 1649 (2010)
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lose sight of the leitmotif of ERISA, improving the security of
retirement and other employee benefit entitlements.5 Thus, courts
have wrongfully permitted individuals to use superseded (state
family law or federal common law) ownership claims to obtain
benefit entitlements from the recipients rather than the plans.
These holdings violate the reasoning of a line of Supreme Court
decisions dating back more than a hundred years, which protected
ERISA entitlements and other federal entitlements, after their
distribution.
The DOL, which is responsible for issuing regulations
pertaining to the effects that the requirements a state domestic
relations order ("DROs") 6 must meet in order to be a qualified
domestic relations order ("QDRO"),7 have on ERISA plans created
many practical issues for both plans and courts for two reasons.
First, the DOL has acted as if it may foster good ERISA practice
with respect to DROs by providing only nonbinding, informal
guidance to the general public rather than extensive DOL
regulations. 8 This omission has created unnecessary issues for
persons seeking to prepare DROs that comply with the pertinent
ERISA requirements, and for plan administrators responding to
such requests. Second, the DOL incorrectly asserted that the
ERISA benefit claim provisions should not govern plan reviews of
DROs for compliance with the QDRO requirements, but has failed
to present an alternative set of review provisions for plans to

(stating that deference to claims reviewers on remand is justified to avoid
imposing excessive administrative costs that would result in benefit
reductions); Fort Halifax Packing Co., Inc. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 19 (1987)
(describing "ERISA's central focus on administrative integrity" as it finds that
ERISA does not preempt Maine requirement that there be a one-time
severance payment to employers closing plants because it does not relate to
ERISA plan, which requires an "ongoing administrative program"); Shaw v.
Delta Airlines, 463 U.S. 85, 105 n.24 (1983) (holding that the state law
directing the plan to provide additional benefits is preempted). Without
ERISA preemption, plan participants could be forced to shoulder the increased
administrative burden of complying with multiple state requirements because
employers may pay for those burdens by reducing plan benefits. Id.
5. ERISA § 2, 29 U.S.C. § 1001.
6. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(B)(ii), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii).
7. ERISA § 206(d)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3).
8. The only DOL regulations addressing this subject are 29 C.F.R.
§ 2530.206 entitled "Time and Order of Issuance of Domestic Relations
Orders," which were issued pursuant to specific Congressional directions in
the Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280 § 1001, 120 Stat. 780
(2006). These regulations do not address: (1) the plans to which the rules
apply; (2) the information the plans must make available, or when the
information must be provided; (3) the procedures and standards the plans
must use to review a DRO; (4) the effect, if any, on plan operations of the
submission to the plan of a DRO for review; or (5) the role of state courts in
enforcing and determining the effects of DROs on ERISA plans.
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follow.9 This failure has created unnecessary issues concerning the
roles of plan administrators and courts in such reviews.
II. SUlMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

This Article will present six major conclusions, suggest that it
would be useful for the Supreme Court to address four related
issues, and suggest that the DOL exercise its authority to issue
regulations pertaining to DROs. Throughout this Article, all
employee benefit plans shall be presumed to be ERISA plans,
unless otherwise described.
First, ERISA benefit entitlements are federal entitlements.
Thus, those entitlements may not be subject to state law
encumbrances, except to the extent the federal government
chooses to permit such encumbrances.
Second, in general, benefit entitlements under the terms of
pension plans, disability plans, or life insurance plans are not
subject to state family law, except to the extent, if any, the plan
sponsors choose to subject the entitlements to such law. Such plan
terms include provisions pertaining to QDROs mandated by
ERISA. Thus, these plans are not generally subject to state family
laws pertaining to domestic relation orders, elective shares, or
community property, or revoking designations on divorce.
Therefore, state family law generally may not be used to change
benefit entitlements from any of these ERISA plans.
Third, benefit entitlements under the terms of pension plans,
disability plans, and life insurance plans are not subject at plan
distribution to state family laws pertaining to domestic relation
orders, elective shares, or community property, or revoking
designations on divorce, unless the plan terms provide for such
deference. It would be useful for the Supreme Court to declare
whether it agrees with this conclusion about ERISA plan payment
entitlements,10 because it seems contrary to Mackey v. Lanier
Collection Agency & Service, Inc.," for domestic relations orders
directed at pension plans not required to provide spousal survivor
benefits.
Fourth, benefit entitlements under the terms of pension
plans, disability plans, or life insurance plans are, after
distribution from the respective plan, not subject to ownership
claims based on either federal common law waivers or state family
laws pertaining to domestic relation orders, elective share laws, or
community property, or revoking designations on divorce,. The
9. See 65 Fed. Reg. 70,245, 70,255 n.39 (Nov. 21, 2000) (providing a
statement accompanying the release of claims regulations).
10. See Kennedy v. Plan Adm'r of the Du Pont Say. & Inv. Plan, 555 U.S.
285 (2009) (discussing a pension plan's fiduciary obligation rather than benefit
entitlements of participants and beneficiaries).
11. Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825 (1988).
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Supreme Court should declare whether it agrees with this
conclusion, which it expressed in Boggs v. Boggs1 2 and Egelhoff v.
Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner,13 but questioned in a Kennedy v. Plan
Administrator of the Du Pont Savings & Investment Plan
footnote. 14
Fifth, domestic relations orders that satisfy the QDRO
requirements do not govern disability plans, life insurance plans,
or pension plans not required by ERISA to provide spousal
survivor benefits, unless the terms of such plans so provide. Again,
it would be useful for the Supreme Court to declare whether it
agrees with this conclusion, which it has not yet addressed,
although the Kennedy Court referred favorably to a Seventh
Circuit decision that held to the contrary.15
Sixth, the QDRO requirements for a domestic relations order
are not satisfied if the order does not require the relevant plan to
make the benefit payment to an alternate payee but requires the
participant to make such designation or to refrain from making a
new designation. It would be beneficial if the Supreme Court,
which has not addressed this issue, indicated whether it agrees
with this conclusion because this characteristic is common among
both the automatic restraining orders issued as a customary part
of many domestic relations proceedings, and the many domestic
relations orders pertaining to life insurance.
It would be useful for the DOL to eliminate most litigation
pertaining to the QDRO requirements by issuing regulations that:
(a) clarify that QDROs govern only pension plans required to
provide spousal survivor benefits, and other plans whose terms
provide for such deference; (b) clarify that QDROs do not include
the customary automatic restraining orders directing parties to
domestic relations court proceedings to refrain from making
changes to life insurance and pension plan designations; (c)
describe a fiduciary duty on plan administrators to provide the
plan information needed to prepare a QDRO, such as general plan
information, including the QDRO procedures, and benefit
information about a participant to potential alternate payees
under a QDRO; (d) require plans to process benefit claims based
on domestic relations orders, like other benefit claims, with the
additional requirement that the participant be notified of the
claim and be permitted to object to the claim; (e) clarify the
benefits that are available pursuant to the terms of a QDRO,
which are not otherwise available under the plan term; and (f)
recognize that state courts, which are authorized to decide and
12. Boggs, 520 U.S. at 833.
13. Egelhoffv. Egelhoffex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141 (2001).
14. Kennedy, 555 U.S. n. 10 at 285.
15. Id. at 302 (citing Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Wheaton, 42 F.3d 1080, 1084
(7th Cir. 1994)).
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enforce benefit claims, may use such authority with respect to
claims based on QDROs, i.e., determine if a domestic relations
order is a QDRO.
III. ISSUES PERTAINING TO THE INTERACTION BETWEEN ERISA AND
STATE FAMILY LAW

This Article focuses on three major state family law issues.
First, what spousal survivor benefits may ERISA plans provide?1 6
Second, how might domestic relations orders and other state laws
affect benefit entitlements? Finally, how do divorces affect
entitlements of a participant's former spouse to the participant's
survivor benefits? ERISA addresses all these issues, albeit often
not explicitly.
A. Basic State Family Law ProvisionsPertinent to Employee
Benefits
There are two basic family law regimes: (1) community
property, which is the rule in ten states and Puerto Rico, and (2)
equitable distribution, which is the rule in forty states and the
District of Columbia.17 Community property laws treat marriage
as an economic partnership in which both spouses, by operation of
law, acquire and have equal ownership in property acquired by
their efforts during the marriage, but separate ownership in other
property.18 Although, either party may manage community
property, one party may dispose of the property for less than fair
value without the consent of the other during the marriage.19 In
contrast, equitable distribution systems treat property as title
based during the marriage, but upon the dissolution of the
marriage, equitable principles are applied to divide between the
spouses the particular state's concept of marital propertyproperty acquired by their efforts during their marriage. 20 Thus, if
one party has title in an equitable distribution state, even if such
property would be treated as marital property on a marital
dissolution, the party need not obtain permission from the other to
dispose of it for less than fair value during the marriage.
Both systems provide for spousal survivor benefits from what
16. There is also some discussion of the devisable interest of a spouse who
predeceases a participant, for which there are few open issues.
17. See Caroline Newcombe, The Origin and Civil Law Foundation of the
Community PropertySystem, Why CaliforniaAdopted It, and Why Community
Property PrinciplesBenefit Women, 11 U. MD. L. J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER
& CLASS 1, 2-13 (2011) (discussing community property); Deborah H. Bell,
Family Law at the Turn of the Century, 71 MISS. L.J. 781, 789-95 (2002)
(discussing community property and equitable distribution).
18. Newcombe, supra note 17, at 9-10; Bell, supra note 17, at 791.
19. Cal. Fam. Code § 1100 (a), (b) (West 2012).
20. Newcombe, supra note 17 at 35-37; Bell, supra note 17, at 793-95.
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they treat as marital property. Under community property, upon
the death of one spouse, the surviving spouse obtains by operation
of law a full right to half of all of the community property, and the
decedent may devise his or her half. 21 In particular, for death
benefits obtained with community property, each spouse has the
right to half of the benefits unless they consent to a different
division. 22 Almost all equitable distribution states give surviving
spouses a right to elect to take the maximum of a family
allowance, and a share (one-third to one-half) of the statutory
elective estate, which usually consists of the decedent's probate
estate augmented in some manner. 23
The elective share laws are derived from a widow's right to
dower, which was a life estate in one-third of certain real property
of her husband. 24 There are four major criticisms of many of the
elective share statues. First, the survivor may be entitled to
excessive assets because the elective estate includes non-marital
assets, such as the decedent's $1,000,000 probate estate for a
recently married decedent whose marital property is less than
$50,000. Second, the statute may be avoided by the use of excluded
property, such as by buying life insurance that is often excluded. 25
For example, an elective share may not include a $1,000,000 life
insurance policy. Third, the statute may be avoided by gifts. 26 For
example, an elective share may not include $1,000,000 transferred
during the decedent's life. Fourth, the spouse may be entitled to a
different value of assets upon dissolution of the marriage by
divorce than by death. In other words, are both spouses' properties
considered in determining the elective share, so that a surviving
spouse who owns a disproportionately large part of the marital
property is not given a windfall because the surviving spouse has a
small interest in the decedent's marital property?27 For example,
21. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 100(a) (West 2002).
22. See, e.g., Patillo v. Norris, 135 Cal. Rptr. 210, 215 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976)
(citing the predecessor of CAL. FAM. CODE § 1100 (b) (West 2004)).
23. See generally Terry L. Turnipseed, Community Property v. The Elective
Share, 72 LA. L. REV. 161 (2011). Georgia is the only state without an elective
share statute. Id. at 162.
24. Id. at 161, 163-70.
25. Id. at 171-72, 180-81.
26. Thus, elective share statutes often add back gifts in some manner. See,
e.g., N. Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.1-A(b)(1)(A)-(B). The first add
backs an undefined phrase "gifts causa mortis," which excludes gifts that may
be excluded under the terms of 26 U.S.C. § 2503(b) or (e) (2006). The second
adds back all transfers made within one year of death not otherwise added
back.
27. See Turnipseed, supra note 23, at 172-86 (suggesting that divorce
equivalency may be best achieved with a community property system). See
generally Raymond C. O'Brien, Integrating Marital Property into a Spouse's
Elective Share, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 617 (2010) (analyzing the attempt to
address this issue with sections 2-201-214 of the Uniform Probate Code).
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should a widow who owns marital assets of $1,000,000 be entitled
to an elective share of one half of her husband's marital property
of $200,000 rather than the parents who he designated to receive
such property?
Both systems provide for property distributions and the
payment of alimony, support, or maintenance on marital
dissolutions. Community property systems entitle each spouse to
an undivided half interest in the community property. Four
community property states divide community property equally,
but the other six distribute the property equitably. 28 In equitable
distribution states, marital property is subject to equitable
distribution, whose criteria vary by state. 29 With the prevalence of
no-fault divorce and changes in social and work customs, there is
less and less use of the traditional alimony model of monthly
payments to a former wife to replace the husband's duty to support
his wife's standard of living as long she remained unmarried. Such
traditional payments were subject to change depending on the
financial circumstances of both parties. These payments are being
replaced by a more limited set of transition payments and lump
sum payments associated with equitable property divisions in both
property systems.3 0
Many states have laws revoking designations of spouses on
divorce unless the divorce decree or the governing instrument
provides to the contrary. 3 ' The Uniform Probate Code takes this
approach, and treats the divorced spouse as having predeceased
the designator. 32 The apparent presumption is that it is reasonable
to presume that a person is likely to wish to replace his former
spouse as his designee unless he acts to repeal the designation
after the divorce, which may be done in the divorce decree, or in

28. See generally James R. Ratner, Distribution of Marital Assets in
Community Property Jurisdictions:Equitable Doesn't Equal Equal, 72 LA. L.
REV. 21 (2011) (criticizing the lack of standards for these equitable
distribution statutes). Cf. Newcombe, supra note 17, at *4 n.9 (quoting CAL.
FAM. CODE § 2550 (West 2004)) ("[i]n a proceeding for dissolution of
marriage ... the court shall ... divide the community estate of the parties
equally.").
29. See, e.g., Bell, supra note 17, at 795-99 (providing a description of an
implementation of such a system in Mississippi, the last non-community
property state).
30. See generally id. at 799-803. There, however, may be a tax advantage
for making periodic alimony payments. Under Code §§ 72 and 215, the payor
may deduct the payment from his or her income, and the recipient must
include the payment in his or her gross income.
31. See, e.g., N. Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.4 (LEXIS 2012)
(showing an example in an equitable distribution state); REV. CODE WASH.
ANN. § 11.07.010 (2012) (showing an example in a community property state).
Community property states need to deal with this issue because after a
divorce no community property remains, only separate property.
32. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-804 (amended 2008).
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his initial designation. The difficulty with this presumption it that
it is not clear that someone who wants to keep a former spouse as
the designee would realize that it is necessary to repeat the
designation if the person does not prefer the default designee take
following a divorce.
B. Basic ERISA ProvisionsPertinentto Family Law
ERISA governs private pension and welfare plans that are
not church plans.33 However, ERISA applies neither to plans that
are limited to the self-employed or their spouses, 34 nor to
individual retirement accounts ("IRAs") that are not part of an
ERISA pension plan. 35
Five major ERISA provisions govern family law issues.
First, ERISA provides a mechanism to enforce ERISA benefit
entitlements. In particular a participant or a beneficiary has a
right to initiate an action to "recover benefits due to him under the
terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan,
or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the
plan." 3 6 Other ERISA sections determine the extent, if any, to
which plan terms must, or may, incorporate state law.
Second, ERISA regulates spousal survivor benefits. The terms
of certain pension plans must provide for specified spousal
survivor benefits that are available by default.3 7 Moreover, those
plans must disregard spousal waivers of those entitlements rights
that are state law waivers but do not comply with the ERISA
waiver and consent rules, such as prenuptial agreements.38 It
appears that ERISA permits life insurance plans and all other

33. ERISA §§ 4(a), 4(b)(1)-(2), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1003(a), 1003(b)(l)-(2). Church
plans, however, may elect to be covered by ERISA.
34. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3.3(b) (2012).
35. There is no exclusion for IRAs that are part of ERISA plans, such as
Simplified Employee Pension Plans ("SEP Plans") or Simple Retirement
Account Plans, although such plans are exempt from certain provisions of
ERISA, such as the ERISA vesting provisions. ERISA § 201(6), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1051(6). See also ERISA § 4(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1003(c) (providing that individual
retirement accounts that hold only voluntary employee contributions, which
are permitted to be part of qualified plans under section 408(q), are treated as
subject to the fiduciary provisions, enforcement, and preemption provisions as
SEP Plans).
36. ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
37. ERISA §§ 201, 205(b), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1055(b).
38. See, e.g., Hurwitz v. Sher, 982 F.2d 778, 781 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding
that a spouse may not be ordered to comply with a prenuptial waiver and
waive a pension interest after the death of participant). This is a frequently
cited case even though the plan was a one-person plan. Thus, it was not an
ERISA plan. See also Nat'l Auto. Dealers & Assocs. Ret. Trust v. Arbeitman,
89 F.3d 496 (8th Cir. 1996) (reaching the same result for ERISA plan,
including preemption of state court orders directing a participant's spouse to
comply with the waiver).
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ERISA pension plans to provide (1) no survivor benefits,39 (2) only
spousal survivor benefits, or (3) survivor benefits, that may, but
need not, include spousal benefits, and may, but need not, permit
participants to designate beneficiaries. It also appears these plans
may choose whether to respect state law waivers of spousal
benefits.
Third, ERISA regulates DROs. The terms of pension plans
that are required to provide spousal survivor benefits must also
provide that benefits, including survivor benefits, 40 be paid in
accordance with a DRO that is a qualified domestic relations order
("QDRO").41 Such plans may not choose to follow the requirements
of any other DRO,42 other than, perhaps, a requirement that a
spouse has waived a claim to ERISA benefits. 43
Fourth, ERISA requires the terms of those pension plans that
are required to provide spousal survivor benefits to also provide
that plan benefits may not be assigned or alienated.44
Fifth, ERISA preempts state laws related to "any employee
benefit plan."4 5 In particular, unless the plan terms provide to the
contrary, it appears that four major state family law provisions are
preempted:
(1) community property laws, elective share laws, or
revocation on divorce laws, to the extent, if any, the laws relate to
survivor benefits from ERISA pension plans or life insurance
plans; 46
(2) community property laws, to the extent the laws relate to
devisable interests by a participant's spouse if the spouse
predeceases the participant;
(3) waiver laws, to the extent, if any, the laws relate to
survivor benefits from ERISA pension plans or life insurance
plans, which may escape preemption if the resulting waivers are
treated as federal common-law waivers;
(4) laws governing DROs, to the extent, if any, the laws relate
to ERISA pension, disability, or life insurance plans or plan
benefit entitlements.
39. Insurance plans, of course, by definition provide survivor benefits.
40. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(A).
41. ERISA § 206(d)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3).
42. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(A).
43. See Kennedy, 555 U.S. at 288 (holding that because the waiver did not
satisfy the terms of the plan's governing documents, the plan must disregard a
DRO with a waiver). However, the Court explicitly stated it would not address
the effect of the waiver, if the waiver had conformed to the plan terms. Id. at
299 n.10.
44. ERISA § 206(d)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1).
45. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
46. This Article largely disregards health care plans. ERISA § 609, 29
U.S.C. § 1169 requires that such plans provide benefits in accordance with the
terms of DROs that qualify as Qualified Medical Child Support Orders.
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C. Issues About ERISA Family Law Provisions
The acceptance of ERISA myths has resulted in conflicting
decisions and practices pertaining to five major issues. These
issues could be resolved by decisions of the Supreme Court and the
issuance of DOL regulations. Those actions would (1) assure that
family law practice better conforms to the ERISA family
provisions, and (2) reduce the number and cost of disputes about
the meaning of those ERISA provisions.
First, it is not clear which ERISA pension or life insurance
benefit plans must follow a DRO satisfying QDRO-like conditions.
It appears that only pension plans required to provide spousal
survivor benefits must do so. However, there are many decisions to
the contrary. There is also considerable controversy about the
meaning of the QDRO requirements even for pension plans
required to provide spousal survivor benefits.
Second, it is not clear under which conditions, if any, pension
and life insurance plans must give effect to benefit waivers in
DROs, and what effects they must give to such waivers.
Third, it is not clear how DROs affect the rights of ERISA
plan participants and beneficiaries to retain plan benefits. It
appears that persons, who have received from the plan the plan
benefit to which they are entitled, may not be required to pay any
portion of the benefit to a person claiming entitlement to such
portion under a DRO. Again, there are many decisions to the
contrary.
Fourth, there is little case law about the effects of state
community law on ERISA plan distributions during the marriage,
state elective laws on ERISA plans.
Fifth, it is not clear which roles ERISA plans, federal courts,
and state courts play in implementing ERISA's family law
provisions. There are five major procedural questions:
(1) How may a person obtain the information about a
participant's plan benefits or the plan's procedures pertaining to
preparing a QDRO, if the participant is unwilling to direct the
plan to provide such information, and the plan is unwilling to do
so without such direction? The DOL online booklet entitled,
"QDROs- the Division of Pensions Through Qualified Domestics
Relations Orders" 4 7 ("DOL QDRO Guide") does not encourage a
plan to distribute the plan's QDRO requirements and procedures
until after a person has submitted a DRO for review. Such late
distribution would appear to be rather inefficient.
(2) To what extent, if any, may a person seeking to prepare a
47. QDROs: The Division of Pensions Through Qualified Domestic
Relations Orders,U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMP. BENEFITS SEC. BENEFITS ADMIN.
2-1, http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/publications/qdros.html (last visited Aug. 13,
2012) [hereinafter DOL QDRO GUIDE].
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DRO, or preparing a DRO, prevent the participant from rendering
the qualified DRO moot, in whole or in part?
(3) To what extent, if any, are plans responsible for deciding if
a person has a benefit entitlement if there is a family law dispute
about the entitlement? If the plan is responsible for making such
determination, must it use procedures similar to the claims
procedure rules? 48
(4) To what extent may state courts decide ERISA family law
issues or issue ERISA family law orders?
(5) What recourse does a person with a benefit entitlement
pursuant to the terms of a DRO have if the plan administrator has
paid such benefits to another person, and when may the plan
avoid double payment liability in such a case?4 9
IV. PRE-ERISA FAMILY LAW SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
Two sections of the U.S. Constitution are particularly
relevant even though the Constitution never explicitly addresses
either domestic relations law or family law. First, the full faith
and credit section5 o provides that "Full Faith and Credit shall be
given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial
Proceedings of every other State." Second, the Supremacy Clause
provides that the federal law is the supreme law of the land and
the "Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding." 51 The Supreme Court has invoked both to
address family law issues starting in the mid-nineteenth century
and continuing into the twenty-first century.
A. JurisdictionDecisionsApplying the U.S. Constitution While
Expressing Deference to State Domestic Relations Law
The Supreme Court has always expressed a strong desire to
keep the federal courts out of domestic relations disputes, but did
not hesitate to decide if there were conflicting state law holdings,
which governed, although it rarely does so at this time. 52 The
48. See 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1 (2012) (setting forth benefit claims
procedures).
49. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(I), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(I), provides relief to plans
subject to the QDRO requirements similar to those available when spousal
benefits are paid to the wrong person. Cf. ERISA § 205(c)(6), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1055(c)(6) (setting forth the circumstances under which a plan is discharged
from liability).
50. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
51. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
52. See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 176-77, 185 (1988)
(explaining that the Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act of 1980 requires
states to afford full faith and credit to valid child custody determinations
entered by a sister state's courts, but does not give federal courts jurisdiction
over such determinations).
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Court's most recent decision provided that federal courts may
exercise diversity jurisdiction over domestic relations disputes if
the litigants were not seeking divorce, alimony, and child custody
decrees.
For example, in 1858, the Court in its first such decision,
Barber v. Barber,53 declared, "[w]e disclaim altogether any
jurisdiction in the courts of the United States upon the subject of
divorce, or for the allowance of alimony. . . ."54 A divided court,
however, concluded that the federal courts had diversity
jurisdiction to decide a family law question.55 Thus, the Court
could and did apply the full faith and credit provision of the
Constitution to enforce a New York alimony judgment against a
New Yorker who became a Wisconsin resident, and tried to defeat
the judgment by obtaining a Wisconsin divorce that provided for
no alimony.56 In 1890, in Ex Parte Burrus,5 7 the Court ruled that a
father could not use a federal writ of habeas corpus to obtain
custody of his infant son from the parents of his deceased wife.58
The Court held that the father alleged no breach of a federal law,
thus, no such writ was available.5 9 The Court expanded its Barber
statement about the inapplicability of federal law to domestic
relations to the following: "[t]he whole subject of the domestic
relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the
laws of the States and not to the laws of the United States." 60
Moreover, the Court held that federal courts could not use
diversity jurisdiction to decide child custody disputes.6 1 On the
other hand, in the twenty-first century the Court used the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect parental
rights from being unduly restricted by family law and other state
law. 62
6 3 the Supreme Court
In 1945, in Williams v. North Carolina,
cited Burrus and made a similar statement:
The problem is to reconcile the reciprocal respect to be accorded by
53. Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. 582 (1858).
54. Id. at 584.
55. Id. at 583.
56. Id. at 599.
57. Ex Parte Burrus, 136 U.S. 586 (1890).
58. Id. at 596-97.
59. Id. at 589-93.
60. Id. at 593-94. This quote also appears in Williams v. North Carolina,
325 U.S. 226, 233 (1945), in the context of a similar statement.
61. Burrus, 136 U.S. at 596-97.
62. See, e.g., Troxell v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 72-74 (2000) (preempting a
Washington state law presumption in favor of grandparent visitation rights).
The decision contains a good discussion of similar decisions. Id. at 65-66.
63. Williams, 325 U.S. 226. In contrast, there had been no challenge of the
domicile claims of the same parties in Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S.

287 (1942).
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the members of the Union to their adjudications with due regard for
another most important aspect of our federalism whereby the
domestic relations of husband and wife .. . were matters reserved to
64
the States . . . and do not belong to the United States.

The Court again decided it had jurisdiction, but this time it
decided that the full faith and credit provision was inapplicable to
the first divorce. The Court held that North Carolina could find
that two of its residents were not domiciled in Nevada when they
obtained a divorce from such state.65 Thus, the full faith and credit
provision did not require North Carolina to respect the divorce
issued by Nevada because the Court held Nevada lacked
66
jurisdiction to issue the divorce.
Finally, in 1992, in Ankenbrandt v. Richards,6 7 the Court first
observed that the U.S. Constitution did not prevent the federal
courts from exercising jurisdiction over domestic relations
disputes.66 The Court then discussed the extent to which Burrus
limits federal jurisdiction, as follows:
Although In re Burrus technically did not involve a construction of
the diversity statute, as we understand Barber to have done, its
statement that "the whole subject of the domestic relations of
husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the
States and not to the laws of the United States," . . . Id., at 593-94,
has been interpreted by the federal courts to apply with equal vigor
in suits brought pursuant to diversity jurisdiction. See, e.g., Bennett
v. Bennett, 221 U.S. App. D.C. 90, 93, 682 F.2d 1039, 1042 (1982);
Solomon v. Solomon, 516 F.2d 1018, 1025 (CA3 1975); Hernstadt v.
Hernstadt, 373 F.2d 316, 317 (CA2 1967); see generally 13B C.
Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 3609, pp. 477-479, nn. 28-32 (1984). This application is consistent
with Barber's directive to limit federal courts' exercise of diversity
jurisdiction over suits for divorce and alimony decrees. See Barber,
21 HOW at 584. We conclude, therefore, that the domestic relations
exception, as articulated by this Court since Barber, divests the
federal courts of power to issue divorce, alimony, and child custody

decrees.69
Thus, the Court concluded that federal courts had diversity

64. Williams, 325 U.S. at 232-33 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting
Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379, 383-84 (1930)) (citing In re Burrus, 136 U.S. at
593-94). In Popovici, the Court held that the federal courts lacked jurisdiction
to conduct divorce proceedings between a Romanian diplomat and his
American wife. Popovici, 280 U.S. at 383-84.
65.

Williams, 325 U.S. at 239.

66. Id. The significance of this decision and its progeny is discussed in
detail by Ann Laquer Estin, Family Law Federalism: Divorce and the
Constitution, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 381 (2007).

67. Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689 (1992).
68. Id. at 696.
69. Id. at 703 (emphasis added).
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jurisdiction to decide whether a mother, who was a Missouri
citizen acting on behalf of her daughters was entitled to damages
for the alleged tort of child abuse by their father and his female
companion, who were citizens of Louisiana. 70
B. Early Twentieth-Century DecisionsRegarding the Treatment of
Alimony Judgments by Federal Statutes and the Preemption of
State Family Law by a FederalPropertyEntitlement
In the early twentieth century, the Supreme Court held that
federal bankruptcy law did not treat a state law alimony judgment
as a dischargeable ordinary debt.7 1 The Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia reached a similar decision with respect to
how another federal debtor protection statute treated a federal
alimony judgment. On the other hand, the Supreme Court held
that a federal property entitlement preempted a state family law
claim both before and after the transfer of the property.
In 1904 in Wetmore v. Markoe,72 the Supreme Court ruled
unanimously that a state law alimony obligation was not
discharged in bankruptcy because
[u]nless positively required by direct enactment, the courts should

not presume
unfortunate
enforcement
husband to
children.73

a design upon the part of Congress, in relieving the
debtor, to make the law a means of avoiding
of the obligation, moral and legal, devolved upon the
support his wife and to maintain and educate his

Thus, this was a statutory interpretation decision, namely
whether Congress permitted and intended to permit an individual
to use bankruptcy law to avoid a non-modifiable family support
judgment. The Court never used the word "preempt." Nor did it
refer to the relation between federal law and family law in
general. Instead, it resolved the question by focusing solely on the
meaning of the statutory term "debt."74 Moreover, the Court
previously held that traditional alimony payment obligations,
which are subject to change depending on the circumstances of the
parties, 7 5 could not be avoided by bankruptcy.7 6 The Court saw no
reason to distinguish the prior decision's reasoning. In particular,
debts from business transactions or contracts may be discharged
in bankruptcy. However, family support obligations do not arise in

70. Id. at 704.
71. Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 74 (1904).
72. Id. at 68.
73. Id. at 77 (emphasis added).
74. Id. at 72.
75. See generally Bell, supra note 17, at 799-800 (stating that the fixed
obligation was in the original decree pursuant to New York law).
76. Audubon v. Shufeldt, 181 U.S. 575 (1901).
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that manner; thus, they may not be so discharged.7 7
In 1940, in Schlaefer v. Schlaefer,78 the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit similarly held that disability
payments were subject to execution for an alimony judgment. The
Life Insurance Act Disability Insurance Code for the District of
Columbia, a federal statute exempted the disability payments
from process to pay any debt or liability of the insured.79 The
alimony judgment was entered under the District of Columbia
family law, which again would have been a federal statute.80 The
Court rejected the exemption claim using language similar to that
in Wetmore-"[t]he obligation on which appellant's claim is based
is not a 'debt' or a 'liability' in the ordinary usages of those terms.
It is a duty of higher obligation. As has been said, it is not one
within the usual purposes of exemption statutes."8 1 Thus, the
discussion following the quote addressed the interpretation of
similar state exemption statutes rather than any preemption
issues.82
On the other hand, in 1905, in McCune v. Essig,8 3 the
Supreme Court ruled unanimously that the federal homestead
law, rather than Washington state community property law,
determined title to federal property that the decedent was
establishing by homesteading it when he died, i.e., the federal law
preempted the state family law.84 This was the Court's first
apparent family law preemption decision.8 5 The Court held that
federal law provides that title to U.S. property is not encumbered
by any state claims before or after the title transfer. The Court
first quoted an excerpt of the following from an earlier decision of
the Court:
We hold the true principle to be this, that whenever the question in
any Court, state or federal, is, whether a title to land which had once
been the property of the United States has passed, that question must
be resolved by the laws of the United States; but that whenever,
77. Wetmore, 196 U.S. at 72-76.
78. Schlaefer v. Schlaefer, 112 F.2d 177 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
79. Id. at 179.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 186.
82. Id. at 186-88.
83. McCune v. Essig, 199 U.S. 382 (1905).
84. Id. at 390 (citing Wilcox v. Jackson, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 498, 517 (1839))
(holding a conveyance of part of Ft. Dearborn in Cook County, Illinois not
subject to the state encumbrance)).
85. But see The Constitution of the United States of America Analysis and
Interpretation, S. Doc. NO. 108-17, at 2163-324 (2002), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-CONAN-2002/pdf/GPO-CONAN-2002.pdf;
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-CONAN-2010/pdfGPO-CONAN-2010.pdf
(2010 Supplement) (chronological list of all state laws that Court has held to
be preempted does not show an earlier family law preemption decision, but
also does not list Essen).
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according to those laws, the title shall have passed, then that
property, like all other property in the state, is subject to state
legislation; so far as that legislation is consistent with the admission
that the title passed and vested according to the laws of the United
States.86
Moreover, the Court dismissed the homesteader's daughter's
alchemy argument that she had an enforceable community
property right that appeared as if by magic immediately after title
passed to the homesteader's widow pursuant to the federal
homestead law:
But, it is contended, that a beneficial interest having been created
by the state law in McCune when the title passed out of the United
States by the patent, it "instantly dropped back in time to the
inception or initiation of the equitable right of William McCune, and
that the laws of the State intercepted and prevented the widow from
having a complete title without first complying with the probate
laws of the State." This, however, is but another way of asserting
the law of the State against the law of the United States, and
imposing a limitation upon the title of the widow which section 2291
of the Revised Statutes does not impose.87
Thus, the Court held that state law claims that arise after the
transfer, such as failure to pay a rental obligation, may encumber
the transferred federal property, but a superseded state law
ownership claim to the transferred property may not do the same.

C. Pre-ERISA Decisions-FederalBenefit Entitlements Preempt
State Family Law
Starting in 1950 and continuing to the present, the Court
substantially broadened the scope of federal entitlements that
would be transferred without any encumbrance by state family
law. The Court consistently held that the owner of a benefit
entitlement could obtain and keep payments to which he or she
was entitled under federal law as opposed to a person who
asserted a state family law claim to such benefits. As discussed,
infra, the Court reached the same conclusion with respect to
ERISA benefit entitlements after reversing one decision to the
contrary in response to congressional legislation.
88
In 1950, the Supreme Court decided in Wissner v. Wissner
that a soldier's parents and designated beneficiaries were entitled
to receive and retain all the proceeds from a life insurance policy
under the National Service Life Insurance Act of 1940.89 His

86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655 (1950).

89. Id. at 658-59.
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widow, from whom he was estranged throughout his military
service, was not permitted to obtain the proceeds from his parents,
even though he used community property to pay the policy
premiums.90 The Court declared that:
The controlling section of the Act provides that the insured "shall
have the right to designate the beneficiary or beneficiaries of the
insurance [within a designated class] . . . and shall . .. at all times
have the right to change the beneficiary or beneficiaries. . . ." Thus

Congress has spoken with force and clarity in directing that the
proceeds belong to the named beneficiary and no other.9'
The three dissenters argued that there was an implicit exception
to such mandate in the eight community property states. 92 In such
states, they asserted that the soldier may only decide upon the
disposition of his half of the insurance policy if the premiums were
paid with the compensation earned by the soldier during the
marriage, as occurred in this case. 93 This is a consequence of the
community property presumption that spouses have equal
ownership rights to the compensation earned by either during the
marriage.94 Consequently, the dissent argued the spouse is
entitled to half of the life insurance proceeds in this case.
The majority held there was no implicit community law
exemption to the designation mandate; thus, the widow's
community property rights were preempted.95 The majority also
rejected the assertion that even if the U.S. military was required
to pay the designated beneficiaries, the soldier's widow was
entitled to obtain the proceeds from the designees under the
community property rules. In addition to the above benefit
mandate the majority pointed to the "flat conflict" of such an
assertion with the statutory provision that "[p]ayments to the
named beneficiary 'shall be exempt from the claims of creditors,
and shall not be liable to attachment, levy, or seizure by or under
any legal or equitable process whatever, either before or after
receipt by the beneficiary. . . ."'96 Unlike the Schlaeffer statute at
issue, supra, this statute protected the beneficiary rather than the
participant, and protected payments received by the beneficiary
from process.
The majority rejected three other arguments presented by the
dissent. The dissent argued that many decisions held that family
support claims were not preempted by anti-alienation language

90. Id.
91. Id. at 659 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 802(g) (2006)).

92. Id. at 661-64 (Minton, J., dissenting).
93.
94.

Id. at 661-62 (Minton, J., dissenting).
Id. (Minton, J., dissenting).

95. Id. at 659-60.
96. Id. at 659.
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such as that under consideration.97 The majority responded that
family support was not at issue in this case and community
property claims rest on business relations between the spouses
rather than the moral obligations upon which family support
rested.98 The dissent also argued that the function of the antialienation provision was to protect the government insurance fund
from attachments rather than to protect the beneficiaries.9 9
Finally, the dissent stated that Congress could not have intended
to permit a soldier to defraud his wife by using community
property to purchase a life insurance policy whose benefits did not
go to her. 100 The majority responded to the final two arguments
with its above statement about the clarity of the statutory
language.101
The Court concluded by describing the federal interest that is
served by the statute,102 which would appear to apply, mutatis
mutandis, if the insurance were provided not to a serviceman, but
to a private employee whose entitlement to life insurance was
determined by federal law, such as ERISA, as follows:
Possession of government insurance, payable to the relative of his
choice, might well directly enhance the morale of the serviceman.
The exemption provision is his guarantee of the complete and full
performance of the contract to the exclusion of conflicting claims.
The end is a legitimate one within the congressional powers over
national defense, and the means are adapted to the chosen end.1o3
The Supreme Court in Free v. Bland,104 decided in 1962,
without dissent, 0 5 that a surviving spouse, rather than the
decedent's sole heir and son from an earlier marriage, was entitled
to full ownership of a savings bond that had been acquired with
community property and had been issued in the name of both
spouses with an "or" between the names. Under the relevant
federal regulations such designation provided that "[ilf either
coowner dies without the bond having been presented and
surrendered for payment or authorized reissue, the survivor will

97. Id. at 663 n.2 (Minton, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 659-60. The only federal case cited, Schlaefer, did not discuss the
federal preemption issue, but the interaction of two D.C. statutes. Schlaefer,
112 F.3d at 177.
99. Id. at 664 (Minton, J., dissenting). This is contradicted by the
application of the anti-alienation provision on its face to distributed benefits.
100. Id. at 663 (Minton, J., dissenting).
101. Id. (Minton, J., dissenting).
102. See William L. Lynch, Note, A Framework for Preemption Analysis, 88
YALE L.J. 363, 382-84 (1978) (describing this federal interest as a federal
objective of the statute).
103. Wissner, 338 U.S. at 660-61.
104. Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962).
105. Two of the justices did not participate in the decision. Id. at 671.
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be recognized as the sole and absolute owner."to The Court
summarily dismissed the relevance of state family law with the
following description of conflict preemption, i.e., the effect of the
supremacy clause in the U.S. Constitution, as follows:
The relative importance to the State of its own law is not material
when there is a conflict with a valid federal law, for the Framers of
our Constitution provided that the federal law must prevail. Article
VI, Clause 2. This principle was made clear by Chief Justice
Marshall when he stated for the Court that any state law, however
clearly within a State's acknowledged power, which interferes with
or is contrary to federal law, must yield. 107
In particular, the survivorship provision was a federal law, which
as held in Wissner, must prevail over any conflicting state law,
such as the community property provision at issue that attempted
to supersede the survivorship provision.10 8 Thus, the decedent's
son was not entitled to have the decedent's bond interest
transferred directly to him by the federal government as of the
date of the death of the decedent.
Under the Free reasoning, there would be similar preemption
of state right of election statutes that include federal savings
bonds and other obligations that pass by right of survivorship in
the elective estate, such as that in New York.109 In particular, the
state law could not affect the right of the survivor to receive the
proceeds of the federal obligation. Nor could the survivor be
required to give up any other property so that a surviving spouse
would receive the statutory elective share.
The Court, as it did in McCune and Wissner, held that the
decedent's son was also not entitled indirectly to the decedent's
interest in the bond, i.e., he had no right to obtain the value of the
inherited bond from the surviving spouse. The Court, as it did in
McCune and Wissner, focused on the beneficiary designation
resulting from the joint title:
Notwithstanding this [survivorship] provision, the State awarded
full title to the co-owner but required him to account for half of the
value of the bonds to the decedent's estate. Viewed realistically, the
State has rendered applicable award of title meaningless. Making
the bonds security for the payment confirms the accuracy of this
view. If the State can frustrate the parties' attempt to use the bonds'
survivorship provision through the simple expedient of requiring the
survivor to reimburse the estate of the deceased co-owner as a
matter of law, the State has interfered directly with a legitimate
exercise of the power of the Federal Government to borrow

106. Id. at 668 n.4.

107. Id. at 667 (citations omitted).
108. Id. at 668.
109. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.1-A(b)(3).
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money.110

In 1966, the Supreme Court in United States v. Yazell, 1 'u

decided, in apparent contrast, that the United States could not
collect a debt from a wife who had not obtained the court approval
required under the Texas coverture law to enter into the
individually designed and negotiated SBA loan. The Court
declared:
We do not here consider the question of the constitutional power of
the Congress to override state law in these circumstances by direct
legislation or by appropriate authorization to an administrative
agency coupled with suitable implementing action by the agency. We
decide only that this Court, in the absence of specific congressional
action, should not decree in this situation that implementation of
federal interests requires overriding the particularstate rule involved
here. Both theory and the precedents of this Court teach us
solicitude for state interests, particularly in the field of family and
family-property arrangements. They should be overridden by the
federal courts only where clear and substantial interests of the
National Government, which cannot be served consistently with
respect for such state interests, will suffer major damage if the state
law is applied.112
This decision to find no federal preemption is consistent with both
Wissner and Free. The Court distinguished Wissner, in which the
Court observed that it had held the state property law at issue was
"in derogation of the federal statutory policy that soldiers have an

absolute right to name the beneficiary of their National Service
Life Insurance [the requisite 'federal interest']."113 Moreover, the
Court also implicitly distinguished Free by stating that "[t]his
Court's decisions applying 'federal law' to supersede state law
typically relate to programs and actions which by their nature are
and must be uniform in character throughout the Nation." 14 The
Court gave as an example, the remedial rights on federal
commercial paper. The same reasoning would apply to
entitlements under federal savings bonds and the subsequently
enacted uniform ERISA rules. In contrast, the SBA loans at issue
were individually negotiated, required by the SBA rules to
conform to the relevant state law, and the SBA judgment remedies

were limited to those generally provided by state law.115

110. Id.
111. United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966).

112. Id. at 352 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
113. Id. at 353.
114. Id. at 354.
115. Id. at 354-58.
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D. Summary of Relation of State Family Law to Employee Benefit
Plans Immediately Before the Adoption of ERISA
A participant's spouse has no entitlement to survivor benefits
unless the pension plan provides such benefits, and the participant
does not waive those benefits. Life insurance plans need not
provide any spousal benefits. State community property laws,
state election laws, and state revocation of designations upon
divorces may change who obtains and may retain survivor
benefits, if any.
DROs determine benefit entitlements for life insurance plans,
disability plans, and pension plans. There seems to be no limits on
the extent to which DROs may change plan benefit entitlements,
rather than other entitlements. However, any changes required by
a DRO that violate the plan terms may cause a pension plan to
lose its tax qualification.
V. THE Focus ON THE PAYMENT OF FAMILY SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS
BY CONGRESS AND THE SUPREME COURT IN THE 1970s

Both Congress and the Supreme Court devoted considerable
attention to the payment of alimony and child support in the
1970s. Congress provided that alimony and child support
obligations could be enforced against federal employees and
retirees. The Supreme Court held that alimony could not be
restricted to women.
In January 1975, Congress enacted the "Social Services
Amendments of 1974,"116 and thereby added a new Part D to

Section IV of the Social Security Act ("SSA") entitled, "Child
Support and Establishment of Paternity."117 In that section,
Congress provided that the federal government would permit child
support and alimony obligations to be enforced against its
payments to federal employees as follows:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, effective January 1,
1975, moneys (the entitlement to which is based upon remuneration
for employment) due from, or payable by, the United States
(including any agency or instrumentality thereof and any wholly
owned Federal corporation) to any individual, including members of
the armed services, shall be subject, in like manner and to the same
extent as if the United States were a private person, to legal process
brought for the enforcement, against such individual of his legal
obligations to provide child support or make alimony payments.1 18
This section would have no effect on Wissner situations because
that claim was not for child support or alimony.
116. Social Services Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-647, 88 Stat. 2337
(1975).

117. Id. § 101.
118. 42 U.S.C. § 659, Social Security Act § 462 (2006) [hereinafter SSA].
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Thus, within months of enacting ERISA with nary a word
about DROs, Congress addressed the interaction between DROs
and federal entitlements stemming from employee benefit
payments by the federal government, which are not covered by
ERISA. In particular, Congress provided for deference to the
provisions of DROs requiring periodic payments of support and
maintenance obligations but not for provisions requiring other
payments. Thus, as discussed in Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo,119 the
Supreme Court concluded that the DRO providing for payments of
community property obligations was preempted for payments
under the Railway Retirement Act. 120 Those payments were
covered by the SSA because those payments were apparently made
by a federal agency. Despite the lack of such provision, many
courts as discussed, infra, nevertheless took a far more deferential
approach to state law with respect to ERISA benefit entitlements
before the enactment of REACT.
There were many ambiguities about the implementation of
the child support sections of the Social Security Act. 121 Thus, in
1977, Congress amended the Social Security Act in Title V (the
final Title) of the Tax Reduction and Simplification Act of 1977122
to add definitions and detailed implementation instructions. The
definitions included the following definition of alimony, which
clarified that the statute was inapplicable to property settlements
pursuant to state family law:
(c) The term "alimony", when used in reference to the legal
obligations of an individual to provide the same, means periodic
payments of funds for the support and maintenance of the spouse (or
former spouse) of such individual, and (subject to and in accordance
with State law) includes but is not limited to, separate maintenance,
alimony pendente lite, maintenance, and spousal support; such term
also includes attorney's fees, interest, and court costs when and to
the extent that the same are expressly made recoverable as such
pursuant to a decree, order, judgment issued in accordance with
applicable State law by a court of competent jurisdiction. Such term
does not include any payment or transfer of property or its value by
an individual to his spouse or former spouse in compliance with any
community property settlement, equitable distributionof property, or
other division of property between spouses or former spouses.123

119. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979), superseded by statute,
Pub. L. No. 98-76, tit. IV, § 419(a), 97 Stat. 411, 438 (1983).
120. Id. at 590.

121. This provision did not seem to make social security payments subject to
these support obligations, although as discussed, infra, that would change at
about the time that REACT was enacted.
122. Tax Reduction and Simplification Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-30, 91
Stat. 126 (1977).

123. 42 U.S.C. § 662, SSA § 462 (emphasis added). This section was later
revised without changing its meaning, and added to the end of 42 U.S.C.
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In the same year, Congress further enhanced the social security
benefits for a divorced spouse of an individual entitled to social
security benefits by reducing the minimum period of marriage for
a divorced spouse to obtain spousal benefits based on the
124
individual's social security benefits from twenty to ten years.
ERISA has always only permitted plans to require at most one
year of marriage. 125
In 1979, in Orr v. Orr,126 the Supreme Court held that the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment preempted
127
the Alabama alimony statute that restricted alimony to women.
The Court made no mention of the Burrus or Barber deference to
domestic relations law. The Court determined that the statute did
not satisfy the standard equal protection criteria: "classifications
by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must
128
be substantially related to achievement of those objectives."
129
the Supreme Court
In 1980, in Santosky v. Kramer,
of the Fourteenth
Clause
Process
Due
the
held
similarly
Amendment preempted a New York statute terminating parental
rights if a child is permanently neglected. The majority explained
why the traditional deference to family law was inappropriate:
The dissent's claim that today's decision "will inevitably lead to the
federalization of family law," post, at 773, is, of course, vastly
overstated. As the dissent properly notes, the Court's duty to
"[refrain] from interfering with state answers to domestic relations
questions" has never required "that the Court should blink at clear
130
constitutional violations in state statutes."
VI. ERISA AS INITIALLY ENACTED IN 1974
ERISA Section 2: Congressional Findings and Declaration of Policy
(a) The Congress finds that the growth in size, scope, and numbers
of employee benefit plans in recent years has been rapid and
substantial; that the operational scope and economic impact of such
plans is increasingly interstate; that the continued well-being and

security of millions of employees and their dependents are directly
affected by these plans; that they are affected with a national public
interest; that they have become an important factor affecting the
stability of employment and the successful development of

§ 659, SSA § 459. See Pub. L. No 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105, 2242-46 (1996).
124. Social Security Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-216, § 337, 91
Stat. 1509, 1548 (1977). The Social Security Amendments of 1977 considerably
improved spousal benefits as discussed in Peter W. Martin, Social Security
Benefits for Spouses, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 789 (1978).
125. ERISA § 205(f), 29 U.S.C. § 1055(f).
126. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
127. Id. at 282-83.
128. Id. at 279.
129. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
130. Id. at 768 n.18.
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industrial relations; that they have become an important factor in
commerce because of the interstate character of their activities, and
of the activities of their participants, and the employers, employee
organizations, and other entities by which they are established or
maintained; that a large volume of the activities of such plans are
carried on by means of the mails and instrumentalities of interstate
commerce; that owing to the lack of employee information and
adequate safeguards concerning their operation, it is desirable in the
interests of employees and their beneficiaries, and to provide for the
general welfare and the free flow of commerce, that disclosure be
made and safeguards be provided with respect to the establishment,
operation, and administration of such plans; that they substantially
affect the revenues of the United States because they are afforded
preferential Federal tax treatment; that despite the enormous
growth in such plans many employees with long years of employment
are losing anticipatedretirement benefits owing to the lack of vesting
provisions in such plans; that owing to the inadequacy of current
minimum standards, the soundness and stability of plans with
respect to adequate funds to pay promised benefits may be
endangered; that owing to the termination of plans before requisite
funds have been accumulated, employees and their beneficiarieshave
been deprived of anticipated benefits; and that it is therefore
desirable in the interests of employees and their beneficiaries, for the
protection of the revenue of the United States, and to provide for the
free flow of commerce, that minimum standards be provided
assuring the equitable character of such plans and their financial
soundness.1'1
ERISA's substantive terms were explicitly directed at the
protection of the benefit entitlements of participants and
beneficiaries. The word dependent never appears again in the law.
Moreover, despite the other congressional actions at this time
emphasizing the importance of federal law facilitating the
payment of family support, ERISA is silent about such payments,
domestic relations law, or other aspects of family law.
A.

ERISA's Purpose and Coverage

ERISA was a response to the protests made on behalf of many
employees and their beneficiaries who had been deprived of
anticipated pension and welfare benefits. 132 Under the pre-ERISA
rules, many individuals who qualified for pension or welfare
33
benefits never received their promised benefits because:1
(a) participants and beneficiaries were not generally entitled

§ 2, 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (emphasis added).
132. An excellent history of ERISA may be found at JAMES A.
131. ERISA

WOOTEN, THE
EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974 A POLITICAL HISTORY
(U.C. Press 2004).
133. See, e.g., EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAw lxxix-c (Steven J. Sacher et al. eds.,

BNA Books 2d ed. 2000) [hereinafter EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAw] (providing an

in-depth analysis on employee benefits law).
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to the disclosure of plan terms and conditions, their benefits, or
the financial condition of their plans; (b) no general federal
standards required persons operating such plans to pay promised
benefits or to avoid transactions that would dissipate plan assets;
and
(c) participants and beneficiaries had no federal right to
appeal benefit denials either within the plan or to the courts
unless they participated in certain collectively bargained plans.134
ERISA, which was signed into law on Labor Day of 1974,
protects plan participants and their beneficiaries. A participant is
defined to include any employee or former employee of an
employer who is, or may become, eligible to receive an ERISA plan
benefit, such as a lifetime pension benefit, or whose beneficiaries
may be eligible to receive an ERISA plan benefit, such as survivor
benefits. 3 5 A beneficiary is defined as "a person designated by a
participant, or by the terms of an employee benefit plan, who is, or
may be, entitled to a benefit thereunder." 13 6
Although the congressional declaration of policy refers to a
concern for the "the continued well-being and security of millions
of employees and their dependents," Congress never used the word
"dependents" or "dependent" again in the statute, which is 207
pages. 137 There are instead multiple references in the declaration
and the substantive parts of ERISA to protections for employees,
participants, and beneficiaries. The only protections ERISA
initially offered for dependents are the minimal spousal survivor
provisions discussed, infra. Thus, there is little evidence from the
face of the statute that Congress intended thereby to protect any
other dependents of employees, except to the extent they were plan
beneficiaries. Moreover, as discussed, supra, within months of
enacting ERISA with nary a word about DROs, Congress provided
that DROs may be applied against employee benefit payments by
the federal government, which plans are not covered by ERISA.
Moreover, neither the declaration of policy nor the statute
expresses a concern about the administrative burdens being placed
on employee plans by ERISA, although as discussed, infra, the
134. Benefit denials by collectively bargained plans administered jointly by
representatives of the union and the employer or employers could be
challenged as being violations of section 302 of the National Labor Relations
Act, 20 U.S.C. § 186. This section permits the establishment and operation of
jointly administered employee benefit plans. Claimants, however, had to show
the determination was arbitrary and capricious. There was also no protection
against employer retaliation. Cf. Firestone Tire & Rubber v. Bruch, 489 U.S.
101, 108-11 (1989) (rejecting this standard of review for ERISA benefit
denials).
135. ERISA § 3(7), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7).
136. ERISA § 3(8), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(8).
137. Cf. ERISA § 2(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (lacking any further reference to
the dependent reference in Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat 829-1035 (1974)).

664

The John Marshall Law Review

[45:635

courts repeatedly express such concern.
ERISA does not regulate all employer plans. Governmental
plans are not subject to ERISA.1s Church plans are also not
subject to ERISA unless the plans elect to be covered. 139 Moreover,
ERISA does not apply to employee benefit plans whose only
participants are the owners and the spouses of the owners of the
trade or business sponsoring the plan.140 It is irrelevant whether
the plan sponsor of such a plan is a corporation, a partnership, or
an incorporated entity.141 ERISA does not apply to IRAs that are
not part of an ERISA pension plan, but applies to IRAs that are
part of a pension plans.
ERISA applies to (1) pension plans,142 which include profitsharing and 401(k) plans, and (2) welfare plans,143 which include
medical, disability, life insurance and severance plans. For
simplicity, all such plans by covered employers will be herein
denoted as ERISA plans.
ERISA does not require employers to establish any ERISA
plans, but ERISA imposes minimum standards on the
establishment and operation of any covered employee benefit plans
that covered employers choose to adopt. 144

138. ERISA § 4(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1).
139. ERISA § 4(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(2).
140. 29 C.F.R. §§ 2510.3-3(b), (c). If there are other participants, then the
owner and the owner's spouse are provided with the ERISA protections such
as the protection of pension plan assets of a bankrupt participant. Yates M.D.,
P.C. Profit Sharing Plan v. Hendon, 541 U.S. 1, 4-5 (2004).
141. 29 C.F.R. §§ 2510.3-3(b), (c).
142. Pension plans are generally defined as plans that provide retirement
income to employees or result in the deferral of income by employees for
periods extending to the termination of covered employment; although, under
certain circumstances, severance plan arrangements are treated as welfare
plans rather than as pension plans. ERISA § 3(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2).
Employees may, but need not, be able to obtain distributions from pension
plans before the termination of employment. Profit-sharing plans often permit
such in-service distributions, although tax-qualified 401(k) plans may only
permit the in-service distribution of employee contributions. However, certain
unfunded pension plans, known as excess benefit plans, are excluded from
ERISA coverage. ERISA § (4)(b)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(5).
143. Welfare plans are generally defined as plans that provide participants
or their beneficiaries with medical, surgical, or hospital care, or benefits in the
event of sickness, accident, disability, death or unemployment, or vacation
benefits, apprenticeship or other training programs, or day care centers,
scholarship funds or prepaid legal services. ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1).
These plans do not include payroll practices, such as sick pay, holiday pay,
jury pay or overtime. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-1(b)(3). See generally Mass. v.
Morash, 490 U.S. 107 (1989) (distinguishing ERISA covered welfare benefit
plans from the customary unfunded vacation benefit plans, which are not
covered by ERISA).
144. See, e.g., Esden v. Bank of Bos., 229 F.3d 154, 172 (2d Cir. 2000)
(providing that employer pension plan benefits may not be forfeited). Some of
these standards do not, however, apply to unfunded plans that are maintained
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Many, but not all, pension plans try to satisfy the tax
qualification rules of sections 401 or 403 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986, as amended (the "Code") and thereby qualify for
favorable tax consequences. 145 Those rules, which are often similar
to those of ERISA, are administered by the Internal Revenue
Service (the "Service"). The Service issues determinations about
the tax-qualification of pension plans. These rules are not always
the same as required for ERISA compliance. For example, the
Service may find that an amendment satisfies the qualification
rules while declining to express an opinion on its ERISA
compliance. 146 Thus, such an amendment may be ineffective
because it violates ERISA. 147 A qualified pension plan may also
violate ERISA requirements that are not part of the qualification
rules, such as the additional disclosure requirements 148 and claims
processing requirements. 149 On the other hand, pension plans may,
but need not be drafted, 15 0 so that they incorporate the Code's
qualification rules, and create benefit entitlements based on such
rules. 15 1 In contrast, plans confined to owner-employees may be
tax-qualified, but not be regulated by ERISA.

primarily for the purpose of providing deferred compensation for a select group
of management or highly compensated employees. ERISA §§ 201(2), 301(a)(3),
401(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051(2), 1081(a)(3), 1101(a)(1). Those plans are often
called top-hat plans. See e.g., Daft v. Advest, Inc., 658 F.3d 583, 594-95 (6th
Cir. 2011) (discussing the standard of review of top-hat determinations by plan
administration, particularly their select group nature); In re IT Grp., Inc., 448
F.3d 661, 667-69 (3d Cir. 2006) (discussing the characteristics of such plans,
particularly their unfunded nature). Such plans are often called non-qualified
because they do not qualify for the favorable tax treatment that is generally
provided to ERISA deferred compensation plans.
145. Albert Feuer, Qualified Retirement and Deferred Comp Plan Death
Benefits and Estate Planning, 72 TAXES 255, 256-58 (1984) [hereinafter
Qualified Retirement Plans].
146. See Swede v. Rochester Carpenters Pension Fund, 467 F.3d 216, 221-22
(2d Cir. 2006) (discussing this distinction).
147. See id. at 221 (holding that the Supreme Court's ruling in Central
Laborers' Pension Fund v. Heinz, 541 U.S. 739, 746-48 (2009), invalidating
post-retirement suspension of benefit provision was retroactive under ERISA,
notwithstanding contrary ruling in IRS Rev. Proc. 2005-23, 2005-1 C.B. 991,
with respect to the tax qualification of those same provisions).
148. See, e.g., ERISA § 102, 29 U.S.C. § 1022 (setting forth the substantive
and distribution requirements for a summary plan description).
149. ERISA § 503, 29 U.S.C. § 1133.
150. See, e.g., Edes v. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc., 417 F.3d 133, 143-44 (1st Cir.
2005) (holding that a discriminatory classification of employees eligible to
participate in the plan may violate the qualification rules but need not violate
the plan's governing documents).
151. For example, pension plans may explicitly incorporate qualification
rules, which are not part of the ERISA rules, such as the non-discrimination
rules. In Edes, the plaintiffs failed to timely argue that the plan included a
requirement that it must "comply with Treasury regulations governing
qualification for preferred tax status." Id. at 144 n.13.
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Defined contribution pension plans [hereinafter DC Plans]152
are pension plans in which each participant has an individual
account.153 DC plans include money purchase pension plans,154
profit-sharing plans, 5 5 and 401(k) plans.15 6 A participant's
benefits in a DC plan are expressed in the form of a lump sum
equal to the value of the participant's account at the time at issue.
The plan terms may, however, permit benefits to be paid in a form
other than a lump sum, such as a life annuity beginning either at
once or at some future time.
Defined benefit pension plans [hereinafter DB Plans]15 7 are
pension plans in which participants do not have individual
accounts.15 8 A participant's benefits in DB plans are expressed in
the form of a life annuity beginning at the participant's normal
retirement age.15 9 The annuity is called the participant's normal
152. ERISA § 3(34), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34). A participant's benefits in such
plans are based solely upon the sum of: (1) the amounts contributed to the
participant's account and any income, expenses, gains, and losses; and (2) any
forfeitures of other participants' accounts allocated to such participant's
account. All investment risk is placed on the participant, who benefits from
investment gains and suffers from investment losses. Thus, a participant's
accrued benefits, namely the participant's account balance, may either
increase or decrease in the course of a year. Benefits may be and are usually
made available on a participant's termination of employment. Distributions
may be also permitted prior to the termination of such employment.
153. It is also possible for welfare plans to provide participants with
individual accounts such as flexible spending arrangements or cafeteria plans
which permit participants to allocate fixed amounts among a set of welfare
benefits.
154. Plans in which the annual contributions are fixed by a plan formula.
Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(1)(i).
155. Plans in which the annual contributions are not fixed by a plan
formula but need not be based on profits. Id. § 1.401-1(b)(1)(ii); I.R.C.
§ 401(a)(27) (2010).
156. Plans in which employees may make pre-tax contributions of part of
their compensation to the plan pursuant to the terms of I.R.C. § 401(k) and the
regulations thereunder.
157. ERISA § 3(35), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(35).
158. But see Jennifer Staman & Erika Lunder, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS
22214, CASH BALANCE PENSION PLANS-SELECTED LEGAL ISSUES 1-2 (updated
May 16, 2008), available at http://aging.senate.gov/crs/pensionll.pdf (last
visited Aug. 13, 2012); Patrick J. Purcell, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 30196,
PENSION ISSUES: CASH BALANCE PLANS 7-12 (updated Aug. 7, 2003), available
at http://benefitslink.com/articles/cashbal30196_2003.pdf (last visited Aug. 13,
2012) (providing a discussion of hybrid plans in which a participant's benefit
in a DB plan may appear to be an individual account); see also Pension
Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-80, § 701 120 Stat. 780 (2006)
[hereinafter PPA of 2006] (permitting a wider range of such plans).
159. See generally ERISA § 3(24), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(24) (defining a
participant's
normal
retirement
age);
see
also
Laurent
v.
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 448 F. Supp. 2d 537, 545-46 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)
(offering an extensive discussion of the significance of the phrase, "normal
retirement age."); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-1(b)(2) (setting forth the
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retirement benefit and is derived from a formula that usually
includes the participant's compensation and years of service. 60
The plan terms may, however, permit benefits to be paid in a form
other than a life annuity, such as a lump sum payment, if such
form is the actuarial equivalent to the life annuity.' 6 '
B. Initial ERISA ProvisionsPertinentto Family Law
As initially enacted in September 1974, ERISA contained only
one of its five major family law provisions in its current form. That
section was the civil enforcement section, which gives a participant
or beneficiary a federal entitlement, viz., the right to "recover
benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his
rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future
benefits under the terms of the plan."162
This section is implemented with three other provisions.
First, actions for benefit claims may be brought either in the
federal district courts or in state courts of competent
jurisdictions. 6 3 The federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction for
all other ERISA actions. 6 4 A defendant may, and often does,
remove a benefit claim to federal court.165
Second, ERISA plans are required to process benefit claims
pursuant to claims procedures that satisfy DOL requirements. 6 6

requirements to be a normal retirement age).
160. The plan need not permit lump sum payments of plan benefits.
However, many plans permit lump sum payments of the value of the annuities
as of the date of the payment, which may be as of the participant's normal
retirement age or as of another date. A participant's accrued benefits, namely
the annuity beginning as of the participant's normal retirement age, may not
decrease in a year. For example, a participant who has accrued a $1,000
annual lifetime annuity beginning as of the participant's normal retirement
age may not find that such benefit will decrease at any later time. All
investment risk is placed on the employer, who benefits from investment gains
and suffers from investment losses. Benefits may be, but are often not, made
available when a participant terminates employment for a reason other than
death, although distributions are not generally permitted prior to such
employment termination.
See also Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.401(a)-(1)(b)(1)(iv), 1.401(a)-3 (as amended in
2004) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.401(a)-1, 1.401(a)-3). These describe
conditions under which participants may receive plan distributions prior to a
termination of employment, but during a phased retirement without
threatening the plan's tax-qualification. PPA of 2006 § 905.
161. ERISA § 204(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1054(c)(3).
162. ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88
Stat. 829, 891 (1974).
163. ERISA § 502(e)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1).
164. Id.
165. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), (b). See generally JAYNE E. ZANGELEIN ET AL.,
ERISA LITIGATION 155-62 (4th ed. 2011) (providing an overview of litigation
arising under ERISA).
166. ERISA § 503, 29 U.S.C. § 1133.
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These procedures must provide adequate written notice of any
claim denial, the reasons for such denials, and the opportunity for
a full and fair review of such denial by a claims fiduciary.16 7 Those
regulations16 8 were first issued in 1977,169 and were most recently
amended in 2001.170 Benefit claimants are generally required to
exhaust plan review procedures before courts will accept benefit
claims.171
Third, ERISA plan administrators are required to provide
participants and beneficiaries of their plans with both general
plan information, such as the plan governing documents,1 72 and
specific information, such as benefit statements.173 ERISA permits
participants and beneficiaries to bring actions against those
administrators to obtain any information to which they are
entitled under ERISA.174 If such information is not provided
within thirty days, penalties may, but need not, be imposed
against the plan administrator.175 Reasonable attorneys' fees may
also be imposed against such an administrator. 76 Courts do not
appear as a practice to award attorneys' fees or assess penalties
merely because the participant or beneficiary found it necessary to
retain and pay an attorney to request the material formally or
initiate a law suit.177 In contrast, ERISA mandates the assessment
of attorneys' fees and liquidated damages if an employer fails to
make timely benefit contributions to a multi-employer ERISA
plan.178

The initial version of ERISA contained a predecessor of the
second ERISA family law provision that regulated spousal
survivor benefits, although far less extensively than it does now.
Only one initial ERISA provision explicitly referred to spousal
benefits, which had to be made available in very limited
circumstances. ERISA § 205, 29 U.S.C. § 1055, required those
pension plans that provided annuity benefits to provide joint and
167. Id.
168. 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1.
169. Pension and Welfare Benefit Programs, 42 Fed. Reg. 27,426 (May 27,
1977) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2560).
170. Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration, 66 Fed. Reg. 35,886,
35,887 (July 9, 2001) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2560).
171. See generally ZANGELEIN ET AL., supra note 165, at 358-78 (discussing
ERISA's exhaustion of remedies requirement).
172. ERISA § 104(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(4).
173. ERISA § 105, 29 U.S.C. § 1025.
174. ERISA § 502(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1) authorizes actions to enforce
the requirements set forth in ERISA § 502(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c).
175. ERISA § 502(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c).
176. ERISA § 502(g)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1).
177. See, e.g., ZANGELEIN ET AL., supra note 165, at 284-88, 459-79
(discussing ERISA remedies for failure to provide information and when
attorneys' fees may be recovered in ERISA litigation).
178. ERISA § 502(g)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2).
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survivor annuity benefits (with the spouse having survivor rights)
as the default annuity benefit at retirement and during the period
for which early retirement is permitted.1 9 However, the plans to
which the provision applied were also required to permit a
participant to waive such benefit form and thereby deprive the
spouse of those survivor benefits, because such waivers required
no spousal consent. 180 Thus, spousal protection was quite limited
even for these plans.181 Moreover, those plans that provided no
annuity benefits, such as profit-sharing plans and many money
purchase pension plans, were not required to provide a
participant's spouse with any survivor benefits. REACT
significantly changed these provisions.
The initial version of ERISA contained no predecessor of the
third family law provision that regulated DROs. The initial
provisions of ERISA did not mention DROs; thus, it did not
explicitly regulate them. REACT added such provisions.
The initial version of ERISA contained a close predecessor of
the fourth family law provision that regulated the alienation of
employee benefits. ERISA initially required pension plans subject
to the spousal survivor benefit provisions described above to
provide that the assignment or alienation of pension benefits is
prohibited [hereinafter the Alienation Prohibition]. 182 This
protection is not limited to participants, but extends also to plan
beneficiaries.18 3 The Alienation Prohibition prevents an individual
from endangering his or her pension benefits by voluntary or
179. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829, 862-864. A similar provision was
made part of the tax qualification rules at I.R.C. § 401(a)(11). Pub. L. No. 93406, 88 Stat. 829, 935-37. Qualification requirements, however, do not provide
participants or beneficiaries with substantive benefit rights unless, as
discussed, supra,the plan terms include those requirements.
180. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829, 862-864. ERISA § 205(e), in its initial
form, also supports this.
181. These plans did not include pension plans not subject to Part 2 of Title
I pursuant to ERISA § 201, 29 U.S.C. § 1051, such as top-hat plans.
182. ERISA § 206(d)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1). Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829, 864-65. Code § 401(a)(13) is the corresponding tax qualification provision.
The pre-ERISA tax code did not contain any alienation prohibition. Cf. Rev.
Rul. 56-432, 1956-2 C.B. 525 (providing that there is no tax-qualification issue
if a pension plan pays participant's creditors rather than participant); Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, ch. 736, 68A Stat. 134 (1954).
183. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-13(c)(1)(ii). Under Reorganization Plan No. 4 of
1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 47,713 (Oct. 17, 1978) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R.
§2570.200a-2), the Service has the responsibility for establishing the
regulations with respect to the prohibition on the assignment or alienation of
pension benefits. ERISA § 206(d), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d). Those regulations are
associated with the similar prohibition in I.R.C. § 401(a)(13)(B). Although the
regulations were amended on August 22, 1988, in 53 Fed. Reg. 31,850, which
was after the April 30, 1979, effective date of the reorganization plan, the
initial version of the regulations were promulgated on February 15, 1978, in
43 Fed. Reg. 6942 (Feb. 15, 1978), which was prior to such date.
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involuntary alienations. ERISA includes the prohibition in order
"to further ensure that the employee's accrued benefits are
actually available for retirement purposes." 184
The Alienation Prohibition has been invoked to preempt
DROs that attempt to govern ERISA benefits as will be discussed,
infra. However as discussed, supra, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly used a federally established entitlement rather than an
alienation prohibition, to preempt DROs beginning in 1905 with
McCune and concluding in 1981 with Ridgway. The current form
of the Alienation Prohibition, as discussed, infra, may, however, be
used to preempt a DRO that does not challenge the ownership of
ERISA benefits, but that tries to enforce a judgment that is not
based on an ownership claim against such assets. The initial
provisions did not mention DROs. REACT significantly changed
these provisions.
The initial version of ERISA contained a predecessor of the
fifth ERISA family law provision that regulated the ERISA
preemption of state laws. There are three kinds of ERISA
preemption discussed, infra. Two are implicit and are described as
ERISA Conflict Preemption and ERISA Field Preemption. One is
explicit and described as ERISA General Preemption. 185
ERISA Conflict Preemption is based on the United States
Constitution's supremacy clause, 186 which provides that federal
law supersedes any conflicting state law.187 Under such conflict
preemption, ERISA supersedes a state law that contradicts either
the ERISA minimum participation standards for pension plans, 8 8
or the ERISA minimum vesting standards for pension plans.189 In
particular, ERISA Conflict Preemption would supersede a state
statute permitting pension benefits to be forfeited if a participant
is credited with less than ten years because ERISA only requires
184.

H.R. REP. No. 93-779, at 66 (1974), reprinted in (1) 1974-3 C.B. 244,

309, and in (2) STAFF OF S. COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 94TH
CONG. LEG. HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT

OF 1974: PUBLIC LAW 93-406, at 2584, 2655 (1976) [hereinafter ERISA LEG.
HISTORY]; H.R. REP. NO. 93-807, at 68, reprinted in (1) 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4670, 4734; and (2) ERISA LEG. HISTORY 3115, 3188.
185. See The Constitution of the United States of America Analysis and
Interpretation, S. Doc. No. 108-17, at 257-78 (2002), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-CONAN-2002/pdf/GPO-CONAN-2002.pdf,
111-397 (2010), available at
as supplemented by S. DOC. No.
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-CONAN-2010/pdfGPO-CONAN-2010.pdf
(discussing the general application of preemption principles).
186. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
187. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 177 (1824) (voiding a New York law giving
exclusive privileges to operate steamboats in New York waters because it
conflicted with congressional statutes licensing those engaged in coastal
trade).
188. ERISA § 202, 29 U.S.C. § 1052.
189. ERISA § 203, 29 U.S.C. § 1053.
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six years.190 However, ERISA Conflict Preemption has no effect on
state laws that pertain to but do not contradict those standards. In
particular, ERISA Conflict Preemption would not supersede a
statute setting more stringent minimum participant or vesting
standards than ERISA sets for pension plans or even one setting
minimum participation or vesting standards for welfare plans. 191
ERISA Field Preemption is based on the principles described
by the Supreme Court as follows in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp.:

Congress legislated here in a field which the States have
traditionally occupied. So we start with the assumption that the
historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the
Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of

Congress. Such a purpose may be evidenced in several ways. The
scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to make
reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to

supplement it. Or the Act of Congress may touch a field in which the
federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be
assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.
Likewise, the object sought to be obtained by the federal law and the
character of obligations imposed by it may reveal the same purpose.
Or the state policy may produce a result inconsistent with the
objective of the federal statute. It is often a perplexing question
whether Congress has precluded state action or by the choice of
selective regulatory measures has left the police power of the States
undisturbed except as the state and federal regulations collide. 192
The "perplexing
question" often leads to considerable
disagreement about whether a state law is superseded by ERISA
under field preemption. 193 For example, does field preemption
apply to state laws imposing minimum participation standards for
welfare plans?19 4 On the other hand, any state law that conflicts
with ERISA is subject to field preemption, because the conflict

190. ERISA § 203(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(2).
191. We are disregarding the limited state regulation of insured plans,
including welfare plans, which ERISA permits as discussed, infra.
192. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230-31 (1947) (emphasis
added) (citations omitted). The Court decided that the United States
Warehouse Act superseded state regulation of only those matters expressly
regulated by the Act. Id. See also Arizona v. United States, 2012 U.S. LEXIS

4872, **18-20 (June 25, 2012) (citing parts of this quote, which the Court used
to find parts of the Arizona alien registration law were preempted).
193. See, e.g., Lynch, supra note 102, 376-82 (discussing field preemption
four years after the enactment of ERISA).
194. See, e.g., Donald T. Bogan, Protecting Patient Rights Despite ERISA:
Will the Supreme Court Allow States to Regulate Managed Care?, 74 TUL. L.

REV. 951, 972-85 (2000) (arguing that because ERISA does not substantively
regulate welfare plans ERISA should not apply field preemption to the state
regulation of welfare plans). Professor Bogen therein also disagrees with much
of the preemption analysis of ERISA set forth in this article.
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shows Congress had a clear and manifest purpose to supersede
such state law. Courts as discussed, infra, often refer to the Rice
"clear and manifest purpose" test when they find a state law is not
preempted, without discussing whether the state law at issue is a
police power or whether the the state and federal regulations
conflict.
ERISA preemption is not limited to ERISA Conflict
Preemption and ERISA Field Preemption. The initial ERISA
provisions explicitly preempted state laws that "relate to any
[ERISA] employee benefit plan," but do not mention DROs,
domestic relations law, or any other aspect of family state law. 195
This preemption is often called ERISA General Preemption, and
includes both ERISA Conflict Preemption and ERISA Field
Preemption, discussed, supra, because both preempt state laws
that not only relate, but relate very adversely, to ERISA plans in
their capacity as benefit providers. The term "state law" includes
all laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other state action having
the effect of state law. 196 State laws are often enforced with state
court or administrative agency orders. Thus, such orders are
preempted under the same standards as state statutes.
The ERISA General Preemption was an important element in
the development and passage of ERISA.197 One of the ERISA floor
managers, John H. Dent, stressed how the ERISA General
Preemption enhanced the protection of participants as follows:
Finally, I wish to make note of what is to many the crowning
achievement of this legislation, the reservation to Federal authority
[of] the sole power to regulate the field of employee benefit plans.
With the preemption of the field, we round out the protection

afforded participants by eliminating the threat of conflicting and
inconsistent State and local regulation. . .. 198

195. ERISA § 514, 29 U.S.C. § 1144, in its initial form, Pub. L. No. 93-406,
88 Stat. 829, 897 (1974).
196. ERISA § 514(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(1).
197. See James A. Wooten, Legislative and Political History of ERISA
Preemption Part-1, 14 J. PENSION BENEFITS 31 (2006), James A. Wooten,
Legislative and Political History of ERISA Preemption Part 2, 14 J. PENSION
BENEFITS 5 (2007), James A. Wooten, Legislative and Political History of
ERISA Preemption Part 3, J. PENSION BENEFITS 15 (2008); WOOTEN, supra
note 132, at 258-65, 281-85 (2004). But cf. Catherine L. Fisk, The Last Article
About the Language of ERISA Preemption? A Case Study of the Failure of
Textualism, 33 HARv. J. LEG. 35, 52-57 (1996) (discussing the ambiguity of the
statute and the official legislative history); see also Robert H. Jackson, The
Meaning of Statutes: What Congress Says or What the Court Says, 34 A.B.A.
535, 538 (1948) ("It is a poor cause that cannot find some plausible support in
legislative history, which often includes tentative rather than final views of
legislators or leaves misinterpretation unanswered lest more definite
statements imperil the chance of passage.").
198. 120 CONG. REc. H8696, H8701 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 1974) (statement of
Rep. Dent) reprinted in ERISA LEG. HISTORY, supra note 184, at 4670
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The ERISA provisions directing that there be a study on or before
September 2, 1976, of the effects of the ERISA General
Preemption were never implemented.199 No regulations have been
issued with respect to the section. Many court decisions have,
however, addressed the significance of the statutory phrase "relate
to any [ERISA] employee benefit plan."
Two major police powers were excluded from the initial
ERISA General Preemption, to the extent they were police powers.
However, there was no exclusion or mention of DROs or any other
aspect of state family law. The two exclusions must also apply to
both conflict and field preemption, because both are included
within the ERISA General Preemption. First, there is an exclusion
for state laws regulating insurance, banking or securities. 200 This
exclusion does not permit state insurance laws to determine the
rights of designees of insured plans. 201 Second, there is also an
exclusion from preemption for generally applicable criminal laws
of the states. 202 This exclusion applies to general criminal laws,
such as larceny and embezzlement laws. It may not be used to
regulate employee benefit plans by criminalizing employee benefit
requirements, such as criminalizing the failure of corporate
officers to insure that prompt employer plan contributions are
made. 203
Thus, in accord with the principle that the state police powers
may not be superseded by federal statutes unless "that was the
clear and manifest purpose of Congress," it is reasonable to
conclude that if, arguendo, domestic relations laws, or any other
(emphasis added).
199. ERISA § 3022, 29 U.S.C. § 1222.
200. ERISA § 514(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2). This section also includes an
exclusion for state laws regulating banking or securities. For a more extensive
discussion of the insurance exemption see Matthew G. Vansuch, Note, Not
Just Old Wine in New Bottles: Kentucky Ass' of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller
Bottles a New Test for State Regulation of Insurance, 38 AKRON L. REV. 253
(2005); Donald T. Bogan, ERISA: State Regulation of Insured Plans After
Davila, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 69 (2005).
201. The Supreme Court unanimously decided that a state law is deemed to
be a "law ... which regulates insurance" only if. (1) the state law must be
specifically directed toward entities engaged in insurance, and (2) the state
law must substantially affect the risk pooling arrangement between the
insurer and the insured. Ky. Ass'n of Health Plans, Inc., v. Miller, 538 U.S.
329, 342 (2003). Thus, the exclusion does not affect the focus of this Article,
the rights of beneficiary designees. See e.g., Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 147
(preempting a state law pertaining to the designee of a life insurance plan).
202. ERISA § 514(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(4).
203. See, e.g., Sforza v. Kenco Constructional Contracting Co., Inc., 674 F.
Supp. 1493, 1494 (D.C. Conn. 1986) (rejecting criminal law exclusion);
Blackburn v. Iversen, 925 F. Supp. 118, 120, 122 (D.C. Conn. 1996)
(preempting statute imposing personal liability on corporate officers because it
relates to ERISA plans, but permitting alter ego claim against officers to go
forward).
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family laws, are state police powers, to the extent, if any, they are
inconsistent with ERISA, including the requirement that the
terms of an ERISA plan consistent with ERISA be followed,
ERISA preempts those state laws. 204 Congress is unlikely to have
inadvertently omitted any mention of these laws within ERISA or
its legislative history because within the prior two years Congress
adopted major legislation to enhance women's rights, such as the
proposed constitutional amendment granting women equal
rightS2 05 and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972.206 A
fortiori, domestic relations law, or any other family law provisions,
are less obvious police powers than criminal law, banking law,
securities law, or insurance law. Thus, they may not be implicitly
characterized as police powers excluded from the ERISA General
Preemption. Some commentators have used policy arguments to
criticize Congress severely for this approach. 207
ERISA generally does not preempt state laws to which plan
terms refer. For example, the terms of a life insurance plan may
provide that if a participant has made no effective designation, the
proceeds shall be distributed in accord with the law of intestacy of
a specified state. On the other hand, a plan may not incorporate a
state law that violates any ERISA mandates. Thus, a provision
that an ERISA plan be interpreted by the laws of a certain state
only applies to the extent such laws are consistent with ERISA.
C. Summary of Relation of State Family Law and ERISA
Immediately After the InitialAdoption of ERISA
A participant's spouse has no entitlement to survivor benefits
unless the pension plan provides such benefits and the participant
does not waive those benefits. Life insurance plans need not
provide any spousal benefits. It was then uncertain whether the
ERISA federal protective entitlements of private employee benefits
would be treated as federal entitlements similar to that in
McCune, Wissner, or Free, or would be treated as private
entitlements governed by state family law. In the former case,
ERISA benefit entitlements would not be subject to state family
law with respect to benefit payments by plans or with respect to

204. Rice, 331 U.S. at 230.
205. Equal Rights Amendment, H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong. (1971) and S.J.
Res. 8, 92d Cong. 86 Stat. 1523, 92d Cong. (1972).
206. Patsy T. Mink Equal Opportunity in Education Act, Pub. L. No. 92-318,
86 Stat. 235, 373-75 (1972) (prohibiting sex discrimination in education).
207. See e.g., Sylvia Law, Familiesand Federalism, 4 J. OF L. & POL'Y 175,
202-04 (2000) (describing the ERISA statutory approach to domestic relations
law as "thoughtless and seemingly irrational"). The author does not discuss
the REACT changes to these provisions, although she therein discusses postREACT decisions.
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benefits received by participants or beneficiaries. 208 In the latter
case, ERISA benefit entitlements would be subject to state family
law both with respect to benefit payments by plans and with
respect to benefits received by participants or beneficiaries.
VII. POST-ERISA BUT PRE-1984 SUPREME COURT DECISIONS-NONERISA FEDERAL BENEFIT ENTITLEMENTS PREEMPT STATE FAMILY
LAW
The Supreme Court held that state domestic relations order
obligations based on state community property law, rather than
support obligations (the latter were addressed by the amendments
to the SSA discussed, supra) were preempted for benefits under
the federal railway workers retirement act, under the military
retirement system, and under the military life insurance system.
In 1979, the Supreme Court held in Hisquierdo,209 that state
community property rules could not be used to compel a railroad
worker to pay his divorcing wife any amount as a result of the
railway pension benefits he had accrued during their marriage,
but was not receiving. These benefits are funded with the taxes
collected from the employers and employees together with
contributions by the federal government. 210 The Court used a
different approach than Free, although it referred to Free, Wissner,
and Wetmore as follows:
This case, like those four,2 11 has to do with a conflict between
federal and state rules for the allocation of a federal entitlement....
The critical terms here include a specified beneficiary protected by a
flat prohibition against attachment and anticipation.. . . . The

critical terms here include a specified beneficiary protected by a flat
prohibition against attachment and anticipation.... The pertinent
questions are whether the [state community property] right as
asserted conflicts with the express terms of federal law and whether
its consequences sufficiently injure the objectives of the federal
program to require nonrecognition.212

It is not clear why the Court described Wetmore as discussing a
conflict between federal and state rules. Wetmore, as discussed,
supra, simply pertained to a statutory interpretation question: Did
the bankruptcy statute provide for the discharge of family support
obligations, as it did for debts from business transactions? In

208.
209.
210.
211.

McCune, 199 U.S. 382 at 389-90.
Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. at 572.
Id. at 574-75.
The fourth case was Yiatchos v. Yiatchos, 376 U.S. 306, 307-08 (1964),

which dealt with the unrelated issue of whether an individual had wrongfully
used community property to purchase a savings bond that was registered as
owned jointly by the individual and his brother. There was no conflict between
federal and state law.
212. Hisquierdo,439 U.S. at 582-83 (emphasis added).

The John Marshall Law Review

676

[ 45:635

contrast, in Hisquierdo, there was a conflict. The federal statute
provided that retirement payments be made solely to the
participant, but the state community property law provided that a
portion of the payments be made to the participant's former
spouse.
The Court observed that Congress provided for a spousal
2 13
The Court
benefit, which it deliberately terminated on divorce.
also focused on the federal anti-anticipation statute, which
provided that:
Notwithstanding any other law of the United States, or of any State,
territory, or the District of Columbia, no annuity or supplemental
annuity shall be assignable or be subject to any tax or to
garnishment, attachment, or other legal process under any
circumstances whatsoever, nor shall the payment thereof be
anticipated. 214
The Court observed that this statute is not limited to prohibitions
on garnishments, but also states that the participant's annuity
shall not be subject to any "legal process under any circumstances
215
whatsoever, nor shall the payment thereof be anticipated"
Moreover, the explicit exception to these provisions set forth in
legislation passed in 1975, for amounts needed to satisfy an
obligation for alimony or child support, specifically excluded
216
community property claims, such as the one at issue.
Finally, the Court seemed to identify a federal interest for the
federal treatment of the payments, namely that by exempting
retirement pay from other garnishments, Congress deliberately
2 17
It is
increased the incentive for a divorced employee to retire.
not clear why a divorced employee requires a greater monetary
incentive than a married employee. Thus, this is a make-weight
argument.
The Court gave two reasons for rejecting the proposal that the
participant be permitted to retain the pension benefits, but be
required in exchange to give up other property of equivalent value,
namely, the family home. 218 First, under traditional trust law,
similar prohibitions prevent a beneficiary from receiving benefits
219
In this
before the person is scheduled to receive trust payments.
case, the participant was not eligible to start receiving pension
annuity payments at the time of the divorce, but the participant's
former spouse is seeking "equivalent" benefits at such time.

213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Id. at 584-85.
Id. at 576.
Id.
Id. at 586-87.
Id. at 585, 590.
Id. at 588-90.
Id.
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Second, there was considerable uncertainty about the amount of
the participant's pension annuity payments because they
depended on how long the participant lived, worked, and
congressional changes in retirement benefits. 220
The dissenters tried to distinguish Hisquierdo from Wissner
and Free by observing that those cases dealt with survivor
benefits, which the federal statute directed be paid to the person
selected by the decedent. 221 "In each case, explicit provisions of
federal law not only conflicted with principles of state law but also
created property rights at variance with the rights that normally
would have been created by local property law." 222 Moreover, the
dissenters also pointed out that the reference in Wissner to similar
anti-alienation language was dictum. 223 Finally, the dissenters
asserted that the spendthrift-like language at issue is generally for
protection against creditors not against spouses making claims
under community property statutes. 224 The Court responded that
Congress could change the law as it had recently done to permit
the garnishment of civil service retirement benefits for community
property claims. 225
The Supreme Court similarly decided in 1981, in McCarthy v.
McCarthy,226 that a soldier's military retirement pay was not
subject to a divorcing spouse's community property claim. As in
McCune, Wissner, and Free, the Court focused on federal
entitlement language:
The statutory language is straightforward: "A member of the Army
retired under this chapter is entitled to retired pay . . . ." . . . Indeed,

Congress has explicitly stated: "Historically, military retired pay
has been a personal entitlement payable to the retired member
227
himself as long as he lives."
The Court observed that this entitlement was part of a system
that served a strong federal interest. 228 The system was a strong
inducement for enlistment and re-enlistment and encouraged a

220.

Id. at 589.

221. Id. at 596 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The dissenters also distinguished
McCune v. Essig, 199 U.S. 382 (1905), which held that the federal homestead
law superseded state community property law.
222. Id. at 596 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
223.
224.

Id. at 599 n.3 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Id. at 599-600 (Stewart, J., dissenting).

225. Id. at 590 (majority opinion) (referencing Pub. L. No. 95-366, 92 Stat.
600 (1978)).
226. McCarthy v. McCarthy, 453 U.S. 210 (1981), superseded by statute,

Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 97-252, tit. X
§ 1002, 96 Stat. 718, 730-35 (1982) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1408).
227. Id. at 223-24 (quoting 10 U.S.C. § 3929; S. REP. NO. 1480, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess., 6 (1968)) (emphasis added).
228. Id. at 232.
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young and vigorous military. 229 Again, this appears to be a makeweight argument because it is unclear why a divorced serviceman
needs more monetary incentive than a single one to enlist or
reenlist. As in Hisquierdo, the Court pointed to the same 1975
federal legislation that made federal benefits subject to child
support and alimony obligations, but not to community property
awards. 230 Moreover, the Court noted in 1972 when Congress
adopted the retirement pay system at issue, it rejected an attempt
to make such pay subject to attachment by a DRO. 23 1
The Supreme Court also decided in 1981, in Ridgway v.
Ridgway, 232 that a soldier's second wife and designated beneficiary
was entitled to receive and retain all the proceeds from a life
insurance policy under the Servicemen's Group Life Insurance Act
of 1965.233 This was a successor to the federally funded National
Service Life Insurance Act of 1940, which was at issue in
Wissner.23 4 For the successor, the federal government heavily
subsidized insurance that was provided by private parties. 235 The
Court also held that his first wife's minor children had no direct or
indirect rights to those proceeds even though the participant's
divorce judgment required him to designate them to receive those
survivor benefits. 236 The issue concerned a property award to the
participant's minor children rather than an issue of community
property as in Wissner.237 The Supreme Court cited the Hisquierdo
reference to the need to show major damage to a clear and
substantial federal interest before preempting state family law,
and again found such interest by reviewing the federal statutory
language. 238 In particular, the Court held that the case was
controlled by Wissner and repeated its statement from that
decision about the clarity of the congressional intent, which would
also apply to a private employee whose entitlement to life
insurance was determined by federal law, such as ERISA.239
"Here, as there, it appropriately may be said: 'Congress has spoken
with force and clarity in directing that the proceeds belong to the

229. Id. at 232-34.
230. Id. at 234.
231. Id. at 228-30.
232. Ridgway v Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46 (1981), superseded by statute,
Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 97-252, tit. X
§ 1002, 96 Stat. 718, 735-36 (1982) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1448); Pub. L. No.
98-94, Title IX, Part D, § 941 (a)(3), (c)(3), 97 Stat. 653, 654 (1983) (codified at
10 U.S.C. § 1450(f)(3)).
233. Id. at 56, 62.
234. Id. at 55-56.
235. Id. at 52.
236. Id. at 48-49, 60-62.
237. Id. at 53-54, 61.
238. Id. at 54.
239. Id. at 55.
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named beneficiary and no other."' 240
The Court also held that the same anti-attachment provision
considered in Wissner was again an "independent ground" for
preventing (1) a direct claim by the children on the insurer, and (2)
an indirect claim for a constructive trust against the proceeds to
which the second wife was entitled. 241 The Court also cited its
Hisquierdo statements that anti-alienation provisions ensure that
benefits actually reach the beneficiary. 242 The three dissenters
argued that the fraud and breach of trust exception of Free applied
to the soldier who had violated a divorce order by not designating
his minor children as his life insurance beneficiaries. 24 3 The
majority responded that the Supreme Court had declared therein
that this savings bond exception was not applicable where the
issue was the designation rather than whose money was used to
purchase the bonds. 244 The dissent argued that the second wife
was being unjustly enriched by receiving the children's
entitlements, and even though she may not have behaved
improperly, she was not entitled as a gratuitous recipient to keep
the insurance proceeds to which the minor children were
entitled. 245 The soldier in this case had voluntarily waived his
rights to choose a designee other than his minor children by
agreeing to the divorce decree after extensive negotiations. 246 The
majority conceded that the equities favored the children, but, as in
Hisquierdo, stated that Congress had chosen not to apply such
equities when it wrote the law. 24 7 That law insulated the benefits
paid to his designated beneficiary "from attack or seizure by any
other claimant." 248
The dissenters tried to distinguish Wissner.249 They pointed to
the Court's observation that alimony or family support was not at
issue in Wissner.250 In contrast, in this case the reason for the
participant's beneficiary commitment was an issue, and many
decisions held that family support orders were not preempted by
federal anti-alienation provisions similar to the one at issue, 251 or
spendthrift provisions in general, because of the special nature of

240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
(D.C.

Id. at 56 (quoting Wissner, 338 U.S. at 658).
Id. at 60-61.
Id. at 61.
Id. at 64-71 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Id. at 58 (majority opinion).
Id. at 71-72 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 80.
Id. at 61-63 (majority opinion).
Id. at 63.
Id. at 64-71, 71-82 (Powell and Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
Id. (Powell and Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
All the cited decisions other than Schlaefer v. Schlaefer, 112 F.2d 177
Cir. 1940), discussed, supra,were state court decisions.
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the parental legal duty. 252 The majority responded that Wissner
applied to community property rights, which often have elements
of support, as may be the case at issue, rather than alimony or
family support. 253 Moreover, the beneficiary designation more
resembles such a property claim than alimony or child support. 254
Thus, the state law seeking to overturn the designation is
similarly preempted. 255
VIII. COURT AND ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATION OF PRE-REACT
(1984) ERISA PRovISIONS

The significance of the ERISA sections was clarified by the
case law and administrative interpretations in the years between
the enactment of ERISA in 1974 and the enactment of REACT of
1984. The Supreme Court held that ERISA's preemption reach
was quite far-reaching for state law other than family law. The
regulations pertaining to the Alienation Prohibition implied that
ERISA preempted DROs, and all other state family law provisions
not consistent with the terms of pension plans subject to the
spousal survivor provisions. The Supreme Court, however, held
that ERISA did not preempt a DRO giving a participant's spouse
the right to a portion of the participant's payments when the
participant received plan payments, and the Service declared such
payments raised no tax-qualification issues. The Seventh Circuit
held that a DRO could give a participant the right to elect to
receive a portion of the plan payments to which the participant
was entitled even if the participant were not receiving benefits, if
the participant could have elected to receive such payments. The
case law and regulations held that the spousal survivor provisions
provided quite limited protection to spouses. The case law and
interpretations regarding the family law interaction with ERISA
seem to have been confined to pension plans.

252. Id. at 78-81 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
253. Insurance is often required to be provided for minor children to insure
that the children will continue to obtain support if the provider of child
support dies. However, in this case, the purpose of the insurance is not
described even though the participant was required to provide his minor
children with child support.
254. Cf. Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 634 (1987) (distinguishing Ridgway
because Congress intended that veteran's disability benefits be split between a
former soldier and children, although concurrence focused on alimony
exemption from prohibition on alienation).
255. Ridgway, 454 U.S. at 61-62.
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A. Treasury Regulation Pertainingto Alienation Prohibitionand
Implications for Domestic Relations Orders and the Social Security
Alienation Prohibition
In February 1978, the Department of Treasury issued
Treasury Regulation § 1.401(a)-13 pertaining to the Alienation
Prohibition. 256 Those regulations implied that ERISA preempted
DROs, and all other state family law provisions not consistent
with the terms of pension plans subject to the spousal survivor
provisions. The Treasury regulations expanded the statutory
prohibition for benefits as follows:
General rule. Under section 401(a)(13) [26 USCS § 401(a)(13)], a
trust will not be qualified unless the plan of which the trust is a
part provides that benefits provided under the plan may not be
anticipated, assigned (either at law or in equity), alienated or
subject to attachment, garnishment, levy, execution or other legal or
equitable process. 257
Although the Treasury regulations do not define the statutory
phrase "assignment and alienation," they describe the items
included in the phrase as follows:
(1) In general. For purposes of this section, the terms "assignment"
and "alienation" include(i) Any arrangement providing for the payment to the employer of
plan benefits which otherwise would be due the participant under
the plan, and
(ii) Any direct or indirect arrangement (whether revocable or
irrevocable) whereby a party acquires from a participant or
beneficiary a right or interest enforceable against the plan in, or to,
all or any part of a plan benefit payment which is, or may become,
25
payable to the participant or beneficiary. 8

256. 43 Fed. Reg. 6943 (Feb. 17, 1978).
257. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-13(b)(1).
258. Id. § 1.401(a)-13(c)(1). Deference must be given to these regulations
under the Supreme Court's recent unanimous decision in Mayo Foundationfor
Medical Education and Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011)
[hereinafter Mayo]. The Court concluded that the validity of all Treasury
regulations (whether interpretative or legislative) should be determined under
the test set forth in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Specifically, the court must determine "whether the
statute's plain terms 'directly addres[s] the precise question at issue."' Nat'l
Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 986
(2005) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843). If the statute is ambiguous on the
point or silent, then the court must apply the second part of the Chevron test,
which asks whether the regulation is "reasonable." Regulations are reasonable
unless they are "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute."
Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 711 ("In the typical case, such an ambiguity would lead us
inexorably to Chevron two, under which we may not disturb an agency rule
unless it is 'arbitrary or capricious in substance, or manifestly contrary to the
statute."') (citing Household Credit Servs., Inc. v. Pfennig, 541 U.S. 232, 242
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A DRO, which requires a pension plan to pay a person other
than the participant, satisfies the criteria for an included
arrangement. Thus, the only issue is whether the payment is
otherwise excluded from the prohibition. The regulations have
explicit exemptions from the general rule not in the statute. There
are exemptions for federal tax levies, 259 federal and state tax
withholdings, 260 and recoveries of benefit overpayments, 261 but the
regulations, like the statute, do not mention family support
obligations, DROs, or any other aspect of state family law. There
would appear to be as compelling of a case for implicit exemptions
for these three explicit exemptions that the regulation adds to the
statutory exemption for voluntary assignments, as for an implicit
exemption for the payment of a family support obligation, or for
any other aspect of family law.
Thus, in accord with the principle that the state police powers
may not be superseded by federal statutes unless "that was the
clear and manifest purpose of Congress," 262 it is reasonable to
conclude that if, arguendo, domestic relations law, or any other
family law is a state police power, the Alienation Prohibition
preempts those state laws that apply to those pension plans
subject to the spousal survivor provisions. Analysis of the initial
ERISA provisions resulted in the same conclusion as discussed,

supra.
The Social Security Act ("SSA") protected social security
benefits from alienation in 1974 and 1978 as follows:
The right of any person to any future payment under this title [42
USCS §§ 401 et seq.] shall not be transferable or assignable, at law
or in equity, and none of the moneys paid or payable or rights
existing under this title [42 USCS §§ 401 et seq.] shall be subject to
execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process, or

(2004)). However, "[i]f a court, employing traditional tools of statutory
construction, ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise
question at issue, that intention is the law and must be given effect." United
States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1844 (2012) (quoting
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9).
Cf. Nat'l Bank of N. Am. v. IBEW Local No. 3 Pension and Vacation Funds,
419 N.Y.S.2d 127 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dept. 1979) (limiting the Alienation
Prohibition to voluntary transfers, but determining it is inapplicable to third
party garnishments; however, the majority disregarded the dissent's reference
to a Treasury regulation to the contrary, which seems to have been overruled
by Helmsley-Spear, Inc. v. Winter, 426 N.Y.S.2d 778 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dept.
1980), aff'd, 419 N.E.2d 1078 (N.Y. 1981), which prevented an employer from
garnishing a participant's pension for amounts fraudulently taken by the
participant).
259. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-13(b)(2).
260. Id. § 1.401(a)-13(c)(2)(ii).
261. Id. § 1.401(a)-13(c)(2)(iii).
262. Rice, 331 U.S. at 230.
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to the operation of any bankruptcy or insolvency law. 263
264
and is
This is the same language as the initial 1935 enactment,
very similar, but much narrower, than the language in the
regulations for the Alienation Prohibition discussed, infra, which
implies that ERISA protection is not limited to traditional
concepts of legal process or assignment. Without the regulation,
there was considerable ambiguity about the extent of the brief
Alienation Prohibition in ERISA that refers to ERISA pension
benefits as follows, "[e]ach pension plan shall provide that benefits
provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated." 265
However, the ERIA regulation did not address the extent, if any,
to which the Alienation Prohibition, like the Social Security Act,
may protect distributions from pension plans subject to the
spousal survivor provisions.
In 1973, before the enactment of ERISA, the Supreme Court

in Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Board266 emphasized the
extent of the Social Security protection of social security
distributions by holding that social security payments retained the
26 7
quality of money by remaining in "readily withdrawable" form.
In particular, the Court held social security benefits on deposit in
a bank account were not subject to attachment by the local welfare
board. 268 Thus, there seemed little question social security benefits
were protected from alienation both before and after their
distribution, which is more protection than the Supreme Court
provided in the earlier preemption decisions based on federal
entitlements, such as an entitlement to property transferred by
the federal government. In those decisions, such as McCune, the
Court protected the person claiming a superior ownership interest
in the property from encumbering the property on the basis of
such claim, but did not prevent independent levies on the
transferred property based on unrelated claims. 269 However, there
were some state decisions holding that support obligations were
270
enforceable against distributed social security benefits.
263. 42 U.S.C. § 407 (2011), SSA § 207.
264. The section number was changed to the current section number on
August 10, 1939, by ch. 666, Title II, § 207, 53 Stat. 1372. The original section
number was § 208 of the SSA enacted on August 14, 1935, by ch. 531, Title II,
§ 208, 49 Stat. 625.
265. ERISA § 206(d)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1).
266. Philpott v. Essex Cnty. Welfare Bd., 409 U.S. 413 (1973).
267. Id. at 416.
268. Id. at 415-16; see also Carrier v. Bryant 306 U.S. 545 (1939) (U.S.
securities purchased with veteran's benefits, unlike the benefit distributions,
is not protected from execution under a statute that, like the Social Security
Act, protects distributed benefits and was enacted in 1935).
269. McCune, 199 U.S. at 390.
270. See, e.g., Brown v. Brown, 288 N.E.2d 852 (Ohio Ct. App. 1972)
(holding that SSA limits on creditor claims are inapplicable to claims by
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B. Court Interpretationof Effects of ERISA PreemptionProvisions
on Domestic Relations Orders Before Campa Supreme Court
Decision
Prior to the 1980 Supreme Court decision in In re Marriageof
Campa,271 resolving the issue of whether DROs could apply
community property law to ERISA pension plan benefits, on which
the courts divided, courts consistently held that ERISA did not
preempt DROs requiring that ERISA plan benefits be used to pay
a participant's support obligations. Although the decisions focused
on the Alienation Prohibition, none mentioned the relevant
treasury regulation issued early in 1978. No case law addressed
whether ERISA preempted DROs pertaining to life insurance
plans or top-hat plans.
There was a good discussion in 1979 of the pre-Campa state of
law, i.e., before the Campa Supreme Court decision, regarding
child support or alimony DROs in American Telephone and
Telegraph Co. v. Merry.272 The court therein issued a garnishment

order to a pension plan 273 to obtain payment of a participant's
outstanding child support obligation. 274 The court first observed
that the ERISA legislative history is silent about whether the
Alienation Prohibition applied to DRO garnishments. 275 The court
then agreed with Judge Weinfeld's statements in a similar case
that: (1) there was no ERISA Conflict Preemption because the
Alienation Prohibition was inapplicable, and (2) there was no
ERISA General Preemption because of the "fundamental principle
of statutory interpretation (whereby) courts have presumed that
the basic police powers of the States, particularly the regulation of
domestic relations, are not superseded by federal legislation unless
that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." 276
The Merry court cited five similar support holdings 277 in Cody
v. Riecker,278 Cogollos v. Cogollos, 279 Wanamaker v. Wanamaker,280

dependents); Huskey v. Batts, 530 P.2d 1375 (Okla. Civ. App. 1974) (citing
Brown).
271. Carpenters Pension Trust Fund v. Campa, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980)
[hereinafter Campa].
272. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Merry, 592 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1979).
273. There was a question whether the order had been issued to the correct
party, the plan or plan administrator rather than the plan administrator.
274. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 592 F.2d at 122-25.
275. Id. at 120-21.
276. Id. at 122 (citing Cartledge v. Miller, 457 F. Supp. 1146, 1154 (S.D.N.Y.
1978)).
277. For citations to implicit exceptions for family support obligations from
other broad alienation prohibition laws see Cartledge, 457 F. Supp. at 1154
n.42.
278. Cody v. Riecker, 454 F. Supp. 22 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
279. Cogollos v. Cogollos, 402 N.Y.S.2d 929 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978).
280. Wanamaker v. Wanamaker, 401 N.Y.S.2d 702 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1978).
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M.H. v. J.H.,281 and Biles v. Biles.282 The court also mentioned a
similar holding with respect to a community property dispute in
Stone v. Stone.283 The court distinguished Hisquierdo, which was
decided by the Supreme Court earlier in 1979, because of its focus
on community property and reservation that there may be
different considerations for private plans regulated by ERISA.284
The court also noted the similarity to the support obligation, which
Wetmore held could not be discharged in bankruptcy. 285 The court
dismissed General Motors Corp. v. Townsend 286 for relying only on
the statutory language without considering the strong policy in
having participants pay their family support obligations. 287 It also

dismissed Francis v. United Technologies Corp.288 as being less

convincing than the contrary holding of Stone from the same
federal district.289 The court could have better distinguished
Francis and Townsend by observing that in neither were support
obligations at issue. Like Stone, the division of marital property
was at issue. The court observed that the Tax Division of the
Justice Department had filed an amicus brief stating that the
support payments would not violate the alienation prohibition in
the tax qualification rules that was identical to the Alienation
Prohibition. 290 Finally, the court noticed that the ERISA
declaration of policy reference to a concern for "employees and
their dependents." 291
Merry identified a conflict in the Ninth Circuit district courts
about whether community property laws may be used to obtain an
interest in the participant's pension interest in the course of a
marital dissolution.
In 1978, in Stone, a former spouse had been awarded forty
percent of the participant's monthly pension payments in accord
with her community property interest. 292 The court permitted her
to obtain payment directly from the pension plan. The court began
with the reference to Wetmore. "This policy of federal
noninterference with state domestic relations laws means that a
federal court does not construe a federal statute to preempt one of

281. M. H. v. J. H., 403 N.Y.S.2d 411 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1978).
282. Biles v. Biles, 394 A.2d 153 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1978).
283. Stone v. Stone, 450 F. Supp. 919 (N.D. Cal. 1978), appeal then pending,
No. 78-2313 (9th Cir.).
284. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 592 F.2d at 123.

285. Id.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.

Gen. Motors Corp. v. Townsend, 468 F. Supp. 466 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 592 F.2d at 123.
Francis v. United Techs. Corp., 458 F. Supp. 84 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 592 F.2d at 123.
Id. at 125.
Id. at 124.
Stone, 450 F. Supp. at 920.
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those laws unless 'positively required by direct enactment."' 293
However, the phrase quoted was not a reference to federal
preemption or to federal laws in general, but to the interpretation
of the discharge provisions of the federal bankruptcy law. After
concluding that the legislative history did not address whether the
Alienation Prohibition prohibited the application of community
property law to obtain a participant's pension benefit, and
asserting that the "plain meaning" of the statute does do so, the
court applied policy considerations and the Wetmore presumption
against preemption. 294 The court than asserted that preemption
would frustrate a policy goal of the Prohibition, namely that the
participant be able to support his family, and ERISA does not
reject the community property premise that each spouse earns and
deserves half of all marital property. 295 The difficulty with this
analysis is that ERISA differs fundamentally from the bankruptcy
law. ERISA includes a provision preempting all state law related
to employer plans, and that preemption provision is at issue.
Moreover, as discussed, infra, the provisions for the Alienation
Prohibition regulations showed that the Wetmore exclusion
arguments were inapplicable to the Alienation Prohibition.
Furthermore, the court asserted that support obligations may
be enforced against pension plans, and there is often little
difference between assets transferred for support and for property
obligations, so it is far more practical to subject neither to the
Prohibition. 296 The court rejected the relevance of (1) the 1977
social security amendment permitting support obligations but not
community property obligations to be enforced against federal
pensions, and (2) Wissner, which rested on the importance of
following the beneficiary designation.29 7 Finally, the court rejected
the ERISA General Preemption for two reasons. First, the court
argued that the Alienation Prohibition addresses transfers of
pension benefits, and as discussed, permits the enforcement of the
DRO. Thus, the general preemption provision is inapplicable. 298
However, specific ERISA mandates relate to ERISA plans, so the
subject of the mandate must relate to employee benefit plans.
Thus, the ERISA General Preemption preempts state law that is
subject to the mandate unless the plan terms permit the DRO to
be enforced, which the court did not consider. Second, the court
argued that if, arguendo, the ERISA General Preemption is not
rendered ineffective by the Alienation Prohibition permitting the
DRO, like the Alienation Prohibition it is inapplicable because
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.

Id. at 925 (quoting Wetmore, 196 U.S. at 77).
Id. at 925-26.
Id. at 926-28.
Id. at 928-30.
Id. at 929.
Id. at 932.
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there is no clear evidence of the requisite congressional intent to
have preemption. 299
In contrast, in the later decision in the same year, Francis v.
United Technologies,o00 the Stone reasoning was considered and
rejected. The court observed that the application of California
community property law would result in the alienation of half of
the participant's benefit contrary to the Alienation Prohibition,
which has an exception for voluntary assignments, but none for
community property laws. 301 Thus, there was no need to consider
the policy behind the Prohibition, as the court did in Stone, supra.
Therefore, ERISA preempted the application. A Michigan court
had reached the same conclusion using the Alienation Prohibition
in the same manner in 1976, in General Motors Corp. v.
Townsend.302
Francis also held that the former spouse of the participant,
who was not a designated beneficiary, did not have standing to
bring an ERISA action because she was neither a participant nor a
beneficiary as required under ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(A)303 The same conclusion was reached in Kerbow v.
Kerbow, 04 where the court also held that Texas community
property law did not make the spouse of the participant a
beneficiary.3 05 In contrast, the Stone court found that the spouse
had standing because otherwise she would have no remedy for the
plan's failure to pay her plan benefits to her, so the court held that
state community property law transferred the participant's
standing to her.306
Neither Stone nor Francis referred to Treasury Regulations
§ 1.401(a)-13, the regulations pertaining to the Alienation
Prohibition, that the Service issued before both decisions.3 07 Those
regulations, issued earlier in 1978, strongly support the lack of an
implicit exception to the Alienation Prohibition for DROs, as
discussed, supra. Nevertheless, the DOL and the Service, which
had prepared the regulations, asserted there was such an
exception in at least two other amicus briefs at about this time, 308
299.
300.

Id. at 932-33.
Francis,458 F. Supp. at 84.
301. Id. at 86.
302. Townsend, 468 F. Supp. at 466. GM, the plan fiduciary, brought the
action pursuant to ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), to obtain an
injunction against a former spouse trying to garnish the participant's plan
benefits. Id. at 466-67. The court rejected the applicability of the Explicit
ERISA Exemption. Id. at 470.
303. Francis,458 F. Supp. at 86-87.
304. Kerbow v. Kerbow, 421 F. Supp. 1253 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
305. Id. at 1260.
306. Stone, 450 F. Supp. at 921-22.
307. 43 Fed. Reg. 6943 (Feb. 17, 1978).
308. Cartledge, 457 F. Supp. at 1156; Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 592 F.2d at 125.
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although neither decision discussed the reasoning of the
government presented in the briefs, one of which will be discussed,
infra.
In 1979, the California Court of Appeals held in In re Campa
[hereinafter California Campa]309 that ERISA did not preempt: (1)
an order joining an ERISA pension plan, the Carpenters Pension
Trust Fund for Northern California [hereinafter the Carpenters'
Plan] to a state domestic relations proceeding regarding the
pension payments, or (2) a DRO based on state community
property law that directed the Carpenters' Plan to pay a portion of
the participant's benefit to his spouse, when the participant began
to receive his plan benefits, even though the plan document
prohibited such plan payments to a spouse. 310
The court first rejected the Carpenters' Plan's assertion that
the claim be dismissed because the spouse had failed to exhaust
the plan claims process. 311 The court used the futility exception;
denial of the benefit claim was inevitable because the plan terms
prohibited spouses from being paid a portion of the benefits
otherwise payable to the participant. 3 12
The court analyzed the preemption issues using the Rice
principle that state police powers are not preempted by a federal
law unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress. 313
There was no discussion of why a DRO was considered the exercise
of state police powers. After describing ERISA's employee benefit
standards, the court asked whether California law interfered with
those standards, but concluded they did not because that law
assures that family members receive the pension benefits they
anticipated without affecting the integrity of the pension plans
and family is particularly suited to state regulation. 314 The court
repeated the Stone argument that the Alienation Prohibition is
inapplicable because by obtaining a share of the pension payment,
the spouse is getting what she earned.315 The court asserted that
specific references to community property not being applicable to
tax rules, such as the deduction rules, showed that community
property rules are applicable to ERISA.316 The court failed to
consider the more pertinent argument that the applicability of the
Alienation Prohibition could be determined by looking at the
relevant Treasury regulations also disregarded in Stone. The court
rejected the argument that because the pension plan was
309. In re Campa, 152 Cal. Rptr. 362 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979).
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.

Id. at 363.
Id. at 364.
Id. at 365.
Id.
Id. at 365-68.
Id. at 368-69.
Id. at 369.
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collectively bargained, the National Labor Relations Act
preempted the application of state law.3 17 The court also rejected
the claim that dividing the pension payments between the spouses
would cause the plan administrator to violate the fiduciary rules
because the funds would no longer be in the plan. 318 However, it
would seem to be a fundamental fiduciary responsibility to pay
benefits only to the persons entitled to those benefits under the
plan terms. The court distinguished Wissner because the relevant
statute gave the participant the right to choose his beneficiary,
whereas it asserted that ERISA had no such provision. 19
However, ERISA does have such a provision. An ERISA
beneficiary is defined in such a manner. 320
Finally, the court rejected the claim that ERISA preempted
the California law that provided a DRO may only be enforced
against a plan if the plan is joined as a party because the only
consequence to the plan of such joinder is that the plan may have
to issue two checks or one check to a different party, so no burden
is placed on the plan. 321 However, being a party means that the
plan could be subject to discovery within the state court, which
authority it does not have under ERISA, and be subject all the
costs of being a party to a litigation, including the need to monitor
the impact of all filings on the plan's interests.
C. Campa Supreme Court Decision that a Domestic Relations
Order Enforcing Community PropertyInterest Governs An ERISA
Pension Plan and the Plan May Be Forced to Be a Party to a
Domestic Relations Court Proceeding
In June of 1979, after the California Supreme Court denied a
rehearing in California Campa, the Carpenters Plan 322 exercised
its right to appeal a preemption decision from the highest state
court directly to the Supreme Court. 323 The Carpenters Plan
presented the followed two questions for appeal:
1. Do the provisions of Title I of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act, commonly known as ERISA, supersede the provisions
of the California Community property law and implementing
statutes and court rules insofar as they relate to an employee
pension benefit plan covered by that Act?

317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
for N.

Id. at 369-70.
Id. at 370.
Id.
ERISA § 3(8), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(8).
In re Campa, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 371-73.
Appellants' Jurisdictional Statement, Carpenters Pension Trust Fund
Cal. v. Campa, 444 U.S. 1028 (June 19, 1979) (No. 78-1881) [hereinafter

Carpenter's Initial Brief].
323. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2). This was later revised to eliminate such right of
appeal in the Pub L. No. 100-352 § 3, 102 Stat. 662, 662 (1988).
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2. Does a state court have jurisdiction to order the board of trustees
of an employee pension benefit plan covered by ERISA to make
provisions of the documents and
benefit payments in violation of the
324
instruments governing the plan?
Both parties appeared to have thoroughly briefed the issues. 325
The Carpenters Fund briefed narrower distinct preemption issues
than the jurisdictional issues. First, it discussed examples of the
adverse effects of permitting California community property law to
affect the administration of ERISA benefits, including forcing the
plan to be joined in domestic relations proceedings involving plan
participants and forcing the plan to treat a participant's spouse as
an owner of part of the pension plan before the participant begins
to collect his pension benefits. 326 Second, it discussed the adverse
effects of the use of California community property law, rather
than state law in general, to direct ERISA plans to make benefit
payments contrary to their terms, and focused on the prohibition
on payments to a participant's spouse. 327
Both parties referred to a government brief filed on behalf of
the DOL and the Service in the appeal of the Stone district court
decision arguing that ERISA does not preempt benefit claims
based on community property law claims [hereinafter the DOL
Stone Brief].328

The DOL Stone Brief began by emphasizing the breadth of
the ERISA General Preemption, which applied, as one of the
ERISA draftsmen phrased it, to any state law "which would affect
any employee benefit plan [subject to ERISA]."329 The brief cited
and agreed with a statement by Judge Renfrew that "[1]aws
relating to benefits of employee benefit plans relate to those plans
as much as laws relating to their administration." 330
The DOL than presented three preemption conclusions. First,
a participant's current or former spouse is not an ERISA plan
participant or beneficiary by virtue of state community property
law. 331 Second, state community property may not be used to
provide a participant's spouse or former spouse with rights greater

324. Carpenter's Initial Brief.
325. Ms. Campa's representatives filed a motion to affirm (Sept. 17, 1979)
(hereinafter Campa Affirm Motion).
326. Carpenter's Initial Brief; Brief in Opposition to Motion to Affirm,
Carpenters Pension Trust Fund for N. Cal. v. Campa, 444 U.S. 1028 (Sept. 27,
1979) (No. 78-1881) [hereinafter Campa Affirm Motion).
327. Carpenter's Initial Brief; Campa Affirm Motion.
328. The brief was reproduced in full at BNA Pension Reporter No. 221,
January 8, 1979, p. R-7-R-14.
329. Id. at R-10.
330. Id. (citing Standard Oil v. Agsalund, 442 F. Supp. 695, 707 (N.D. Cal.
1977)).
331. Id. at R-11.
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than those of the participant. 332 Third, to the extent the interest of
a participant's spouse or former spouse is derived only from state
property law, such interest may not be enforced against an ERISA
plan.333
The DOL nevertheless concluded that the DRO was
enforceable because it was subject to an implicit exemption from
the Alienation Prohibition. There was no consideration of the
Service's regulation on the Alienation Prohibition that been issued
in February 1978, although the brief was filed in December
1978.334 Three arguments were presented. First, similar language
in other pre-ERISA federal statutes had been found not to prohibit
the enforcement of family support obligations. 335 However, none
presented the issue before the court, i.e., whether the enforcement
was otherwise preempted as in this case. Second, community
property divisions like family support obligations rested on
equities, namely one in favor of a fair division of property, which
justify an implicit exemption from the Alienation Prohibition. 336
Finally, ERISA had no provision similar to the Wissner provision
giving the participant the right to designate his beneficiary and
thereby defeat a community property claim to death benefit
proceeds.33 7 However, one of the most fundamental provisions of
ERISA gives a participant the right to the benefits set forth in the
plan terms.
The Carpenters' Plan focused on how the DOL Stone Brief
concurred with its position on its two jurisdictional issues. In
particular, the brief argued that ERISA does not permit (1)
community law to require the plan to give spouses distribution
rights they do not have under the plan terms, or (2) the
"importation of state community property law principles into the

332. Id. at R-12.
333. Id. at R-8, R-9 to R-12.
334. Id. at R-14. Those regulations, Treasury Regulation § 1.401(a)-13,
provide that the ERISA phrase "assigned or alienated," has a far broader
meaning than it did within the cited decisions. In particular, it includes any
payments to a party other than the one entitled to those payments under the
plan terms. The regulations do not include any such claims or any claims
based on DROs within the list of explicit exemptions set forth therein.
335. Id. at R-12. Two decisions were cited: In re Flanagan, 31 F. Supp. 402
(D.D.C. 1940) (holding that veterans disability benefits paid to a lunatic's
representative were subject to alimony claims) and Schlaefer, 112 F.2d at 177
(determining that DC disability payments are subject to alimony claims that
are not debts but obligations). The latter was the cited basis for Flanagan.
However, Schlaefer did not mention or address federal preemption because it
only considered the interaction of two D.C. statutes. In particular, Schlafer
held that because the alimony obligation was not a prohibited alienation, it
could be enforced against the disability payments.
336. Id. at R-13.
337. Id.
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administration and operation of benefit plans." 338
Ms. Campa focused on how the DOL Stone Brief concurred
with her position that ERISA permitted the enforcement of a
community property interest in a fraction of the participant's
pension payments, 339 the equitable principles that favor property
settlements in divorces, 340 and the ERISA goal of protecting those
relying on pensions.3 41
The Supreme Court was thus confronted with a thoughtful
opinion on behalf of the highest court of California, the state with
the largest population, and detailed briefs by both parties, which
included a government brief on the issues presented to a lower
court. The Supreme Court had never ruled before on any aspect of
the preemption of ERISA.342 The Supreme Court responded on
January 14, 1980, by dismissing the appeal for "want of
substantial federal question" without any explanation, 343 and on
April 21, 1980, by denying a motion by Ms. Campa's attorneys for
attorneys' fees without giving any explanation of either decision. 344
The Supreme Court has unanimously proclaimed that
dismissals for want of substantial federal question are not
decisions to deny review, but rather are "decisions on the
merits." 345 Thus, "they bind state courts and other federal
courts." 346 The cited statement, which is supported by other
sources, including Hicks, 34 7 was amplified by Justice Brennan in
his Bradley concurrence. Therein, Justice Brennan emphasized
338. Id. at R-8. The arguments, including an extensive quote from the DOL
Stone Brief, can be found at Campa Motion to Affirm at 1-12.
339. Campa Affirm Motion at 4-7.
340. Campa Affirm Motion at 7-8.
341. Campa Affirm Motion at 9-10.
342. See David Gregory, The Scope of ERISA Preemptionof State Law, 48 U.
PITT. L. REV. 427, 459 (1987) (the first decision was issued the following year
in Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504 (1981)); EMPLOYEE
BENEFITS LAW, supra note 133, at 773-855 (beginning with a statement that
the Supreme Court addressed preemption sixteen times from 1981 through
1997).
343. In re Campa, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 362; Carpenters Pension Trust Fund,
444 U.S. at 1028.
344. Carpenters Pension Trust Fund v. Campa, 446 U.S. 906 (1980).
345. Letter from all nine Justices of the United States Supreme Court to
Sen. De Concini (June 22, 1978), reprinted in Eugene Gressman, Requiem for
the Supreme Court's Obligatory Jurisdiction, 65 A.B.A. 1325, 1328 (1979)
(discussing the proposal to make appeals, such as Campa, no longer as of right
but subject to the Court's discretion). Virtually the same letter was written by
Chief Justice Burger to Rep. Kastenmeier (June 17, 1987), reprinted in S.
REP. No. 300, 100th Cong. 2d Sess. 5 (1988), when the proposal was adopted.
See generally ROBERT L. STERN & EUGENE GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT
PRACTICE 213, 215-17 (7th. ed. 1993).
346. Id. (citing Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173 (1977) (per curiam); Hicks
v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975)).
347. Id. at 344.
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that such holdings are limited to the particular facts involved, and
the reasoning needed to address those facts.3" 8 Such features are
often clearer with non-summary opinions that set forth the Court's
reasoning and the facts upon which it relied.
Thus, the Ninth Circuit correctly concluded in Carpenters
Pension Trust for Southern California v. Kronschnabel,349 that in
dismissing the California Campa appeal for want of a substantial
federal question, the Supreme Court necessarily rejected the
argument that ERISA preempts a state court order requiring the
trustees of a pension plan to divide pension payments between the
employee and his or her ex-spouse. 350 Similarly in the companion
case of Stone v. Stone,351 the court stated:
As our decision in Carpenters Pension Trust v. Kronschnabel, 632
F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1980), demonstrates, the Supreme Court's
summary dismissal of the appeal in In re Marriage of Campa, 444
U.S. 1028, (Campa), binds district and circuit courts to the view that

ERISA does not preempt state-court orders requiring a pension plan
to pay [in the future] a community property share of a plan
participant's monthly benefit payments directly to his or her exspouse. 352

Neither court had to consider the effect of the dismissal of the
first claim presented by the Carpenters Plan. As a result, contrary
to the government brief, ERISA did not appear to preempt the
importation of state community property law principles into the
administration and operation of benefit plans, although the extent
of such importation was very unclear. The Campa summary
opinion left open questions of implications not discussed or at
issue. For example, may the participant's spouse devise her state
community property ownership in the participant's pension
benefits to another person if she predeceases the participant?353
The Campa summary opinion left open at least two questions
about whether ERISA preempts any DROs. Although the question
that the Ninth Circuit focused on was whether ERISA preempted
a state law directing a plan to make benefit payments prohibited

348. Mandel, 432 U.S. at 179-80 (Brennan, J., concurring).
349. Carpenters Pension Trust for S. Cal. v. Kronschnabel, 632 F.2d 745
(9th Cir. 1980).
350. Id. at 747-49.
351. Stone v. Stone, 633 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1980) [hereinafter Stone I1].
352. Id. at 742.
353. This was the issue in Boggs, 520 U.S. at 833. The Supreme Court
therein: (1) reversed its summary decision in Campa, and (2) rejected the
positions set forth in Julie McDaniel Dallison, Comment, Disappearing

Interests: ERISA Impliedly Preempts the Predeceasing Nonemployee Spouse's
Community Property Interest in the Employee's Retirement, 49 BAYLOR L. REV.
477, 504 (1997), which argued that ERISA does not preempt such divisibility,
but if it does, the spouse's legatees or heirs may obtain those benefits from the
person paid by the plan.
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by the plan documents, the Supreme Court may not have intended
to cover all state laws that did so, but only the claims discussed.
The decision addressed a prohibition on who could receive plan
benefits, and the state law was a community property claim in a
DRO. There is thus a question, which was raised by the
government brief, of whether ERISA would preempt a DRO, based
upon community property law that required payment at a time or
in a form not permitted by the plan. There was also an open
question of whether ERISA preempted DROs based on noncommunity property principles because that question was not
before the court, and not discussed in any of the briefs. Such
preemption would appear to be unlikely because the same
arguments in favor of claims for support obligations are applicable,
and the same arguments in favor of equitable distribution of
marital property (the alternative to community property) are
applicable. 354
D. Post-CAMPA Interpretationof Effects of ERISA Preemption
Provisionson Domestic Relations Orders
Within days of the Supreme Court decision in Campa, the
Service issued Revenue Ruling 80-27.355 The Ruling held that the
alienation prohibition in the tax qualification requirements, which
is identical to the Alienation Prohibition, would not be violated if a
pension plan complies with an order to meet the participant's
family support obligations when the participant is receiving
benefits by satisfying such obligation with a portion of the benefit
payments that would have otherwise been made to the
participant. 356 The ruling does not mention the Service's
regulations pertaining to the Alienation Prohibition, which were
issued by the Service with respect to the alienation prohibition in
the qualification requirements. The ruling concluded with a
sentence presuming that if the participant is not receiving
benefits, the benefits may not be attached because the participant
has no present right to such benefits. 357 However, the Supreme
Court in Campa approved such an attachment, although no
payments would be obtained until the participant entered pay
status. Moreover, by the terms of the jurisdictional statement in
Campa, which the Supreme Court rejected, payments to a
354. See Stephen J. Brake, Equitable Distribution us. Fixed Rules: Marital
Property Reform and the Uniform Marital Property Act, 23 B.C. L. REV. 761
(1982) (showing that at such time, all the states determined property
allocation upon marital dissolution using equitable principles).
355. Rev. Rul. 80-27, 1980-1 C.B. 85. This Revenue Ruling withdrawn as
obsolete by Revenue Ruling 91-8, 1991-1 C.B. 281, because of the enactment of
REACT.
356. Rev. Rul. 80-27, 1980-1 C.B. 85.
357. Id.
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participant's spouse are permitted before the participant begins to
accept payments and before the time he may be entitled to begin to
receive such payments.
A year later, a federal district court found conflict preemption
without using the phrase for a state court order that a benefit
payment be made contrary to the plan terms. In 1981, in
Monsanto Co. v. Ford,358 the court issued a declaratory judgment
that the Alienation Prohibition would be violated by following a
DRO providing a divorcing spouse with pension payments as
marital assets before a participant reaches age sixty-five and first
359
Those
becomes entitled to begin receiving pension payments.
be
would
spouse
the
because
sought
probably
payments were
before
died
had
participant
if
the
benefits
entitled to no survivor
reaching age sixty-five. 360 In contrast, in the 1983 case, Sochor v.
IBM,361 the New York Court of Appeals reached a similar result
without relying on ERISA by name or the Alienation Prohibition.
The court concluded that a former spouse could not direct a
pension plan to pay her pension benefits that the participant has
not applied for, but is eligible to receive. In particular, she could
not receive a reduced early retirement pension, because such
362
election rights are his alone.
In 1983, the Seventh Circuit in Savings and Profit Sharing
Fund of Sears Employees v. Gago363 distinguished Ford. The court
held that ERISA did not preempt a direction by the participant's
former spouse that the plan make plan payments to her when the
participant could have given, but had not yet given, direction for
plan payments to begin. 364 In particular, the former spouse sought
payment of a property interest pursuant to a marital dissolution,
which was based on marital property rights under an equitable
365
distribution regime rather than a community property regime.
The court relied in large part on Campa using the same reasoning
as the Kronschnabel court. It found no distinction in having the
DRO based on a non-community law because the relevant property
law for marital dissolutions starts with a similar presumption that
marital property is owned fifty-fifty. 366 Ford was distinguished
because the Gago plan permitted the form of the distribution at
the time in question. 367 There was no discussion of the source of
358. Monsanto Co. v. Ford, 534 F. Supp. 51 (E.D. Mo. 1981).
359. Id. at 54.
360. Id. at 53.
361. Sochor v. IBM, 457 N.E.2d 696 (N.Y. 1983).
362. Id. at 698-99.
363. Say. & Profit Sharing Fund of Sears Emps. v. Gago, 717 F.2d 1038 (7th
Cir. 1983) [hereinafter Gago].
364. Id. at 1039-40.
365. Id. at 1044-45.
366. Id.
367. Id. at 1045.
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the right of the participant's former spouse to make such election.
Finally, in Operating Engineers' Local 428 Pension Trust
Fund v. Zamborsky368 the Ninth Circuit extended Kronschnabel to
the payment of family support obligations, as well as community
property law obligations, from the payments that would otherwise
be made to a participant in pay status.369 The court added three
arguments not previously presented with respect to why the
payment would not violate the Alienation Prohibition, but as with
the other courts, it did not mention the relevant regulations. 370
First, the court cited Revenue Ruling 80-27, which showed that
such payments did not violate the same requirement in the tax
qualification rules. 371 Second, the prohibition merely required the
inclusion of such a provision in the pension plan.372 Apparently the
court perceived no ERISA requirement that plan terms be
followed. It seemed to have missed the ERISA provision giving
participants the right to recover benefits pursuant to the plan
terms. 373 Third, the court referred to the Kronschnabel analysis of
the persuasive authority of Campa in concert with the observation
that the courts and legislatures have generally given more
deference to marital support obligations than to marital property
obligations. 374
Thus, prior to REACT, there was little reason to doubt that
DROs requiring pension plans to use a portion of a participant's
benefit payments to satisfy a participant's marital support
obligation or marital property obligation were not preempted by
ERISA. The Service had confirmed that the plan would not violate
the tax-qualification rules by making such payments. 375 There
were secondary questions, such as whether a spouse could use a
DRO to obtain a benefit payment when the participant was not
receiving benefits, although the Supreme Court had so held in its
summary opinion in Campa, although such facts were not before
it. However, no one challenged the Seventh Circuit's finding in
Gago that a participant's spouse had authority to make such an
election if the participant could have chosen to begin receiving
payments. 376

368. Operating Engineers' Local 428 Pension Trust Fund v. Zamborsky, 650
F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1981) [hereinafter Zamborsky].
369. Id. at 202.
370. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-13.
371. Zamborsky, 650 F.2d at 200.
372. Id. at 200-01.
373. ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
374. Zamborsky, 650 F.2d at 201-02.
375. Id. at 200 (citing Rev. Rul. 80-27, 1980-1 C.B. 85).
376. Gago, 717 F.2d at 1045.
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E. Post-Campaand Pre-REACT Supreme Court DecisionsAbout
the Scope of ERISA Preemption
The two post-Campa and pre-REACT Supreme Court
preemption decisions held that the ERISA General Exemption
preempted non-family law attempts to enhance ERISA
protections, but suggested that ERISA plans would continue to
defer to state family law.
The Supreme Court's first non-summary decision pertaining
to ERISA preemption was in 1981, in Alessi v. RaybestosManhattan.377 The Court held that the ERISA General Preemption
prevents the states from enhancing the ERISA protections
378
In
provided to pension plan participants and beneficiaries.
particular, the Court held that a New Jersey law prohibiting
pension benefit offsets for New Jersey workers' compensation
379
awards was preempted because ERISA permitted such offsets.
380 the Supreme Court pointed to
In Shaw v. Delta Airways,
the administrative advantage for participants of having uniform
rules throughout the United States when it held that Explicit
ERISA Preemption preempted a New York law that required
ERISA disability planS381 to provide maternity benefits because
ERISA contained no such mandate at such time. 382 The unanimous
court observed that if such statutes were not preempted, plan
participants could be forced to shoulder the increased
administrative burden of complying with multiple state
requirements because employers may reduce plan benefits to pay
for such burdens. 383 Moreover, the Court stated:
An employer with employees in several States would find its plan
subject to a different jurisdictional pattern of regulation in each
State [if the preemption provision were disregarded], depending on
what benefits the State mandated under disability, workmen's
compensation, and unemployment compensation laws. The
administrative impracticality of permitting mutually exclusive
384
pockets of federal and state jurisdiction within a plan is apparent.

377. Alessi, 451 U.S. at 504.
378. Id. at 521-26.
379. Id. at 510.
380. Shaw v. Delta Airways, 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
381. Disability plans, which are maintained solely for the purpose of
complying with local disability rules, are exempt from ERISA coverage. ERISA
§ 4(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(3). The Supreme Court remanded the case to
determine the applicability of this exemption. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 109.
382. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 108-09. Such discrimination was prohibited as of
April 29, 1979, by the federal Pregnancy Discrimination Act. The issue before
the Court was whether Delta Airways was obligated to pay the locally
mandated benefits accruing before such date. Id. at 88-89.
383. Id. at 105.
384. Id. at 107-08.
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The Court set the stage for this statement by observing that the
breadth of the Explicit ERISA Preemption was shown by the use of
the words "relate to any employee benefit plan" in ERISA § 514(a),
29 U.S.C. §1144(a), rather than the far more limited words that
were present in preliminary versions of ERISA bills.38 5 The Court
quoted portions of the Senate bill and the House bill386 that
immediately preceded the conference bill that became ERISA,
which was approved by both houses in August 1974.387 The first
bill, which was approved by the Senate on March 4, 1974, limited
preemption to matters that "relate to the subject matters
regulated by this Act or the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure
Act [a predecessor of ERISA]."388 The second bill, which was
approved by the House on March 6, 1974, limited preemption to
specified matters, i.e., those that:
relate to the reporting and disclosure responsibilities, and fiduciary
responsibilities, of persons acting on behalf of any employee benefit
plan to which part 1 [the fiduciary responsibility and disclosure
parts of the act] applies . . . [or] relate to the nonforfeitabilty of

participant's benefits in employee benefit plans described in section
201(a) [the plans covered by the vesting rules] or 301(a) [the plans
covered by the funding rules], the funding requirements of such
plans, the adequacy of financing of such plans, portability
requirements for such plans, or the insurance of pension plans
under such plans.389
The Supreme Court observed in a Shaw footnote that there were
limits on the reach of the "related to" phrase by suggesting,
without any mention of its earlier Campa decision, that the DRO
in Merry, which enforced a support obligation, may have been an
example of a state law that was not preempted because it affected
employee benefit plans in "too tenuous, remote and peripheral a
manner."390 On the other hand, the Court began its analysis with a
widely accepted statement of ERISA's goals by citing the Court's
earliest non-summary decisions interpreting ERISA: "ERISA is a
comprehensive statute designed to promote the interests of
employees and their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans."391

385. Id. at 97- 100.
386. Id. at 100 n.18.
387. WOOTEN, supra note 132, at 369-70.
388. See the preemption provision of the bill that passed the Senate, H. R. 2,
93d Cong, 2d Sess., § 699(a), reprinted in ERISA LEG. HISTORY, supra note
184, 3599, 3820.
389. See the preemption provision of the bill that passed the House, H. R. 2,
93d Cong., 2d Sess., § 514(a) reprinted in ERISA LEG. HISTORY, supra note
184, at 4057-59.
390. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 100 n.21.
391. Id. at 90 (citing Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446
U.S. 359, 361-62 (1980); Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan,Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 510
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F. Pre-REACT (1984) Interpretationof Spousal Survivor Benefit
Provisions that Were Initially in ERISA
The Service, which was responsible for issuing regulations
with respect to the spousal survivor pension provisions,
interpreted them to have little effect on the only DC plans to
which they applied, namely those that offered annuity benefits. 392
In particular, plans whose normal retirement benefit was not an
annuity but offered annuities, such as some DC plans whose
normal retirement benefit was a lump sum, could refuse to make
the joint and survivor benefit the default benefit.39 3 Moreover, the
courts held that a participant waiver of joint and survivor benefits
could be successfully challenged only with a showing that the
spouse lacked the capacity to make such a waiver. 394
Thus, the initial ERISA spousal protections were quite
minimal, although under the logic of the Supreme Court's Campa
decision, all elements of state family law, not merely DROs, would
govern ERISA plans. In particular, the traditional spousal
protections, community property and the right of a surviving
spouse to elect against a decedent's elective estate, could be
applied by a participant's spouse to obtain an interest in the
participant's survivor benefit. However, there was one major gap.
These protections would not appear to prevent a participant from
choosing to take a life annuity benefit and, thus, leaving no
survivor benefit.

(1981)).
392. Under Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 47,713 (Oct. 17,
1978) and 29 C.F.R. § 2570.200a-2, the Service has the responsibility for
establishing the regulations with respect to the spousal survivor benefit
provisions of ERISA.
393. I.R.S. Notice 82-4, 1982-1 C.B. 356. The Service announced it would
amend Treas. Reg. § 1.401 (a)-11(b) (1) (1977) to conform to the holding in BBS
Associates, Inc. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1118 (1980), aff'd, 661 F.3d 913 (3d
Cir. 1981), thus invalidating a contrary regulation. In particular, the joint and
survivor annuity would have to be the default choice only if the participant
chose to receive an annuity but not if he selected the lump sum form.
However, no formal amendment seems to have been filed.
394. See Sladek v. Bell Sys. Mgmt. Pension Plan, 880 F.2d 972, 978-79 (7th
Cir. 1989) (denying the dismissal of a spousal survivor benefit claim based on
allegation that participant suffered from Alzheimer's disease and lacked
capacity to deprive her of pre-REACT spousal benefits); but cf., Cobb v. Cent.
States, Sw. and Se. Pension Fund, No. 05-30906, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 21476,
at *17-19 (5th Cir. Aug. 22. 2006) (holding that the court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction for spouse claiming pre-REACT survivor benefits); Lerra v.
Monsanto Co., 521 F. Supp. 1257, 1263 (E.D. Mass. 1981) (holding that a
spouse was not entitled to pre-REACT survivor benefits when the participant
chose life annuity).
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G. Summary of Pre-REACT Relation of State Family Law and
ERISA in Aftermath of Campa
A participant's spouse has no entitlement to survivor benefits
unless the pension plan provides such benefits and the participant
does not waive them. Life insurance plans need not provide any
spousal benefits. It appears that state community property laws,
state election laws and state revocation of designations upon
divorces may change who obtains, and who may retain the
survivor benefits.
DROs determine benefit entitlements for life insurance plans,
disability plans and pension plans. There may be limits on the
extent to which DROs may change entitlements, and changes
contrary to plan terms may cause a pension plan to lose its tax
qualification.
IX. CONGRESS PROVIDES FOR MORE DEFERENCE TO DOMESTIC
RELATIONS ORDERS IN THE 1980S FOR NON-ERISA FEDERAL
ENTITLEMENTS
In the 1980s, before enacting REACT, Congress significantly
limited the extent to which DROs were otherwise preempted with
respect to three major federal retirement entitlements-social
security, military retirement, and railway retirement-by adding
explicit domestic relations law exemptions to their respective
alienation prohibition statutes. None of the relevant statutes
appeared to have state law preemption statutes similar to the
Explicit ERISA Preemption. Thus, those exemptions were
sufficient to overcome the traditional preemption by federal
entitlements of state law. 395
The Supreme Court held on June 26, 1981, in McCarthy3 96
that a former spouse could not use a DRO based on community
property rights to obtain military pension benefits directly from
the plan or indirectly from the participant.3 97 In 1975, as
discussed, supra, Congress provided that a DRO based on child
support could be so used. 398 On September 8, 1982, Congress
395. On the other hand, the fact that all involved federal payments, rather
than private plan payments, may have justified less deference to state law.
396. McCarthy, 453 U.S. at 210.
397. Id. at 223-24. Prior to the legislation, 10 U.S.C. § 3929, entitled the
soldier, and only the soldier, to receive retirement benefits, although 10 U.S.C.
§ 1434 permitted the soldier to choose whether to receive a smaller life
annuity so that survivor benefits may be paid to either his children or
surviving spouse. Id. at 215. Moreover, no alienation or anticipation of the
retirement benefits was permitted other than for specified exclusions, one of
which pertained to child support and alimony, but excluded payments based
on community property law. Tax Reduction and Simplification Act of 1977,
Pub. L. No. 95-30, § 501 (d), 91 Stat. 159 (codified as amended at 42 U. S. C.
§ 659 (2006)).
398. Social Services Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-647, 88 Stat. 2337
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enacted the Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act
("USFSPA") 99 to provide that military retirement pay may be
divided when fixing the property rights or family support
obligations between the parties to a divorce, dissolution,
annulment, or legal separation. The USFSPA was effective for
payments due and made after the enactment of the legislation. 400
Former spouses could not receive any benefits until the armed
services member retires. 401 Direct payments from the military for
community property obligations were limited to former spouses
who had been married at least ten years to the service, 402 and the
direct payments were limited to fifty percent of the member's
disposable retired pay. 4 03 However, the alimony and child support
payment obligations of the armed services member are not limited
by the direct payment amounts, and thus they may be collected
from the payments received by the member.404
The Supreme Court held on November 10, 1981, in Ridgway,
that a former spouse could not use a DRO based on community
property rights to obtain military death benefits on behalf of her
children directly from the plan or indirectly from the beneficiary
participant. 405 The USFSPA also permitted military retirees to
elect voluntarily pursuant to a divorce decree to have survivor
benefits paid to a former spouse, 406 but the court could not order
the retiree to make the selection. 407 The statute was subsequently
amended so it now permits a deemed election by the spouse. 408 The
military established a simple administrative procedure for
processing requests for direct payments. 409
Congress took a more leisurely but similar approach with
respect to pension benefits under the Railroad Retirement Act

(1975).
399. Pub. L. No. 97-252, § 1002, 96 Stat. 718, 730-35 (1982) (codified at 10
U.S.C. § 1408 (2006)); see generally DAVID C. CARRAD, THE COMPLETE QDRO
HANDBOOK 175-98 (3d ed. 2009) [hereinafter COMPLETE QDRO HANDBOOK]
(providing a detailed discussion of this Act); Kristine D. Kuenzli, Uniformed
Services Former Spouses' Protection Act: Is There Too Much Protection for the
Former Spouse?, 47 A.F. L. REV. 1 (1999) (providing a complete review of the
statute's origins and evolution).
400. § 1006, 96 Stat. at 737.
401. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(3).
402. Id. § 1408(d)(2). This is the same ten-year requirement for an
individual's former spouse to become entitled to a part of the individual's
social security benefits that was added in 1977, as discussed, supra.
403. Id. § 1408(e)(1).
404. Id. § 1408(e)(6).
405. Ridgway, 454 U.S. at 59-60.
406. § 1003, 96 Stat. at 735-36 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1448 (2006)).
407. Id. § 1003(d).
408. 10 U.S.C. § 1450(f)(3) (2006).
409. See, e.g., COMPLETE QDRO HANDBOOK, supra note 399, at 183-86
(outlining the procedure for obtaining direct payments).
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after the 1979 case, Hisquierdo, in which the Supreme Court held
that a spouse could not use a DRO based on community property
rights to obtain such retirement benefits directly from the plan or
indirectly from the participant. 410 In 1975, as discussed, supra,
Congress provided that a DRO based on child support could be so
used. In 1981, divorced spouses, who had been married at least ten
years, were first made eligible for spousal benefits from the Title I
railroad retirement benefits, which resemble social security
benefits and are coordinated with those benefits, without regard to
the worker's benefit entitlement. 411 On August 12, 1983, Congress
provided for an additional exclusion from the statute limiting
assignments of retirement payments by the Railway Retirement
Board. The exclusion was for a portion of the retiree's Title II
railroad retirement benefits, which depend on the length of service
and compensation while a railroad employee.412 The portion is
determined in accord with "a court decree of divorce, annulment,
or legal separation or the terms of any court-approved property
settlement incident to any such court decree." 413 The change was
effective prospectively. 414 The Railroad Retirement Board
established a simple administrative procedure for processing
requests for partitioning Title II railroad payments. 415
Finally, on April 20, 1983, Congress amended the SSA to
provide unambiguously that an individual's spouse or dependent
may in the future use a DRO to have the Social Security
Administration use a portion of the social security benefit
otherwise payable to the individual to satisfy the individual's child
support or alimony in the same way as Congress had been done in
1975 for the spouses or dependents of a recipient of federal
compensation. 416 The statute clarifies that any statutory exception
410. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. at 583-85. Prior to the legislation, 45 U.S.C.

§ 231m(a), prevented any alienation or anticipation of the retirement benefits
other than specified exclusions, one of which pertained to child support and
alimony and explicitly excluded payments pertaining to community property.
411. 1981 Railroad Retirement Benefit Amendments, SOCIAL SECURITY
at
1981),
available
(Dec.
at
20-21
BULLETIN,
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v44nl2/v44nl2p20.pdf (last visited August
13, 2012). The change was part of Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357 (1981).
412.

Id.

413. Pub. L. No. 98-76, tit. IV, § 419(a), 97 Stat. 411, 438 (1983); see also
COMPLETE QDRO HANDBOOK, supra note 399, at 226-28 (providing a detailed
discussion of the Act); U.S. R.R. Retirement Bd., Railroad Retirement
at
available
(2009),
Handbook
(providing a complete
http://www.rrb.govigenerallhandbook/chapterl.asp
history of the introduction and amendment of the Railroad Retirement
program) (last visited Aug. 13, 2012).
414. Pub. L. No. 98-76, tit. IV, § 419(b), 97 Stat. 411, 438 (1983).
415. See, e.g., COMPLETE QDRO HANDBOOK, supra note 399, at 226-27
(describing the procedures used for dividing Title II railroad payments).
416. Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21 § 335, 97 Stat.

ERISA's Family Law Provisions

2012]

703

to the alienation prohibition for social security payments 417 must
be explicit by adding the following to that statute:
(b) No other provision of law, enacted before, on, or after the date of
the enactment of this section [enacted April 20, 1983], may be
construed to limit, supersede, or otherwise modify the provisions of
this section except to the extent that it does so by express reference
418
to this section.

The statute added such a reference to SSA § 459(a), 42 U.S.C.

§ 659(a), which contains the correlative exception for periodic DRO
support obligations. 4 19 On its face, the added language is not only
effective prospectively, but it also leaves no question that
payments of a DRO obligation from social security benefits were
not implicitly available in the past or available to satisfy marital
property payment obligations. 420
X. CONGRESS MOOTS CAMPA WITH REACT AND REDUCES
DEFERENCE OF ERISA PLANS To DOMESTIC RELATIONS ORDERS
In contrast to its other legislation in the 1980s pertaining to
the three major federal retirement programs, REACT significantly
limited the extent to which DROs could be used to obtain ERISA
plan entitlements. On the other hand, it introduced survivor
benefits for surviving spouses, which could not be eliminated
without the spouse's consent.

A. REACT's Explicit Purpose and Its Actual Provisions
The Retirement Equity Act of 1984 (REACT) was adopted on
August 23, 1984, after the adoption of the legislation regarding
Social Security, military retirement pay, and railroad retirement
pay described supra. However, there was a fundamental difference
between ERISA and those statutes. Before REACT, a participant's
spouse and dependents had more access to the participant's
ERISA pension payments than the amendments of those statutes
granted, i.e., they could obtain a portion of the participant's
pension payments when made pursuant to a DRO to satisfy family
support obligations, family property obligations, or a mixture of
65, 130 (1983).

417. In contrast, the Alienation Prohibition, ERISA § 206(d)(1), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1056(d)(1), protects benefits rather than payments from alienation.
418. SSA § 207(b), 42 U.S.C. § 407(b) (1998).
419. Pub. L. No. 98-21 § 335(b)(1), 97 Stat. 65, 130 (1983).
420. But see Stanley W. Welsh & Franki J. Hargrave, Social Security
Benefits at Divorce: Avoiding Federal Preemption to Allow Equitable Division
of Property in Divorce, 20 J. AM. AcAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW 285 (2007)
(discussing how some, but not all, courts permit social security benefits, which

are marital property, to be offset against marital property to which the retiree
would otherwise be entitled even though a social security retiree may not be
compelled to use social security benefits to make marital property payments).
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both. Thus, unless there was a change in Supreme Court
jurisprudence or the Service's policies, there was no need for
legislation to permit DROs to avoid the ERISA General
Exemption, the Alienation Prohibition, or tax issues with respect
to pension plan benefit payments. 42 1 However, there was a serious
issue with spousal survivor benefits. ERISA pension plans, unlike
the Social Security system or the railroad retirement system, were
not required to provide a participant's spouse with minimal
survivor benefits, whether they had been married one year, ten
years, or twenty years.
Congress expressed a desire to make ERISA more
accommodating to spouses and their dependents by describing
REACT as intended:
to improve the delivery of retirement benefits and provide for

greater equity under private pension plans for workers and their
spouses and dependents by taking into account changes in work
patterns, the status of marriage as an economic partnership, and
the substantial contribution to that partnership of spouses who
422
work both in and outside the home, and for other purposes.

The President's signing statement described REACT as follows:
I am pleased to sign into law H.R. 4280, the Retirement Equity Act
of 1984. This important legislation is the first private pension bill in
our history to recognize explicitly the importance of women both to
the American family and to the Nation's labor force. It contains
significant measures to enhance women's ability to earn pensions in
their own right. It improves and protects the vital role of pensions
as retirement income to widows.
An end to inequities in the provision of pension benefits to women
has been a top priority of my administration. In September 1983 I
sent to Congress our own pension equity bill. I am pleased that most
of that bill has been incorporated into this legislation I have now
423
approved. . . .
Thus, the President and Congress apparently decided to provide
no additional protections for the two ERISA plans that, like
pension plans, often provided income replacement for a
participant's spouse and dependents, viz., disability plans and life

421. However, there was a need to address the tax qualification of plans
forced to make payments pursuant to the requirements of a DRO which were
not a fraction of the participant's payments. Under the pre-REACT rules such
payments would disqualify the plan.
422. Pub. L. No. 98-397 Preface, 98 Stat. 1426 at 1426 (1984).
423. President Ronald Reagan, Statement on Signing the Retirement Equity
at
available
1984),
23,
(Aug.
1984
of
Act
http://www.reagan.utexas.edularchives/speeches/1984/82384b.htm (last visited
Aug. 13, 2012).
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insurance plans. 424 As discussed, infra, the additional protections
were also not applicable to all pension plans. This was the same
attitude taken in the initial version of ERISA. ERISA did not
address the substantive terms of those plans, but provided for the
enforcement of the terms of the plans.
REACT enhanced spousal protections for plans that could be
required to provide spousal survivor benefits, which, as discussed,
supra, are a subset of ERISA pension plans. However, Congress
reversed the pertinent Supreme Court decision pertaining to
DROs. It had done the same with military pensions and railroad
worker pensions. As a result, ERISA plan benefits would be
treated like those other federal entitlements. In particular, DROs
could not encumber ERISA benefit entitlements except under
specified conditions. This change may have been intended to
assure that there could be simple administrative review of the
compliance of the DROs with these conditions. In particular, those
pension plans required by REACT to provide spousal survivor
pension benefits, described, infra ("Spousal Survivor Pension
Plans"), were required to defer to DROs that are QDROs, but
prohibited from deferring to any others. The sponsors of all other
ERISA plans, such as disability plans, life insurance plans, and
pension plans other than Spousal Survivor Pension Plans, defined,
infra, could decide the extent to which they would defer to DROs.
The legislative history gives some of the considerations
apparently used by Congress as it formulated the parity approach
described in the prior paragraph. After referring to four cases
upholding orders for family support obligations despite claims that
they violated the Alienation Prohibition or the ERISA General
Preemption, including Merry,4 25 two of the committee reports
describe the law regarding whether ERISA preempts community
property rights to pension benefits as follows. "There is a
divergence of opinion among the courts as to whether ERISA
preempts State community property laws insofar as they relate to
the rights of a married couple to benefits under a pension, etc.

424.

See, e.g., ALEXANDER LINDY ET AL., LINDEY & PARLEY SEPARATION
& ANTENUPTIAL CONTRACTS 26-1-26-39 (2d. ed. 2011)
(discussing the role of insurance in assuring the payment of support
obligations).
425. See Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 592 F.2d at 122-25 (summarizing case law in
the course of upholding an order requiring a pension plan to satisfy child
support and alimony arrearage); bBut see Townsend, 468 F. Supp. at 466
(holding that an order based on community property rights to a pension plan
was preempted by the Alienation Prohibition). That case was cited by Merry,
but not by any of the Committee reports.
The reports also did not mention the more up-to-date discussion of this issue
in Zamborsky, 650 F.2d at 196, which as discussed, supra, referred to many of
the Campa implications.
AGREEMENTS
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plan." 426 Footnote number 24, which appears in both reports, cites
only two decisions. The first is a 1978 district court decision,
Francis, which, as discussed, supra, held that the Alienation
Prohibition prevented a participant's spouse from using
community property to obtain an interest in the participant's
pension interest in the course of a marital dissolution. 427 The
second decision, Stone II, was issued two years later by the Ninth
Circuit, which contains the Francis district court and thus
eliminates the conflict within that Circuit. The Stone II court
stated:
As our decision in Carpenters Pension Trust v. Kronschnabel, 632
F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1980), demonstrates, the Supreme Court's
summary dismissal of the appeal in In re Marriage of Campa, 444
U.S. 1028, 100 S. Ct. 696, 62 L. Ed. 2d 664 (1980) (Campa), binds
district and circuit courts to the view that ERISA does not preempt
state-court orders requiring a pension plan to pay a community
property share of a plan participant's monthly benefit payments
directly to his or her ex-spouse. 428
Thus, the reports presented evidence not of a conflict, but rather of
a consensus ratified by the Supreme Court that DROs based on
state community property laws, alimony, or family support laws
established enforceable rights to pension benefits. 429
The Senate bill was described as resolving this non-existent
conflict about DROs as follows:
In the case of a judgment, decree, or order relating to child support,
alimony payments, or marital property rights pursuant to a State
domestic relations law that meets certain requirements (a qualified
domestic relations order), the bill clarifies that such order does not
result in a prohibited assignment or alienation of benefits under the
spendthrift provisions of the Code or ERISA. In addition, the bill
provides that the general ERISA preemption rule does not apply to
these qualified domestic relations orders. 430

426. H.R. REP. No. 98-655, pt. 2, at 18 (1984); S. REP. NO. 98-575, at 19
(1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2547, 2565.
427. Francis, 458 F. Supp. at 86.
428. Stone II, 633 F.2d at 742.
429. See Louise Everett Graham, Kentucky Survey-Domestic Relations, 73

KY. L.J. 379, 380-83 (1984) (discussing the pre-REACT law with respect to the
applicability of the Alienation Prohibition to domestic relations orders); but see
Kerbow, 421 F. Supp. at 1253 (holding that the court lacked ERISA
jurisdiction to consider spousal claim to participant's retirement benefits
because marital dissolution order recognizing spousal community rights in
pension did not result in the spouse being an ERISA participant or
beneficiary). REACT resolved such issue by treating QDROs as beneficiary
designations thereby giving claimants access to federal courts to enforce their
benefit entitlements.
430. S. REP. No. 98-575, at 3 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2547,
2557.
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In short, a DRO that meets the new requirements to be a
QDRO is not preempted and is enforceable. All other DROs are
preempted, and thus not enforceable.
Congress recognized there was an open tax issue about DROs
that provided rights to benefits that the participant had not yet
requested. The discussion in both congressional reports concludes
with a reference to Revenue Ruling 80-27431 that the alienation
prohibition in the qualification requirements will not be violated if
a pension plan complies with a DRO to meet the participant's
family support obligations when the participant is receiving
benefits. 432 The reports also observe that the IRS took no position
about whether the alienation prohibition would be violated if a
state court requires pension payments when the participant is not
receiving benefits. 433 However, the reports do not mention the
Seventh Circuit's Gago decision, discussed, supra, that there is no
ERISA violation if the participant could have elected but did not
elect to receive pension benefits, and the participant's spouse
makes such an election on his behalf. 434 However, with REACT,
Congress provided, as discussed, infra, that under very limited
conditions, a state court may require a pension plan to pay
benefits when the participant is not receiving benefits.435
B. REACT's Substantive Provisions
REACT enhanced the protection of spouses of participants
during the marriage by strengthening and extending the original
pension beneficiary designation mandate of ERISA § 205, 29
U.S.C. § 1055.436 There were four enhancements to this provision:
(a) coverage was broadened beyond pension plans that provided

431. Rev. Rul. 80-27, 1980-1 C.B. 85, was withdrawn as obsolete by Rev.
Rul. 91-8, 1991-1 C.B. 281 because of the enactment of REACT.
432. H.R. REP. No. 98-655, pt. 2, at 18 (1984); S. REP. NO. 98-575, at 19
(1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N., 2565. H.R. REP. NO. 98-655, pt. 1, at
30 (1984), also observed that the Department of Labor had taken a position
similar to that of the IRS.

433. Id.
434. Gago, 717 F.2d at 1045. The decision also referred to a question
whether a state court may order a pension plan to make benefits payments in
violation of the plan terms in the jurisdictional statement. In re Marriage of
Campa, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980). The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal
because such an issue did not raise a substantial federal question, and thereby
answered the question in the affirmative, as discussed supra.
435. The QDRO Provisions permit QDROs to obtain benefits when the
participant is not receiving benefits if the participant could obtain such
benefits and is still working. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(E), 2 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(E).
436. On Nov. 8, 1984, a short time after the enactment of REACT, similar
enhancements were made to the survivor benefits for spouses of federal civil
service employees by the Civil Service Retirement Spouse Equity Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-615, 98 Stat. 3195, 3195-96 (1984).
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annuities; 437 (b) covered pension plans were required to offer
survivor benefits before the participant began to receive plan
benefits, and at the time the participant would begin to receive
benefits;43 8 (c) if a participant were married, covered pension plans
were required to designate the participant's spouse as the
beneficiary of specified survivor benefits; 4 39 and (d) any change in
such default designations required a written consent of the
participant's spouse witnessed by a third party. 440 The amended
mandate shall be referred to as the Spousal Survivor Benefit
Mandate, 441 and the plans covered by such mandate shall be
hereinafter described as the Spousal Survivor Pension Plans.
ERISA § 205, 29 U.S.C. § 1055, however, does not give a
participant's spouse any protection after the dissolution of their
marriage or, if earlier, after the entry of a separation order. 442
The congressional reports do not mention any consideration of
the advisability of requiring ERISA plans to have spousal survivor
provisions other than the pension plans that were subject to the
initial version of ERISA § 205, 29 U.S.C. § 1055. Welfare plans,
such as life insurance plans or disability plans, are not subject to
this REACT enhanced requirement. 443 Three major kinds of
pension plans need not provide spouses with survivor benefits: (a)
top-hat plans, which are primarily for the purpose of providing
deferred compensation for a select group of management or highly
compensated employees ("Top-Hat Plans"), 444 (b) plans maintained
437. ERISA § 205(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1055(b).
438. ERISA § 205(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1055(a).

439. ERISA § 205(c)-(e), 29 U.S.C. § 1055(c)-(e). The required default benefit
is generally: (1) at retirement is a joint and fifty percent survivor benefit at
retirement, with the spouse entitled to the survivor benefit; and (2) before
retirement, an annuity for the spouse's life. Profit-sharing plans that offer no
annuities may instead provide that the surviving spouse is entitled to the full
account balance if the participant dies before withdrawing his benefits. ERISA
§ 205(b)(1)(C), 29 U.S.C. § 1055(b)(1)(C).
440. ERISA § 205(c)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1055(c)(2).
441. The Spousal Survivor Benefit Mandate is subject to the same criticisms
of many state elective laws. A surviving spouse's interest is not affected by the
term of the marriage, so after a year of marriage the surviving spouse may be
entitled to a substantial share of pension assets accumulated before the
marriage. See generally Heather Rose, Comment, Boggs v. Boggs: Creating
Real-Life Cinderellas, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 271 (1999) (criticizing the
statutory allocation, analogizing it to the interests acquired by Cinderella's
step-mother). ERISA § 205(f), 29 U.S.C. § 1055(f permits, but does not
require, a plan to provide that the marriage last for at least a year. Similarly,
if the surviving spouse has a disproportionate share of the marital property it
is not fair to give her more from the pension assets of the deceased spouse.
442. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-20 Q&A-27 (2006); but cf. 42 U.S.C. § 416(d),
SSA § 216(d) (providing that an individual's divorced spouse is entitled to
spousal social security benefits if the marriage lasted at least ten years).
443. ERISA § 201(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1051(1).
444. ERISA § 201(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1051(2); see, e.g., In re IT Grp. Inc., 448
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solely to provide pension benefits for certain employees in excess of
the contribution and benefit limits that the Internal Revenue Code
(the "Code") imposes for tax qualification purposes, 445 and (c)
simplified employee pension plans and simple retirement account
plans, which place assets for participants' benefits in individual
retirement accounts. 446
Before the enactment of REACT, no ERISA section explicitly
referred to the interaction between ERISA and the DROs. Thus,
Congress could not simply transform an existing section to a
beneficiary designation mandate as it had done for spousal
survivor benefits. Congress chose not to add a new section setting
forth a similar beneficiary designation mandate for DROs, which
would have encouraged it to consider which DRO rules to apply to
which ERISA plans. Congress, instead, modified the ERISA
sections setting forth the Alienation Prohibition and the ERISA
General Preemption "to clarify" when such orders were to be
followed and when they were to be disregarded.
First, a second ERISA beneficiary designation mandate was
added, namely ERISA § 206(d)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3).44 7
Spousal Survivor Pension Plans were required to designate
spouses, former spouses, children and dependents of participants
as beneficiarieS 448 pursuant to those state domestic relations
orders that meet the QDRO standards, i.e., QDROs. 449 These
standards included the requirements that the orders be domestic
relations orders,450 which (a) clearly specified the plan, the

F.3d 661 (discussing the characteristics of such plans, particularly their
unfunded nature). Such plans are often called non-qualified because they do
not qualify for the favorable tax treatment that is generally provided to ERISA
pension plans described in Qualified Retirement Plans, supra note 144.
445. ERISA §§ 3(36), 201(7), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(36), 1051(7). But see Albert
Feuer, The Effects of Marital Property Rights, Alimony, Child Support, and
Domestic Relations Orders on Top-Hat Plans, Excess Benefit Plans, and Bonus
available at
(2010),
320
319,
J.
PLAN.
COMP.
Plans, 38
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1719787 (last visited Aug. 13, 2012) (stating that
such plans are very rare).
446. ERISA § 201(6), 29 U.S.C. § 1051(6); I.R.C. §§ 408(k), 408(p). To the
extent a 401(k) plan has designated Roth IRA accounts pursuant to I.R.C.
§ 402A(b)(2), the benefits in such accounts are also not subject to the Spousal
Survivor Benefit Mandate.
447. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(A).
448. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(J), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(J). This beneficiary status
provided the spouses, former spouses, children, and dependents of participants
with standing to claim their plan benefits directly from the plan under: (a)
ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), for a non-terminated plan; (b)
ERISA § 4070(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1370(a) for a terminated single-employer plan; or
(c) ERISA § 4301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1451(a) for a terminated multi-employer plan.
449. The specifications for such orders are set forth in ERISA § 206(d)(3)(B),
29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B).
450. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(B)(i), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(i).
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beneficiaries, and the designated benefits; 45 ' (b) were consistent
with the pension plan's terms; 452 and (c) did not increase the plan's
actuarial costs. 453 However, QDROs are permitted to provide the
following two benefits that may not otherwise be consistent with
the plan's terms: (a) separate benefit interests in certain
circumstances, so that payments may be made even if the
participant is not collecting pension benefits, but has not yet
retired, 454 and (b) spousal treatment of former spouses in certain
circumstances as spouses for purposes of spousal survivor
benefits.455
Second, Spousal Survivor Pension Plans were prohibited from
following the benefit terms of a DRO that was not a QDRO.456
Thus, those benefit terms would be unenforceable because they
were preempted by conflict preemption.
Third, an explicit exclusion of QDROs was added to the
ERISA General Preemption, which shall be described as the
QDRO Exclusion. 457 The QDRO Exclusion is not needed to protect
QDROs from preemption, or to preempt DROs that are not
QDROs. The ERISA requirement that Spousal Survivor Pension
Plans provide that QDROs are beneficiary designations so protects
QDROs.458 The treatment by Spousal Survivor Pension Plans of a
DRO that is not a QDRO as an assignment or alienation results in
the desired preemption.
There appears only to be one sensible explanation for the
QDRO Exclusion. It implies that the excluded items are part of a
larger class of state law that is otherwise preempted because they
"relate to" benefit plans. Thus, ERISA preempts a DRO that is not
a QDRO, but creates, assigns or recognizes rights under state law
to benefit payments from any ERISA plan. However, QDROs only
appear to be defined for Spousal Survivor Pension Plans. Thus, the
implication is that, for life insurance plans, disability plans, and
pension plans other than Spousal Survivor Pension Plans, ERISA
preempts all DROs that create, assign or recognize rights under

451. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(C), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(C).
452. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(D)(i), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(D)(i).
453. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(D)(ii), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(D)(ii).
454. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(E), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(E). It would appear that it
would be more prudent to permit such a spousal decision when the participant
is not working. At such time the participant is not generating the
compensation that was presumably used to pay for support, but the spouse
could expect the source of support to be replaced by the pension plan
payments.
455. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(F), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(F).
456. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(A). Treating ERISA
§ 206(d)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) as applicable to those benefit provisions,
means the plan is prohibited from following those terms.
457. ERISA § 514(b)(7), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(7).

458. Id.
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state law to benefit payments unless the plan chooses to defer to
such a DRO.
If such a DRO "relates to" benefit plans, than other family
laws that create or recognize such state rights to benefit payments
also "relate to" benefit plans. A fortiori, such an exclusion implies
that all family law provisions that create, assign, or recognize
rights under state law to benefit payments, such as provisions
revoking beneficiary designations upon divorces, are preempted.
In short, REACT unequivocally overruled Campa and its
implications that ERISA does not preempt family state law. If
family law, not merely domestic relations law, is not preempted, as
discussed, supra, such law could change benefit entitlements for
ERISA plans.
If Congress wished to provide that ERISA did not preempt
state domestic relations law, or other state family law, for ERISA
plans other than Spousal Survivor Pension Plans, it could have
simply added such an exclusion to ERISA § 514(b), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144(b), together with the QDRO Exclusion. It did not. Such an
implicit and broad exclusion would also violate the thrust of the
QDRO provisions. Those provisions require deference by Spousal
Survivor Pension Plans essentially for those DROs that (1) comply
with plan terms, and (2) provide suitable disclosure to the plan
administrator and the parties to the domestic relations proceeding
of the benefits provided under the DRO. Why would such
requirements be appropriate only for Spousal Survivor Pension
Plans, and why would only such plans be protected from double
payment obligations if their fiduciaries satisfied their fiduciary
obligations in their treatment of DROs?
Thus, in accord with the principle that the state police powers
may not be superseded by federal statutes unless "that was the
clear and manifest purpose of Congress," 459 it is reasonable to
conclude that if, arguendo, domestic relations law or any family
law is a state police power, to the extent, if any, they are
inconsistent with ERISA or ERISA plan terms (those terms
included the required QDRO provisions for Spousal Survivor
Pension Plans), ERISA preempts those state laws. Analysis of the
initial ERISA provisions resulted in the same conclusion.
Congress recognized that the new REACT rules would
preempt DROs, which were previously treated as effective. Thus,
Congress included two grandfather provisions in REACT. First,
those domestic relations orders which did not meet the QDRO
requirements, but which had been accepted by pension plans prior
to the effective date of REACT, remained valid. 460 Second, pension
plans could choose to honor domestic relations orders obtained

459.
460.

Rice, 331 U.S. at 230.
Pub. L. No. 98-397, § 303(d), 98 Stat. 1426, 1453 (1984).
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before the effective date of REACT, which did not meet the QDRO
requirements. 461
In 1986, Congress enacted REACT technical corrections.
Among those corrections was the addition of ERISA § 206(d)(3)(L),
29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(L), which confirmed that the only ERISA
plans that must follow DROs that satisfy QDRO-like rules are
Spousal Survivor Pension Plans. That subparagraph limits the
application of the paragraph (d)(3), which includes all the QDRO
sections, to Spousal Survivor Pension Plans. Subparagraph
(d)(3)(L) was enacted together with a similar addition to the
corresponding tax-qualification Code Section as part of Section
1898(c)(4) of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, entitled "Clarification of
Application of Domestic Relation Provisions." 462 Congress
explicitly intended that the two added provisions "clarif[y] that the
qualified domestic relations provisions do not apply to any plan to
which the assignment or alienation restrictions [the Alienation
Prohibition] do not apply."463
C. Summary of the Relation Between State Family Law and
ERISA in Aftermath of REACT
A participant's spouse has an entitlement to survivor benefits

from Spousal Survivor Pension Plans unless she consents to the
participant's waiver of the benefit. Life insurance plans and
pension plans other than Spousal Survivor Pension Plans need not
provide any spousal benefits. It appears that state community
property laws, state election laws and state revocation of
designations upon divorces are all preempted and may not change
who obtains the survivor benefits unless the respective plan terms
authorize such changes, and ERISA specifies how the default
spousal designation of a Spousal Survivor Pension Plans may be
changed.
DROs may not affect benefit entitlements for life insurance
plans, disability plans and pension plans other than Spousal
Survivor Pension Plans unless the respective plan terms authorize
such changes. Spousal Survivor Pension Plans must defer to, and
may only defer to, DROs that are QDROs, which can address
benefits payable to the participant, and the participant's death
benefits.

461. Id.
462. Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1898(c)(4), 100 Stat. 2085, 2953 (1986).
463. S. REP. NO. 99-313 at 1106 (1986). The final bill made no change to this
section other than changing the section number from 1897(c) to 1898(c). Thus
none was made in the explanation. H.R. REP. NO. 99-514 at 11-857, reprinted
in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4075, 4941.
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XI. THE ALIENATION PROHIBITION TRILOGY OF THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE IMPLICIT DEFERENCE OF ERISA PLANS TO DOMESTIC
RELATIONS ORDERS

The Supreme Court issued three decisions in six years
pertaining to the Alienation Prohibition. The first, Mackey, held in
1988 that ERISA does not preempt the state law garnishment of
benefits of ERISA welfare plans. 4 64 Under Mackey's reasoning,
ERISA would also not preempt other state law alienations, such as
DROs for disability plans, life insurance plans, and pension plans
other than Spousal Survivor Pension Plans. The second, , Guidry
v. Sheet Metal Workers National Pension Fund,465 held in 1990

that the Alienation Prohibition prevented a union from using a
federal labor law to stop a pension plan from paying plan benefits
to a participant who had embezzled funds from the union.466 The
third, Patterson v. Shumate,467 held in 1992 that the Alienation
Prohibition prevented a participant's federal bankruptcy trustee
from obtaining the participant's pension benefits.468 The last two
decisions did not consider whether a recipient could retain the
benefits after their distribution, although Mr. Guidry relied on
state law to do so. 4 69
A.

Supreme Court Approves Garnishmentof Vacation Plan
Benefits

In 1988, the Mackey Court held that an individual's creditor
may garnish 470 the individual's benefits from an ERISA welfare
plan. 4 71 Many questions can be raised about the Court's analysis,
although this Article will focus primarily on the Court's analysis of
the significance of the Alienation Prohibition and the Prohibition's
interaction with the ERISA General Preemption. 472
464. Mackey, 486 U.S. at 841. The Court did not discuss the extent, if any,
to which plan terms may limit such garnishments.
465. Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365
(1990) [hereinafter Guidry 1].
466. Id. at 367, 371-75.
467. Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 755, 760 (1992).
468. Id. at 755, 760.
469. The Tenth Circuit, however, found on remand that: (1) the Alienation
Prohibition did not apply to the pension plan benefits after their distribution,
but (2) state law prohibited the union from obtaining those distributed
benefits. Guidry v. Sheet Metal Worker Local Unions, 39 F.3d 1078, 1081,
1083 (10th Cir. 2000) [hereinafter Guidry Ill.
470. Garnishment is defined as "a statutory proceeding whereby a person's
property, money, or credits in possession or under control of or owing another
are applied to payment of the person's debt to a third person by proper
statutory process against debtor and garnishee." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY
612 (5th ed. 1979).
471. Mackey, 486 U.S. at 831-32.
472. See Albert Feuer, Who Is Entitled to Survivor Benefits from ERISA
Plans?, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 919, 945-47 (2007) [hereinafter Survivor
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The Supreme Court first unanimously agreed that ERISA
preempted an exemption from the Georgia general garnishment
statute for "[flunds or benefits of a pension, retirement, or
employee benefit plan or program subject to the provisions of the
federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as
amended. . . ."473
The Court cited the Shaw statement in its unanimous opinion
that "[a] law 'relates to' an employee benefit plan, in the normal
sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with or reference to such
a plan."4 7 4 By referring directly to ERISA plans, the Court
concluded that the state law related to ERISA and was thus
preempted. 475 The Supreme Court had never preempted a law for
this reason, probably because Shaw also contains the following
statement in a footnote: "Some state actions may affect employee
benefit plans in too tenuous, remote, or peripheral a manner to
warrant a finding that the law 'relates to' the plan."4 76 A provision
preventing an ERISA plan from being affected by another state
statute results in state law not affecting ERISA plans. Thus,
ERISA does not preempt the exemption provision. Therefore, the
garnishment should not have been permitted, and there was no
reason for the Court to consider the general garnishment statute
without the ERISA exemption.4 77 The absurdity of this preemption
holding is shown by observing that the Court thereby allowed
state law garnishments of the pension benefits of Spousal Survivor
Pension Plans. 478 However, those garnishments would violate the
Alienation Prohibition.4 79 Thus, ERISA Conflict Preemption
preempts such garnishments.
Benefit Entitlements], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1087504 (last
visited Aug. 13, 2012) (criticizing that analysis).
473. Mackey, 486 U.S. at 828 n.2.
474. Id. at 829 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Shaw, 463 U.S. at 9697).
475. Mackey, 486 U.S. at 829-30.
476. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 100 n.21. The Supreme Court therein cited
American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 592 F.2d at 121 ("state garnishment
of a spouse's pension income to enforce alimony and support orders is not preempted"), as, perhaps, presenting such an example. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 100
n.21.
477. After finding that the ERISA plan exemption portion of the
garnishment statute was preempted, the Court analyzed the garnishment
statute. Mackey, 486 U.S. at 829. It then found that ERISA did not preempt
that portion in part by using the arguments discussed above. Id. at 831. This
may reflect the Court's strong desire to decide whether ERISA preempted the
application of the general Georgia garnishment statute to ERISA plans other
than Spousal Survivor Pension Plans. This strong desire seemed to be
reflected in the Court's decision to appoint an amicus curiae when the credit
agency elected not to appear in court. Id. at 829 n.3.
478. Macky, 486 U.S. at 832.
479. See Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-13(b)(1) (mentioning garnishments
explicitly).
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The Court followed its discussion of why ERISA preempted
the ERISA exemption in the state law with a disagreement about
whether the ERISA General Preemption prohibited state law
garnishments for plans other than Spousal Survivor Pension
Plans.
The majority asserted that the limitation of the Alienation
Prohibition to garnishments by Spousal Survivor Plans showed
that garnishments were permitted for other plans. 480 If, as
originally enacted in 1974, the Explicit ERISA Preemption
prohibited garnishments for all plans, the majority asserted the
Alienation Prohibition would be superfluous, and this would
violate standard statutory interpretation rules. 481 The majority
missed the fact that the Alienation Prohibition is not superfluous
because it prevents Spousal Survivor Pension Plans from
permitting the prohibited alienations, whereas, other ERISA
plans, such as Top-Hat Plans, may choose to permit alienations.
Thus, ERISA permits arguments about the extent to which the
terms of those other plans permit alienations, such as
assignments. However, the dissent responded that the majority
assertion fails to recognize that the Explicit ERISA Preemption
preempts state law that conflicts with any ERISA mandate, such
as the Alienation Prohibition, because such law thereby relates to
employer benefit plans in a prohibited fashion. 482 The majority
responded regardless of the reason, statutes should not be treated
enacted
two
that were
particularly
as
superfluous,
simultaneously. 483
The dissenters also asserted that the majority interpretation
would render the QDRO Exclusion from the Explicit ERISA
Preemption nugatory because the Exclusion's purpose was "to save
from preemption certain garnishments designed to enforce
domestic relations obligations."484 The majority cited the statutory
REACT goal of "guarantee [ing] that the Nation's private
retirement-income system provided fair treatment for women." 485
The majority then asserted that there was a more plausible
explanation for the QDRO Exclusion, "namely, that Congress
thought that some courts had erroneously construed § 514(a) as
preempting such [domestic relations] orders. In this view, the 1984
amendment served the purpose of correcting the error, thus
clarifying the original meaning of the section." 486 The dissenters
accused the majority of thereby rendering the QDRO Exclusion
480.
481.
482.
483.
484.
485.
486.

Mackey, 486 U.S. at 837-38.
Id.
Id. at 846 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 837.
Id. at 842 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 838.
Id. at 839.
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superfluous.48 7 Both sides partially missed some important points.
The dissenters correctly described the interaction between the
Explicit ERISA Preemption and all ERISA mandates, including
the Alienation Prohibition. ERISA mandates help determine the
significance of the phrase "relate to," although laws not pertaining
to ERISA mandates, such as the one in Shaw, may also relate to
ERISA plans. This should not have been the end of the discussion.
The Court should have asked, as it, did in Shaw and New York
State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Insurance,488 whether the relation is too tenuous, remote, or
peripheral, as the dissenters did.489 The Supreme Court's
subsequent decision in Boggs implicitly held that the relation of
the garnishment statute was not too tenuous, remote, or
peripheral, when it found any state law preempted if it adversely
affected the right of a participant or a beneficiary to receive a plan
benefit, as discussed, infra.490 However, the garnishment would
have been permitted if the plan terms permitted state
garnishments. There was no evidence the plan terms did so. Thus,
the garnishment was preempted.
Both sides misunderstood the QDRO Exclusion from the
ERISA General Preemption. As discussed in the REACT section,
supra, it is not needed to preempt DROs pertaining to Spousal
Survivor Pension Plans that are not QDROs. ERISA § 206(d)(3),
29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3), provides for such preemption. The QDRO
Exclusion could serve a useful purpose without addressing or
having any relation to garnishments. Whether or not a DRO based
on marital rights is a garnishment or would violate the Alienation
Prohibition, the DRO may still violate the Explicit ERISA
Preemption, as the maternity benefits did in Shaw. Thus, as
discussed in the REACT section, supra, the QDRO Exclusion
paradoxically clarified that ERISA preempts DROs not satisfying
the QDRO rules, without regard to whether they apply to Spousal
Survivor Pension Plans or any other ERISA plan.

487. Id. at 845-46 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).

488. N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Ins., 514 U.S. 645 (1995) (holding that ERISA did not preempt the imposition
of hospital surcharges only on non-Blue Cross health insurers) [hereinafter
N.Y S. BCBS]. The Court therein referred favorably to its Mackey decision,
even though the majority therein failed to discuss whether the relation was
too tenuous. Id. at 662.
489. Mackey, 486 U.S. at 842-44.
490. Boggs, 520 U.S. at 841-43.
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B. Supreme Court Finds Alienation ProhibitionSupersedes Other
FederalLaws and Rejects Implicit Equity Exemption from
Alienation Prohibition
The Supreme Court has unanimously decided two cases in
which a participant's creditor sought to use federal law to obtain
the participant's benefits from an ERISA pension plan. ERISA
does not preempt federal statutes. Rather, ERISA provides that
none of its provisions "alter, amend, modify, invalidate, impair or
supersede" any other federal statute.491 Yet, in each case the Court
unanimously decided that the Alienation Prohibition precluded the
creditor's claim.
In 1990, the Supreme Court held in Guidry that the
Alienation Prohibition prevented a union from using a federal
labor law to impose a constructive trust against an ERISA pension
plan and directed the plan to pay plan benefits to an individual
who had embezzled substantial funds from the union. 492 In 1992,
the Court held in Patterson, that the Alienation Prohibition
prevented a participant's federal bankruptcy trustee from
obtaining the participant's pension benefits.493
The Guidry Court held that the specific ERISA prohibition,
the Alienation Prohibition, superseded the general relief parts of
the labor statute. 494 Moreover, eight of the justices495
unequivocally declared:
Nor do we think it appropriate to approve any generalized equitable
exception-either for employee malfeasance or for criminal
misconduct-to ERISA's prohibition on the assignment or alienation
of pension benefits. Section 206(d) reflects a considered
congressional policy choice, a decision to safeguard a stream of
income for pensioners (and their dependents, who may be, and
perhaps usually are, blameless), even if that decision prevents
others from securing relief for the wrongs done them. If exceptions to
this policy are to be made, it is for Congress to undertake that task.
As a general matter, courts should be loath to announce equitable
exceptions to legislative requirements or prohibitions that are
unqualified by the statutory text. The creation of such exceptions, in
our view, would be especially problematic in the context of an
antigarnishment provision. Such a provision acts, by definition, to
hinder the collection of a lawful debt. A restriction on garnishment
therefore can be defended only on the view that the effectuation of
certain broad social policies sometimes takes precedence over the

ERISA § 514(d), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d).
492. Guidry I, 493 U.S. at 375-76. The plan was a result of collective
bargaining by the victimized union. Id. at 372-76.
493. Patterson, 504 U.S. at 759-60.
494. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA), 29
U.S.C. § 501(b) (2006).
495. Justice Thurgood Marshall did not join in this part of the opinion.
491.
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desire to do equity between particular parties. It makes little sense
to adopt such a policy and then to refuse enforcement whenever
enforcement appears inequitable. A court attempting to carve out an
exception that would not swallow the rule would be forced to
determine whether application of the rule in particular
circumstances
would
be
"especially"
inequitable.
The
impracticability of defining such a standard reinforces our
conclusion that the identification of any exception should be left to
Congress.496
Thus, the Court totally rejected equitable arguments supporting
implicit exceptions to the Alienation Prohibition discussed, supra.
Moreover, the Court cited the regulations for its holding that
garnishments were prohibited. 497 However, prior to making this
statement the Court described the family law exception that
Congress had made in REACT "where Congress mandated that
the anti-alienation provision should not apply to a 'qualified
domestic relations order."' 4 98 The Court thereby implied that
contrary to Campa, DROs that create, assign, or recognize rights
under state law to benefit payments violated the pre-REACT
Alienation Prohibition. Thus, such DROs would be preempted.
In 1992 in Patterson, the Supreme Court unanimously held
that the Alienation Prohibition prevented pension benefits from
being alienated under another federal law, the Federal
Bankruptcy Code. 499 In particular, the Court held that the
Alienation Prohibition, which must be part of the terms of an
ERISA pension plan, constituted "an enforceable transfer
restriction" for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code § 541(c)(2)'s
exclusion of property from the bankruptcy estate.50 0 The Court501
described its unanimous decision as extending its holding in
Guidry502 and repeated the previously quoted language from
Guidry about how ERISA § 206(d) reflects a considered
congressional policy choice.50 3

C. Summary of Relation of State Family Law and ERISA in
Aftermath of Alienation ProhibitionTrilogy
A participant's spouse has an entitlement to survivor benefits
from Spousal Survivor Pension Plans unless she consents to the
496. Guidry I, 493 U.S. at 376-77 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
497. Id. at 372.
498. Id. at 376.
499. Patterson,504 U.S. 753.
500. Id. at 760.
501. At this time Justice Clarence Thomas had replaced Justice Thurgood
Marshall on the Supreme Court, and unlike his predecessor, Justice Thomas
joined this part of the opinion that declined to recognize any exceptions to the
Alienation Prohibition.
502. Id. at 764.
503. Id. at 765.
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participant's waiver of the benefit. It appears that for Spousal
Survivor Pension Plans (1) state community property laws, state
election laws, and state revocation of designations upon divorces
are all preempted and may not change who obtains the survivor
benefits unless the respective plan terms authorize such changes,
and (2) ERISA specifies how the default spousal designation of a
may be changed.
Life insurance plans and pension plans other than Spousal
Survivor Pension Plans need not provide any spousal benefits.
DROs determine benefit entitlements for life insurance plans,
disability plans and pension plans other than Spousal Survivor
Pension Plans. There may be limits on the extent to which DROs
may change entitlements, and changes contrary to plan terms may
cause a pension plan to lose its tax qualification. Spousal Survivor
Pension Plans must defer to and may only defer to DROs that are
QDROs, which can address benefits payable to the participant,
and the participant's death benefits.
XII. THE ERISA DESIGNATION TRILOGY OF THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE POTENTIAL EROSION OF THE TREATMENT OF ERISA
ENTITLEMENTS PROTECTED FROM STATE FAMILY LAW OWNERSHIP
CLAIMS BEFORE AND AFTER THEIR PLAN DISTRIBUTION

In 1997, the Supreme Court decided Boggs, in which it
focused on the importance of protecting ERISA pension
entitlements and explicitly declared that Campa no longer
governed pension entitlements and held that pension entitlements
are protected from state community property claims before and
after their distribution from an ERISA plan.50 4 In 2001, in
Egelhoff, the Supreme Court again focused on the importance of
protecting such entitlements, while using administration
language.50 5 The Court declared therein that those protections
were achieved with the core ERISA concern that plan payments be
made pursuant to plan terms.506 In particular, the Egelhoff Court
held that both pension and life insurance entitlements are
protected from state community property claims before and after
their distribution from the ERISA plan.507 In 2009, the Kennedy
Court focused on minimizing a plan's administrative burdens
when it was confronted with the question of a pension plan's
benefit payment liability.50 8 In contrast, in Boggs and Egelhoff, the
Court was confronted with the questions of the extent of benefit
entitlements. The Kennedy Court, in dicta, cast some doubt on

504. Boggs, 520 U.S. at 850.
505. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 141.
506. Id. at 150.
507. Id. at 146-47.
508. Kennedy, 555 U.S. at 301-03.
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whether a person with an ERISA entitlement may keep the plan
benefit payment if another person has an ownership claim to the
benefit, which does not entitle that person to receive the plan
benefit from the ERISA plan.
A. The Supreme Court Supersedes Campa with Boggs and Treats
ERISA Pension Entitlements as FederalEntitlements Protected
from State Family Law Ownership Claims Before and After Their
Distribution
In 1997, the Supreme Court in Boggs v. Boggs held that
ERISA prevented a participant's spouse from using Louisiana
state community law to transfer a portion of his ERISA pension
benefit to their children when she predeceased him.509 Thus, those
children did not thereby derive an entitlement to the pension
amounts paid to him or his designated beneficiaries following his
death. As in Wissner, Free, and Ridgway, the Court applied federal
entitlement principles and held that the federal designation rules
trumped state community property law.510 There appeared to be no
challenge of the decision below that the plans had no direct
liability to the children.511
The participant's first wife, Dorothy, died in 1979.512 This was
after the 1974 enactment of ERISA but before the 1984 enactment
of REACT. In 1980, a Louisiana court ascribed to the first wife's
estate an interest of $21,194.29 in the undistributed interest of the
participant's savings plan (the "Savings Plan").513 The first wife's
will gave (a) the participant a life interest in her assets and one
third of the remainder, and (b) her children two-thirds of the
remainder. 514 The participant remarried Sandra within a year of
the first wife's death, i.e., in 1980.515 In 1985, he retired and
received (a) a lump sum distribution of $151,628.94 from the
Savings Plan, which he rolled into an IRA-he made no
withdrawals before his death in 1989; (b) AT&T shares from an
ESOP, which he retained until his death; and (c) the initial
payments of a qualified joint and survivor annuity with survivor
rights in his second wife from a distinct retirement plan (the
"Retirement Plan").516 Under the participant's will his widow,
Sandra, received a life interest in the AT&T shares and Sandra
appeared to be the sole beneficiary of the IRA.5 17 The adult
509.
510.
511.
512.
513.
514.
515.
516.
517.

Boggs, 520 U.S. at 842-44.
Id. at 844.
Id. at 838.
Id. at 836.
Id. at 837.
Id. at 836-37.
Id. at 836.
Id.
Id. at 837.
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children, after the participant's death, sought the property they
claimed to have been entitled to as of the date of their mother's
death, namely a portion of (a) the annuity payments received by
the participant during his life, (b) the annuity payments being
received by the participant's widow, (c) the IRA account, and (d)
the ESOP shares.5 18 There appeared to be no claim that the
original probate order was a QDRO or subject to the REACT
transition rules.5 19
The Court began its analysis with the traditional statement
that "ERISA is a comprehensive statute designed to promote the
interests of employees and their beneficiaries in employee benefit
plans."520 There was unanimous agreement that the children were
not entitled to any of Sandra's payments from the Retirement
Plan. The Court decided by a vote of 7-2 that the children were not
entitled to receive from the widow, payment for any part of the
spousal survivor benefits paid to the participant's widow from the
Retirement Plan in accord with the Spousal Survivor Benefit
Mandate. 521 The dissent, however, argued that (a) to the extent
that the spouse had received other assets from the estate she was
liable to the children to use them to compensate the children for
the value of the survivor benefits that she received, and (b) ERISA
was only concerned with the uniformity of payments by ERISA
plans. 522 Thus, the dissent argued there would be no ERISA
violation if the widow was required to provide the children with
property other than the survivor benefits that she received. 523 The
majority rejected this argument, as the Court had done in Wissner,
Free, and Ridgway. In particular, the majority observed that the
statutory beneficiary designations of the Spousal Survivor Benefit
Mandate were designed to insure an income stream to the
surviving spouse. 524 Thus, ERISA Conflict Preemption made the
children's community property claim unenforceable:
It would undermine the purpose of ERISA's mandated survivor's
annuity to allow Dorothy, the predeceasing spouse, by her
testamentary transfer to defeat in part Sandra's entitlement to the
annuity § 1055 guarantees her as the surviving spouse. This cannot
be. States are not free to change ERISA's structure and balance. 525

518. Id.

519. The REACT transition rules were not applicable because the pension
plan had not honored the pre-REACT order before the enactment and did not
choose to honor it after the enactment. Pub. L. No. 98-397, § 303(d), 98 Stat.
1426, 1453 (1984).

520. Boggs, 520 U.S. at 845 (citing Shaw, 463 U.S. at 90).
521. Id. at 842.
522. Id. at 862-74.
523. Id. at 871-73 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
524. Id. at 843-44.
525. Id. at 844.
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The Court applied ERISA Conflict Preemption to another
designation mandate, the right of a participant to choose his
beneficiary pursuant to the plan terms, to decide by a vote of 5-4
that the children were not entitled to receive a portion of (a) the
Savings Plan benefits that the participant had received and rolled
over into an IRA, (b) the stock the participant had received from
an ESOP, or (c) the Retirement Plan annuity benefits that the
participant received, but had not rolled over into an IRA or other
tax-qualified plan.526 The majority, as the Court had in Wissner,
Free, and Ridgway, emphasized that the children were not plan
beneficiaries under the plan terms. 527
The Court distinguished the Burrus statement that domestic
relations are governed by state law rather than federal law in two
ways. 52 8 First, the issue before the Court, the validity of a
testamentary transfer, is not a matter of domestic relations.
Second, Congress addressed domestic relations by ensuring that
DROs that meet statutory requirements are not preempted. The
Court had earlier described those requirements as "essential to
one of REA[CT]'s central purposes, which is to give enhanced
protection to the spouse and dependent children in the event of
divorce or separation, . . ."529
The majority also stated that the enactment of REACT made
inapplicable its prior 1980 decision, In re Marriageof Campa.5 30 As
in Wissner, the Court "reinforced" its designation argument by
referring to the Alienation Prohibition,58 ' but then referred to the
participant's designation pursuant to the plan terms "[a]s was true
with survivors' annuities, it would be inimical to ERISA's purposes
to permit testamentary recipients to acquire a competing interest
in undistributed pension benefits, which are intended to provide a
stream of income to participants and their beneficiaries." 532
The Court repeated its Free statement that giving full title to
an individual but forcing the individual to account for the value is
to provide meaningless title. 533
The majority in its final paragraph emphasized the critical
importance of extending ERISA protection to distributed ERISA
benefits as follows:
The axis around which ERISA's protections revolve is [sic] the

526. Id. at 844-50.
527. Id. at 845-50.
528. Id. at 848.
529. Id. at 847.
530. Id. at 849-50. The Supreme Court also explicitly overruled decisions
that reached the same results as Campa, such as Stone, Gago, and
Eichelberger v. Eichelberger,584 F. Supp. 899 (S.D. Tex. 1984).
531. Boggs, 520 U.S. at 851.
532. Id. at 852.
533. Id. at 853.
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concepts of participantand beneficiary. When Congress has chosen
to depart from this framework, it has done so in a careful and
limited manner. Respondents' claims, if allowed to succeed, would
depart from this framework, upsetting the deliberate balance
central to ERISA. It does not matter that respondents have sought to
enforce their rights only after the retirement benefits have been
distributed since their asserted rights are based on the theory that
they had an interest in the undistributedpension plan benefits. Their
state-law claims are pre-empted. The judgment of the Fifth Circuit
is Reversed. 534
The Court had similarly rejected a similar alchemy claim that a
state community property right magically sprang into effect after
the federal government transferred a homestead property in
McCune.5 35
The Court thereby repudiated its suggestion in Shaw footnote
21, discussed, supra, that domestic relations orders may have too
tenuous of an impact on pension plans to be preempted. Instead,
under the Court's reasoning, any state law that adversely affected
a participant's or beneficiary's right to receive an ERISA benefit
entitlement was preempted. The conclusion did not depend on the
benefit being a benefit from a Spousal Survivor Pension Plan, or
from a pension plan. Moreover, under the Court's reasoning,
ownership claims contrary to ERISA plan terms could not be used
to wrest the benefit from the participant or beneficiary entitled to
the benefit under the plan terms.
The dissent responded by focusing on administrative issues
and the Alienation Prohibition, rather than the protection of the
ERISA entitlements of plan participants and beneficiaries. The
dissent thus pointed to the traditional concern for uniform laws to
administer pension plans that it asserted would be satisfied if
decisions by plan fiduciaries to pay benefits to participants and
designated beneficiaries were not affected.536 The dissenters also
argued that community property law didn't "frustrate the
statutory purposes of ERISA."63 7 First, they argued as the Wissner,
Free, and Ridgway dissents had argued that there is no violation
of the Alienation Prohibition because community property
establishes the spousal ownership at the time the pension benefits
are generated. 538 Second, they argued that ERISA is not concerned
534.
535.
536.
537.
538.

Id. at 854 (emphasis added).
McCune, 199 U.S. at 389-90.
Boggs, 520 U.S. at 861-62 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 863-64 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Julie McDaniel Dallison, Comment,

Disappearing Interests: ERISA Impliedly Preempts the Predeceasing
Nonemployee Spouse's Community Property Interest in the Employee's
Retirement, 49 BAYLOR L. REV. 477 (1997); Grant Summers, Comment, ERISA
Preemption of "Direct"and "Indirect"Community PropertyInterests in Pension
Plans upon the Non-ParticipantSpouse's Death, 55 LA. L. REV. 409 (1994).
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with the disposition of any survivor benefits (other than spousal
benefits) from pension plans. 539 Thus, they argued that state law
should control the ultimate disposition of such proceeds as in this
case. 540 Third, they argued that (a) the probate order is not a DRO
because it was not issued under a domestic relations law, and thus
such orders are not alienations under the QDRO Provisions, 541 and
(b) by permitting transfers of pension benefits to former spouses
when they are alive and get divorced, Congress implied that
former spouses should not be deprived of such benefits if they
predecease participants. 542
The majority responded that (a) the Court had to follow the
congressional directions that the spousal survivor provisions and
the QDRO provisions protected the living, such as divorcing
spouses and spousal survivors, rather the dead, such as a spouse
predeceasing the participant, and (b) ERISA protects the income
stream of both participants and beneficiaries, which means the
benefits of both are protected from pre-distribution and postdistribution claims, such as the community property ones at
issue. 543

Boggs cited New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue
Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance544 but did not refer to the
ERISA preemption statement therein:
in cases like this one [health regulation], where federal law is said
to bar state action in fields of traditional state regulation, we have
worked on the "assumption that the historic police powers of the
States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was
the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."545
A forerunner of that statement, however, appears in the dissent. 546
The Court rejected this field preemption approach. Instead, the
Court focused on the ERISA purpose and the conflict with that
purpose, which is similar to its Free approach. "We can begin, and
in this case end, the analysis by simply asking if state law conflicts

539. Boggs, 520 U.S. at 572-73 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
540. Id. at 864-66 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
541. This is a Mackey argument-that if state law alienation is not
explicitly preempted in the Alienation Prohibition, ERISA permits such
alienation.
542. Boggs, 520 U.S. at 866-68 (Breyer, J., dissenting). This is the argument
used to justify elective share laws better approximating the share a surviving
spouse would be entitled to upon a divorce. As discussed, supra, there is no
consensus. Thus, there is a great disparity among the different state laws,
even among the community property states.
543. Id. at 854.
544. Id. at 860 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing N. YS. BCBS, 514 U.S. at
654).
545. N.YS. BCBS, 514 U.S. at 655 (citations omitted). The Boggs majority
cited the prior page. Boggs, 520 U.S. at 860.
546. Id. at 861 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Rice, 331 U.S. at 218).
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with the provisions of ERISA or operates to frustrate its objects.
We hold that there is a conflict, which suffices to resolve the
case."547
In particular, ERISA preempted any state law that conflicted
with the principle that ERISA plan terms determine participant or
beneficiary entitlements. The Court thereby furthered the core
objective of ERISA, which the Court described in Shaw as "a
comprehensive statute designed to promote the interests of
employees and their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans."548
B. The Supreme Court in Egelhoff Treats Both ERISA Pension
and Life InsuranceEntitlements as Federal Entitlements Protected
from State Family Law Ownership Claims Before and After Their
Distribution
In 2001, the Supreme Court in Egelhoff broadened its Boggs
holding when it held that ERISA preempts a Washington state
law that attempts to override a participant's designation of his or
her spouse in an ERISA pension plan or an ERISA life insurance
plan upon the participant's divorce. 549 Thus, the adult children of
the participant's first wife were again not entitled to obtain the
benefits either directly from the plan or indirectly from the
participant's second wife and designated beneficiary.55 0 The Court
mentioned administrative burdens in the context of federal
entitlement principles by focusing on the ERISA General
Preemption, which preempts any state laws that seek to prevent
plan benefits from being paid in accord with the plan terms.55 1
The Egelhoff majority declined to use the ERISA Conflict
Preemption but instead used the broader ERISA General
Preemption. 552 However, the Court stated: "[a]nd as we have
noted, the statute at issue here directly conflicts with ERISA's
requirements that plans be administered, and benefits be paid, in
accordance with plan documents."5 58 These ERISA requirements
are fiduciary requirements, applicable to most ERISA plans.554
These fiduciary requirements arise from the more fundamental
547. Id. at 842 (emphasis added).
548.

Shaw, 463 U.S. at 90.

549. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 147-48.
550. Id. at 144-46.
551. Id. at 149-50. There is an exception for state laws explicitly exempted
from the ERISA General Exemption, such as insurance law, securities law,
banking law, criminal law, or DROs that are QDROs.
552. Two of the justices, in a concurring opinion, observed that the Court
found that state law was connected with ERISA because it conflicted with
ERISA, and thus the Court was applying conflict preemption. Egelhoff, 532
U.S. at 152-53 (Scalia, J., concurring).
553. Id. at 150.
554. See ERISA § 401(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (identifying the plans that are
excluded from those fiduciary requirements).
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requirement that for all ERISA plans, participants and
beneficiaries have enforceable entitlements to benefits under the
plan terms.555 Thus, state laws, which conflicted with the plan
terms of any ERISA plan, would be similarly preempted by the
ERISA Conflict Preemption.5 56 In particular, state statutes
providing for revocation of spousal designations upon the
participant's divorce statutes would be preempted for plans not
55 7
subject to the referenced fiduciary rules, such as Top-Hat Plans.
The majority concluded that the state statute was preempted
under the ERISA General Preemption because it had two
impermissible connections with ERISA plans.
[First,] [t]he administrators must pay benefits to the beneficiaries
chosen by state law, rather than to those identified in the plan
documents. The statute thus implicates an area of core ERISA

concern. In particular, it runs counter to ERISA's commands that a
plan shall "specify the basis on which payments are made to and
from the plan," § 1102(b)(4), and that the fiduciary shall administer
the plan "in accordance with the documents and instruments
governing the plan," § 1104(a)(1)(D), making payments to a
"beneficiary" who is "designated by a participant,or by the terms of
[the] plan." § 1002(8).558

The Court also distinguished generally applicable laws, which
regulate "areas where ERISA has nothing to say," such as state
minimum wage and benefit for apprentices, which are not
5 59
preempted because they only incidentally affect ERISA plans,
from statutes, such as the one at issue, which are preempted
because they "govern[] the payment of benefits, a central matter of
plan administration."5 60 Because garnishment laws govern the
payment of benefits, even though they may be generally applicable
laws, they are preempted. Therefore, the Court implicitly rejected
Mackey's allowance of the garnishment of ERISA benefit payments
without considering the "core ERISA concern" of paying benefits in
accord with plan terms.5 61 This approach is also consistent with its
555. Such entitlements may be enforced under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), 29
U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
556. See generally Albert Feuer, Will The Supreme Court Reinforce Or
Undermine Basic ERISA Principles When It Decides A Death Benefit Dispute?,
3 CHARLESTON L. REV. 289, 302-06 (2009) (discussing why ERISA
entitlements are based on plan terms rather than on plan documents),
availableat http://ssrn.comlabstract=1337276. (last visited Aug. 13, 2012).
557. See supra note 144 and accompanying text (discussing Top-Hat Plans).
558. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 147 (emphasis added).
559. Id. at 148 (citing Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v.
Dillingham Constr., N. A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 330 (1997)). The issue in
California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement was a minimum wage
and benefit statute for apprentices. Cal. Div. of Labor StandardsEnforcement,
519 U.S. at 316.
560. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 148.
561. See id. at 147 (setting forth the "core ERISA concern").
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deferential approach to field preemption in New York State
Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Insurance to fields of traditional state regulation, such as health
regulation discussed, supra.
Second, it conflicts with "one of the principal goals of
ERISA,"562 viZ, to enable employers "to establish a uniform
administrative scheme, which provides a set of standard
procedures to guide processing of claims and disbursement of
benefits." 563
Such conflict arises because:
Plan administrators cannot make payments simply by identifying
the beneficiary specified by the plan documents. Instead they must
familiarize themselves with state statutes so that they can
determine whether the named beneficiary's status has been
"revoked" by operation of law. And in this context the burden is
exacerbated by the choice-of-law problems that may confront an
administrator when the employer is located in one State, the plan
participant lives in another, and the participant's former spouse
lives in a third. In such a situation, administrators might find that
564
plan payments are subject to conflicting legal obligations.
The Court rejected the argument that because administrators
could avoid liability to a second claimant either by refusing to
make payments until the benefit dispute is resolved or by

following plan designations unless they had notice of a marital
dissolution, the state law did not impose an undue burden on plan
65
administrators. 5
The Court emphasized that the primary ERISA concern was
minimizing
rather than
protecting benefit entitlements
administrative burdens on plans by observing:
The dissent observes that the Washington statute permits a plan
administrator to avoid resolving the dispute himself and to let
courts or parties settle the matter. See post, at 6. This observation

only presents an example of how the costs of delay and uncertainty
can be passed on to beneficiaries, thereby thwarting ERISA's
56 6

objective of efficient plan administration.

The Court also observed that under the Washington statute, a

562. Id. There is no reference for this characterization.
563. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Fort Halifax Packing Co. v.
Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 9 (1987)). This sentence was used by the Coyne Court to
describe the purpose of the ERISA General Preemption. The Court therein
considered the purpose of the ERISA General Preemption in order to
determine the significance of the phrase "employee benefit plan." The Court
did not therein characterize uniformity as a principal goal of ERISA.
564. Id. at 148-49 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
565. Id. at 149.
566. Id. at 149 n.3 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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plan making payments in accord with the beneficiary designation
exposes the administrators to the risk that a claim may be made
that the administrators had actual knowledge of the marital
dissolution.56 7 Furthermore,
[u]nder the text of ERISA, the fiduciary "shall" administer the plan
"in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the
plan[.]". . . The Washington statute conflicts with this command
because under this statute, the only way the fiduciary can
administer the plan according to its terms is to change the very
terms he is supposed to follow. 5 68
The two dissenters asserted that family law may not be
preempted unless the state statute does substantial damage to
"clear and substantial federal interests" 5 69 as described in
5 70
In particular, plan administrators must resort to
Hisquierdo.
state law to determine who is a spouse or who is a child, so why
may they not do the same to determine whether a participant
wishes to continue to have a spouse as a beneficiary? If the plan
sponsor wishes to avoid resort to state law, it can simply provide
that state law is irrelevant in such determinations. In fact, in
Mackey the Court permitted a far more significant burden to be
57
imposed upon plans by allowing levies on welfare plan benefits. '
The dissenters also argued that Washington's law "furthers
ERISA's ultimate objective-developing a fair system for
protecting employee benefits." 572 In particular, they asserted that
the revocation rule is consistent with the general rule of the
Uniform Probate Code and prevents the former spouse from
receiving an unexpected windfall, such as this case in which the
divorce settlement provided that the participant retained one
hundred percent of his pension benefits.573 As a result of the
majority's decision, the former spouse thus received a windfall of
$80,000 six months after the divorce.5 74 Finally, the dissent
asserted that under the Court's reasoning, slayer statutes, which
in many states prevent designees who kill participants from being

567. Id. at 149.
568. Id. at 151 n.4 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D)).
569. Id. at 157-60 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
570. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. at 581. However, immediately after that
reference, the HisquierdoCourt referred to four instances where such damage
was found and concluded that such damage was present in the case it was
considering. Id. at 582-83. The Court therein prevented a spouse from using
community property law to obtain a portion of the participant's pension. Id.
571. Mackey, 486 U.S. at 841. However, the Mackey majority did not discuss
the burden imposed on the plan or its participants by the garnishments.
572. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 158 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
573. Id. at 159 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
574. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). This is similar to the waiver argument
made by the dissenters in Ridgway, where the majority also disregarded the
argument.
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entitled to plan benefits, would be preempted because they differ
from state to state.57 5
The majority response was that "this [state] statute governs
of plan
a central matter
the payment of benefits,
76
ERISA
entitlements,
federal
Like
all
administration."
federal
a
substantial
serve
to
established
were
entitlements
participants
that
to
insure
a
desire
is
case,
there
In
this
interest.
and beneficiaries obtain the benefits due under the terms of an
ERISA plan, which must meet ERISA's requirements.
Consequently, the state law undermines a substantial federal
77
interest by calling for a disregard of a "core ERISA concern."
Thus, the statute is preempted.

C. The Supreme Court Holds in Kennedy that a Domestic
Relations Order May Create an ERISA Claim that Is Not Based on
State Law and Suggests that a Superseded Benefit Claim May Be
Enforced Against a DistributedERISA Benefit
In 2009, the Supreme Court decided Kennedy, in which it held
that a waiver by Liv, the participant's former spouse, of pension
benefits in their divorce decree did not affect her right to obtain
the plan's survivor benefits from the plan pursuant to the
participant's pre-divorce designation.578 The Court rejected the
premise of the plan administrator's argument that ERISA
preempted the waiver because the administrator asserted that the
waiver violated the Alienation Prohibition.57 9 The Court held that
the waiver was not an alienation. Thus, it was not subject to the
Alienation Prohibition.58 0
The Court also rejected the argument by the plan
administrator that because the waiver was part of a domestic
relations order it was a state law preempted by ERISA § 514(a), 29

575. Id. at 160 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The dissent is correct about the
prevalence and the differences among slayer statutes. However, that issue was
not before the Court, which declined to decide the issue at such time. Id. at
152.
576. Id. at 148.
577. Id. at 147.
578. Kennedy, 555 U.S. at 289, 297. For an extensive and critical analysis of
this decision, see Albert Feuer, Did a Unanimous Supreme Court Misread
ERISA, Misread the Court's Precedents, Undermine Basic ERISA Principles,
and EncourageBenefits Litigation?,37 COMP. PLAN. J. 247 (2009) [hereinafter
Kennedy Analysis], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1485204 (last visited
Aug. 13, 2012) (providing an extensive and critical analysis of Kennedy);
Albert Feuer, Will The Supreme Court Reinforce or Undermine Basic ERISA
Principles When it Decides a Death Benefit Dispute?, 3 CHARLESTON L. REV.
289 (2009), available at http://ssrn.comlabstract=1337276 (last visited Aug. 13,
2012) (same).
579. Kennedy, 555 U.S. at 291-92, 297-98.
580. Id. at 292-98.
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U.S.C. § 1144(a) (the "ERISA General Preemption").58 1 Without
giving any citations, the Court declared:
But recognizing a waiver in a divorce decree would not be giving
effect to state law; the argument is that the waiver should be
treated as a creature of federal common law, in which case its
setting in a state divorce decree would be only happenstance. A
court would merely be applying federal law to a document that
might also have independent significance under state law. 582
In short, the Court held that the waiver was not subject to ERISA
preemption because it was a federal common law waiver. 583
However, the Court failed to set forth the terms of what it
elsewhere describes as a "federal common law waiver embodied in
a divorce decree that was not a [qualified domestic relations order]
QDRO."584 Which parts of the divorce decree are discarded? If
none, the waiver is identical to a domestic relations order that is
preempted for failing to be a qualified domestic relations order
("QDRO").585 On the other hand, does the embedded common law
waiver consist of anything other than the former spouse's waiver?
This uncertainty makes it difficult to determine whether the
federal common law waiver has any effect other than letting the
designee decline the benefit if the plan terms permit him to do so
with such a waiver. The Court suggested that the waiver has such
a limited effect in its footnote 10 discussed, infra.
The Court's opinion also created two issues about the
significance of its prior holdings that an ERISA benefit
entitlement gives the one with the entitlement the right to retain
such benefits against another person claiming an ownership
interest in the benefit, which claim is superseded by the ERISA
benefit entitlement.
First, the opinion never addressed the issue whether Liv had
a benefit entitlement under the plan terms. Instead, after
dismissing the arguments that ERISA preemption rendered the
waiver a nullity, the opinion solely focused on whether the plan
administrator fulfilled its fiduciary responsibilities by distributing
the plan payment to Liv, which question was not before the Court.
The Court found the administrator did because the Court held
that the waiver was not consistent with the plan's governing
documents; thus, the plan fiduciaries could not follow its terms.586
Unlike the Egelhoff and Boggs Courts, the Kennedy Court focused
entirely on the administrative advantages of the requirement that
the plan documents be followed. Thus, it referred to those
581.

Id. at 298-99.

582. Id. at 299.
583.
584.
585.
586.

Id. at 297.
Id. at 288.
ERISA § 206(d)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3).
Kennedy, 555 U.S. at 299-304.
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decisions as follows:
Two recent preemption cases are instructive here. Boggs v. Boggs,
held that ERISA preempted a state law permitting the
testamentary transfer of a nonparticipant spouse's community
property interest in undistributed pension plan benefits. We
rejected the entreaty to create "through case law ... a new class of
persons for whom plan assets are to be held and administered,"
explaining that "[t]he statute is not amenable to this sweeping
extratextual extension." And in Egelhoff we held that ERISA
preempted a state law providing that the designation of a spouse as
the beneficiary of a nonprobate asset is revoked automatically upon
divorce. We said the law was at fault for standing in the way of
making payments "simply by identifying the beneficiary specified by
the plan documents," and thus for purporting to "undermine the
congressionalgoal of 'minimiz[ing] the administrative and financial
burden[s]' on plan administrators,(identifying "the conflict between

the plan documents (which require making payments to the named
beneficiary) and the statute (which requires making payments to
someone else)").587
The dissenters in Boggs and Egelhoff, who argued that the
recipients of plan distributions should not be entitled to keep those
amounts, had used a similar approach. They emphasized that
their rejected position would be the consistent with the ERISA
goal minimizing the administrative burden because it had no
effect on the plan's payment obligations.
Second, the opinion contained a footnote that raised questions
about the Court's current and prior holdings. The Court had no
reason to address whether the participant's estate could force the
former spouse to give it the distributed benefit. The question was
not before the Court, which had been informed that the former
spouse had spent the plan distribution.5 88 Thus, it would have
been impractical for the participant's estate to seek to recover the
benefit distribution from her, and the estate did not try to do so.
Nor did the parties brief this theoretical issue for the Court.
Nevertheless, in footnote 10 ("Footnote- 10"),589 the Court limited
587. Id. at 302-03 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
588. See Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits at 33-34, Kennedy v. Plan
Adm'r for DuPont Say. & Inv. Plan, 555 U.S. 285 (filed Aug. 7, 2008) (No.
at
available
07-636),
https://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs/07-08/07-636-PetitionerR

eply.pdf. (last visited Aug. 13, 2012).
589. Compare Teia Moore, Comment, When Happily Ever After is Not Ever
After, After All: Rectifying the Plan Documents Rule Under ERISA to Benefit
the Right Person, 52 S. TEX. L. REV. 127 (2010) (discussing the implications of

Footnote-10, and arguing that designee should be forced to give the distributed
benefit to the default designee) with Albert Feuer, The Kennedy Supreme
Court Giveth with Footnote 13, but Taketh with Footnote 10, The Department
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its holding, and then addressed the issue as follows:
Despite our following answer to the question here [holding that the
plan administrator was "not required to honor Liv's waiver" and
thus not required to distribute the pension benefit to the
participant's estate], our conclusion that § 1056(d)(1) does not make
a nullity of a waiver leaves open any questions about a waiver's
effect in circumstances in which it is consistent with plan
documents. Nor do we express any view as to whether the
[participant's] Estate could have brought an action in state or
federal court against Liv to obtain the benefits after they were
distributed. Compare Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 853, 117 S. Ct.
1754, 138 L. Ed. 2d 45 (1997) ("If state law is not preempted, the
diversion of retirement benefits will occur regardless of whether the
interest in the pension plan is enforced against the plan or the
recipient of the pension benefit'), with Sweebe v. Sweebe, 474 Mich.

151, 156-159, 712 N.W.2d 708, 712-713 (2006) (distinguishing Boggs
and holding that "while a plan administrator must pay benefits to
the named beneficiary as required by ERISA," after the benefits are
distributed "the consensual terms of a prior contractual agreement
may prevent the named beneficiary from retaining those proceeds");
Pardee v. Pardee, 2005 OK CIV APP. 27, PP20, 27, 112 P. 3d 308,
313-314, 315-316 (2004) (distinguishing Boggs and holding that
ERISA did not preempt enforcement of allocation of ERISA benefits
in state-court divorce decree as "the pension plan funds were no
longer entitled to ERISA protection once the plan funds were
59 0
distributed').

In the first part of Footnote-10,91 the Court declines to
discuss the extent, if any, of the effectiveness of the former
spouse's waiver. Of course, a waiver that does not violate the cited
592
Alienation Prohibition may violate other ERISA provisions.
However, in this case, the Court had concluded earlier, on the
same page, that there was no such violation for the waiver at
issue. Why, then would a waiver consistent with the plan's
governing documents not be effective? The Court held that because
the waiver in this case was not consistent with those documents, it
did not adversely affect the designee's right to receive the

of Labor & Many Lower Courts Miss the Decision's Ultimate Meaning, 39
COMP. PLAN J. 111, 121-25 (2011) [hereinafter Kennedy Footnote Analysis],

available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1859809 (last visited Aug. 13, 2012).
(discussing the implications of Footnote-10, but arguing that the designee has
the right to retain the distributed benefit).
590. Kennedy, 555 U.S. at 300 (emphasis added).
591. I did not recognize the significance of the first part of the footnote when
I prepared the Kennedy Analysis, supra note 578, or the Kennedy Footnote
Analysis, supra note 589.

592. For example, as discussed with respect to the Campa filings, supra, a
DRO may be preempted for violating the Explicit ERISA Preemption even if it
does not violate the Alienation Prohibition.
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designated benefit from the plan.59 3
There seems to be only one logical explanation for the first
part of Footnote-10. The Court appears to have decided that a
federal common law waiver may be effective to the extent the
individual wishes to use it to decline to receive property, as was
done with each waiver in the decisions and treatises the Court
cited in support of the proposition that ERISA permits federal
common law waivers of ERISA benefits. 594 On the other hand, a
waiver need not provide the basis for another party to wrest the
waived property from the waiving individual, as the participant's
estate was seeking to do. In short, the Court observed that it was
not deciding the extent of effectiveness of a federal common law
waiver.
In the second part of Footnote-10, the Court suggests it may
be prepared to revisit its cited Boggs5 95 holding and its Egelhoff 9 6
holding, which was not cited. Those decisions held that the owner
of an ERISA benefit, which supersedes another person's ownership
claim to the plan benefit, also supersedes that person's ownership
claim to the benefit after its distribution by the plan. By
undermining those precedents sua sponte, the Court seemed to be
warning practitioners that it may be willing to reconsider those
holdings.
XIII. SUPREME COURT ISSUES

There are four major Supreme Court issues. First, may a
preempted or superseded claim of ownership under family law be
enforced after the ERISA benefits have been distributed? 97
Second, may DROs be used to obtain plan payments from any
ERISA plan other than a Spousal Survivor Pension Plan if the
plan terms do not provide for such payment? Third, must all
pension plans, disability plans, and life insurance plans, not
merely Spousal Survivor Pension Plans, follow DROs that satisfy
the QDRO requirements? Fourth, are the QDRO requirements
satisfied if the order directs the participant to make or maintain a
designation rather than directing the plan to accept the
designation? If not, those DROs, which are often used by DROs
applicable to life insurance plans or by automatic restraining
orders issued as part of domestic relations proceedings, would not
593. Kennedy, 555 U.S. at 291.
594. Id. at 294-95.
595. Boggs, 520 U.S. at 845.
596. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 141.
597. A similar issue arises under the Federal Employees' Group Life
Insurance Act. See, e.g., Maretta v. Hillman, 722 S.E.2d 32 (Va. 2012)
(preempting a Virginia revocation upon divorce statute which applied only
after the benefit distribution, and discussing the conflicting state decisions on
this point).

734

The John Marshall Law Review

[45:635

be treated as effective by such plans, unless the plan terms
provided for such deference.
A. May a Preempted State Family Law or Superseded Common
Law Claim of Ownership of an ERISA Entitlement Be Used to
Wrest the Benefits From the PersonEntitled to the Benefit
Payment?
The Kennedy Footnote-10 suggests that the Supreme Court
may be ready to revisit the Boggs and the Egelhoff holdings,
perhaps within the narrower context recently used by the Third
Circuit, in Estate of William Kensinger v. URL Pharma,Inc.598 The
court therein also characterized a waiver by Adele, a designee, in a
divorce decree, like Liv in Kennedy, as a federal common law
waiver. The court then used the arguments from the decisions
cited in Footnote-10 to help establish that Adele was compelled by
such waiver to give Mr. Kensinger's estate her distributed ERISA
entitlement.59 9 It will thus be useful in the discussion, infra, to
refer to the additional arguments presented by the court to uphold
the Kensinger's Estate's claim against Adele, who unlike Liv, the
Kennedy designee, had not dissipated the funds at issue.
The Kensinger court and the two state decisions cited in
Footnote-10, which the Kensinger court used to bolster its
conclusions, present three basic arguments against postdistribution protection: (1) an individual should fulfill his
contractual obligation,60 0 (2) the key concern of ERISA is the plan's
administrative convenience rather than the protection of the
benefits of plan participants and beneficiaries, 6 01 and (3) the Boggs
decision contains a critical reservation. 602
The contract argument 603 is somewhat difficult to grasp
598. Estate of William Kensinger v. URL Pharma, Inc. 674 F.3d 131 (3d Cir.
2012). See generally Albert Feuer, A Misguided Kennedy Offspring from the
Third Circuit,31 TAX MGM'T WKLY. J. 564 (Apr. 23, 2012),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2047238(last visited Aug. 13, 2012).
599. See generally Estate of William Kensinger, 674 F.3d 131 (analyzing the
Kennedy decision).
600. Id.
601. Id. at 136-37.
602. Id. at 138.
603. Id. at 136; see also Andochick v. Byrd, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65903, at
*20 (E.D. Va. May 9, 2012) (holding that the participant's estate may wrest
pension and life insurance benefits from the participant's designee under the
plan terms, and describing the contract right as "the right to enforce the
waiver provision [in the separation agreement]"). The Andochick court rejected
the claim that the contingent beneficiary under the plan terms could use the
waiver to obtain the benefits from the plan or the designee. Id at *29 n.8.
Permitting such wresting is contrary to the most rational interpretation of the
participant's intentions, namely to have the plan terms, rather than his will's
treatment of assets otherwise undisposed or intestate rules, determine who is
entitled to keep his plan survivor benefit.
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because the terms of the "contract," i.e., the federal common law
waiver, are uncertain. 604 First, the Kennedy Court did not describe
the extent of the federal common law waiver that was not subject
to ERISA preemption. As discussed, supra, we can only be
confident that the participant may compel the ERISA plan not to
pay him the waived benefit, as was the case with each waiver cited
by Kennedy.60 5 Thus, even if, arguendo, state case law about
similar waivers in domestic relations orders pertaining to nonERISA survivor benefits60 6 could help determine the law for
federal common-law waivers, its relevance is quite unclear.
The courts have consistently rejected contractual arguments
to enforce a spousal waiver of survivor benefits that violates a
pension plan's terms.60 7 Such designees may not be ordered to give
up their survivor benefits to the default designee.6 08 The question
is whether the protections for benefits provided under the terms of
an ERISA plan similarly override a contract, such as the uncertain
one at issue. Kennedy held those protections override a contract
with respect to the plan distribution of a survivor benefit.
Moreover, in Footnote-10 on which the Kensinger court is relying,
the Supreme Court refused to rule whether such waiver could be
used to wrest benefit payments from the former spouse, if the plan
604. But see Geoff Ward, Note, Clear, Voluntary, & Made in Good Faith:An
Alternative to the Supreme Court's Incorrect Approach to Resolving Conflicts
Between Common Law Waivers and ERISA Plan Documents in Kennedy v.
Plan Administrator for DuPont Savings and Investment Plan, 64 TAX LAW
1003, 1010-17 (2011). The contract and the common-law waiver are treated as
identical to the DRO. However, in such cases, as discussed, supra, the common
law waiver would appear to be preempted by the ERISA General Preemption.
605. Kennedy, 555 U.S. at 294-95.
606. See, e.g., Life Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Ortiz, 535 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2009);
State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Brockett, 737 F. Supp. 2d 1146 (E.D. Cal. 2010)
(discussing the California law regarding waivers, particularly its focus on: (1)
reviewing all the terms of the decree or settlement agreement, and (2)
determining why the policy owner did not subsequently change the
designation at issue). See generally Susan N. Gary, Applying
Revocation-on-Divorce Statutes to Will Substitutes by Gary, 18 QUINNIPIAC
PROB. L.J. 83, 93-99 (2004) (providing an overview of revocation-on-divorce
statutes and the call for expansion).
607. See, e.g., Hagwood v. Newton, 282 F.3d 285, 291-92 (4th Cir. 2002)
(providing a good summary of the case law regarding consents to waivers of
spousal benefits, and other situations where the law fails to enforce contracts
that violate statutory standards).
608. See, e.g., Hurwitz v. Sher, 982 F.2d 778, 781 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding
that a spouse may not be ordered to comply with a prenuptial waiver and
waive the survivor benefit after the participant's death). But cf. Callahan v.
Hutsell, Callahan & Buchino P.S.C. Revised Profit Sharing Plan, No. 92-5796,
1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 34005, at *3-4 (6th Cir. Dec. 20, 1993) (remanding to
determine if spouse breached a prenuptial agreement to execute a plan
consent to a new beneficiary designation). The Callahan court failed to
recognize that because consents are not beneficiary designations, it is
irrelevant if there was such consent.
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allowed such a waiver.609
In Sweebe v. Sweebe,6 10 the Michigan Supreme Court held
that the participant's former spouse, the recipient of benefits from
an ERISA life insurance plan, had to give the benefit payment to
the default designee because the recipient had agreed when she
6 11
divorced the participant to waive that benefit.
The Sweebe court distinguished its case from Boggs because
Boggs involved pension benefits, 612 which is correct but irrelevant
because Egelhoff reached the same conclusion with respect to
distributed life insurance benefits. The court also asserted that its
holding did not conflict with Egelhoff because it relied on an
agreement, rather than a state law, and it did not change the
administrator's responsibilities.6 13 However, the ERISA General
Preemption preempts any state law, not merely state statutes, but
also state court decisions concerning state law, such as those by a
Michigan court. 614 Thus, this is another distinction without a
difference.
Finally, the Sweebe court distinguished Egelhoff, because the
Sweebe court asserted that its holding did not change the
administrator's responsibilities. 61 5 However, the Supreme Court in
Egelhoff considered, and rejected, such an administrative focus. In
particular, the Supreme Court held that the revocation by a
divorce statute was preempted even though the Court reported
that the lower court had "emphasized that the statute does not
alter the nature of the plan itself, the administrator's fiduciary
6 16
duties, or the requirements for plan administration."
617 the Oklahoma Court of Appeals held
In Pardee v. Pardee,
that a participant's widow, who received his pension survivor
benefit, was required to give half the benefit to his former spouse
in accord with the terms of a domestic relations order that was not
a QDRO.618 The Pardee court did not mention Egelhoff but
attempted to distinguish Boggs as follows:
The facts in Boggs are distinguishable from those presented here. In
Boggs, the facts involved pre-distributionfunds still in the control of
the plan administrator, as opposed to the present case where the
609. Kennedy, 555 U.S. at 299 n.10.
610. Sweebe v. Sweebe, 712 N.W.2d 708 (Mich. 2006).
611. Such a provision is a part of 'Michigan's statutory insurance clause,"
for inclusion in Michigan divorce decrees. Partlow v. Person, 798 F. Supp. 2d
878, 881 (E.D. Mich. 2011).
612. Sweebe, 712 N.W.2d at 713.

613. Id.
614.
615.
616.
617.
618.
funds

ERISA § 514(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(1).
Sweebe, 712 N.W.2d at 713.
Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 145 (internal quotations omitted).
Pardee v. Pardee, 112 P.3d 308 (Okla. Civ. App. 2004).
See id. at 315-16 (holding that ERISA does not provide protection for
that have already been distributed).
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pension plan funds were distributedto Pardee and were no longer in
the hands of the plan administrator. The Supreme Court in Boggs
emphasized this distinction by stating that "this case does not
present the question whether ERISA would permit a nonparticipant
spouse to obtain a devisable community property interest in benefits
paid out during the existence of the community between the
participant and that spouse." 619
The Oklahoma court, like the Kensinger court,620 misunderstood
the Boggs reservation. The ownership claim of the Boggs children
arose therein when their mother died, at which time the pension
benefit had not been distributed. 621 The children did not try to
enforce their claim, which relied on their mother's community
property devisable interest, until after the participant's pension
benefits had been distributed. 622 That is why the pension plan was
not a party in Boggs or in Pardee. Similarly, the ownership claims
in both Kensinger and Pardee originated when the divorce decree
was issued, which was prior to the distribution of the pension
benefit. As in Boggs, the claimants did not try to enforce their
claim until after the pension benefits had been distributed. The
case the Boggs Court did not decide was the one that would have
arisen therein if the participant had received his pension benefits
before the mother's death. Such benefits were not at issue in
Kensinger or Pardee.
The Kensinger court also sought to distinguish Boggs further
with its assertion that the Supreme Court therein used the
Alienation Prohibition to preclude the testamentary transfer by
the participant's spouse before the benefit was distributed. 623 In
contrast, the Kensinger court asserted it was considering a postdistribution transfer. 624 However, this was not the basis of the
Boggs decision or of the similar decision in Egelhoff. The
Alienation Prohibition could have not been the basis in Egelhoff,
because the Alienation Prohibition does not apply to the life
insurance benefit at issue. Moreover, in both cases, the Supreme
Court held that post-distribution transfers.
The Kensinger court also referred to some decisions that it
asserted had permitted creditors to obtain distributed benefit
entitlements, and asked how they may be distinguished. 625 There
are two important distinctions. None can reverse the Supreme
Court because all are by lower courts. Second, all but one of these
lower court decisions involved creditors rather than parties
619. Id. at 313 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
620.
621.
622.
623.
624.
625.

Estate of William Kensinger, 674 F.3d at 138-39.
Boggs, 520 U.S. at 836-37.
Id. at 834-35.
Estate of William Kensinger, 674 F.3d at 138.
Id. at 138.
Id. at 137-38.
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claiming the ownership of the benefit. The issue in those cases was
whether the Alienation Prohibition prohibited a creditor from
recovering distributed benefit payments. In contrast, the issue in
Kensinger was whether a party whose ownership claim to an
ERISA benefit that had been superseded may force the owner of
the benefit to pay the party the benefit that the owner received
from the plan. 626 The non-creditor decision of Trucking Employees

of North Jersey Welfare Fund v. Colville, Inc.,627 supports the

Boggs approach. That decision permitted a plan to recover a
benefit overpayment, i.e., the court enforced a superior claim to an
ERISA benefit entitlement. 628
Thus, the following concluding words of the Boggs decision
also apply to the Pardee and Kensinger fact patterns, whether the
superseded ownership claim rests on state law or federal commonlaw:
Respondents' claims, if allowed to succeed, would depart from this
framework, upsetting the deliberate balance central to ERISA. It
does not matter that respondents have sought to enforce their rights
only after the retirement benefits have been distributed since their
asserted rights are based on the theory that they had an interest in
the undistributedpension plan benefits. Their state-law claims are

pre-empted. The judgment of the Fifth Circuit is Reversed. 629

Thus, there seems to be little reason to reverse the Supreme Court
holdings that a person may not obtain ERISA benefits from either
the plan or the benefit recipient on the basis of an ownership claim
to the benefits that is superseded by the plan terms.6 30 On the
other hand, the post-Kennedy lower courts have divided on this

626. Id. at 134.
627. Trucking Emps. of N.J. Welfare Fund, Inc. v. Colville, 16 F.3d 52 (3d
Cir. 1994).
628. But see Great-W. Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudsen, 534 U.S. 204
(2002); Sereboff v. Mid-Atl. Med. Servs., 547 U.S. 356 (2006) (describing
conditions under which benefit overpayments may be recovered).
629. Boggs, 520 U.S. at 854 (emphasis added).
630. Cf. David S. Lebolt, Making the Best of Egelhoff: Federal Common Law
for ERISA-Preempted Beneficiary Designations, 28 J. PENSION PLAN. &
COMPLIANCE 29, 38-42 (2002) (arguing that the Egelhoff Court's focus on
fiduciary payment responsibility leaves room for the application of a
constructive trust to the distributed proceeds); Sarabeth A. Rayho, Divorcees
Turn About in Their Graves as Ex-Spouses Cash In: Codified Constructive
Trusts Ensure an Equitable Result Regarding ERISA-Governed Employee
Benefit Plans, 106 MICH. L. REV. 373 (2007) (arguing like the Pardee court
that ERISA permits a constructive trust to be imposed on the distributed
proceeds without adequately addressing the Egelhoff or Boggs decisions);
Ward, supra note 604, at 1017-19 (2011) (arguing that constructive trusts are
still viable after the Kennedy decision); see also In re Estate of Paul J. Sauers,
971 A.2d 1265, 1271 n.4 (Pa. 2009), rev'd in part, 32 A.3d 1241 (Pa. 2011)
(reversing the lower court's acceptance of the Rayho argument on the grounds
that ERISA preempted such a state law remedy).
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issue. They have generally permitted designees to retain
distributed pension death benefits but not life insurance
benefits.63 1
B. Are Domestic Relations Orders Always EnforceableAgainst
ERISA Plans Other Than Pension Plans Required to Provide
Spousal Survivor Benefits?
Although this position has not been widely embraced, a
unanimous Supreme Court referred positively to MetropolitanLife
Ins. Co. v. Wheaton,632 in which the concurrence presented by the
Seventh Circuit's Chief Judge Daniel A. Manion took this
position. 633 This was the Campa position, is a logical consequence
of Mackey, and is a variation of a view expressed by the dissenters
in Boggs and Egelhoff. Thus, it merits a full and serious
discussion.
Judge Manion characterized domestic relations law as a law
of general applicability, similar to the general garnishment law,
which the Supreme Court held, without using such phrase in
Mackey634 that an ERISA plan, that was not a Spousal Survivor
Pension Plan, must defer to. In both cases, the limits on the
general law were applicable only to Spousal Survivor Pension
Plans. Thus, Judge Manion asserted, ERISA plans other than
Spousal Survivor Pension Plans, must follow all DROs, whether or
not the orders meet any of the QDRO requirements. 635 However,
the reasoning of the Mackey decision has been repudiated by
subsequent Supreme Court decisions with respect to state family
law, and thus its relevance is quite questionable.
The "generally applicable law" exception to ERISA
Preemption was found applicable to a California state unrelated
business tax that mirrored the federal unrelated business tax,
although with a much lower tax rate, by the Second Circuit
6 36 The court therein referred
decision, Hattem v. Schwarzenegger.
to Mackey although that decision never used the phrase "generally
applicable law." However, the Second Circuit analysis cited 637 the
generally applicable law analysis of Egelhoff v. Egelhoff.6 38 In that

631. Kennedy Footnote Analysis, supra note 589, at 121-25; Partlow, 798 F.
Supp. 2d 878, Flesner v. Flesner, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4615 (S.D. Tex. Jan.
13, 2012) (consisting of post-article life insurance decisions also holding that
ERISA does not protect distributed benefits with similar arguments to the
ones discussed above).
632. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Wheaton, 42 F.3d 1080 (7th Cir. 1994).
633. Id. at 1086 (Manion, C.J., concurring).
634. Mackey, 486 U.S. at 825.
635. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 42 F.3d at 1084.
636. Hattem v. Schwarzenegger, 449 F.3d 423 (2d Cir. 2006).
637. Id. at 430.
638. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 141.
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case, the Supreme Court majority did not mention Mackey.639 The
majority also did not therein hold or declare that generally
applicable state laws are exempt from ERISA preemption. Instead,
the majority declared:
In other words, unlike generally applicable laws regulating "areas
where ERISA has nothing to say," Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 330,
which we have upheld notwithstanding their incidental effect on
ERISA plans, see, e.g., ibid. [holding that prevailing wage statutes
applicable to all apprentice plans without making any reference to
whether the Plan is an ERISA Plan], this statute governs the
payment of benefits, a central matter of plan administration. 640
The Hattem decision has been strongly criticized for its analysis of
whether the relation between a state tax and ERISA plans is too
tenuous, remote, or peripheral. 641
The Egelhoff Court held that a state family law statute
revoking a designation upon divorce was preempted because the
state law conflicted with the fundamental requirement that
ERISA plan participants and beneficiaries have enforceable
entitlements to benefits under the plan terms. Under the same
reasoning, a state court order that attempted to revoke a
participant's designation would also be preempted, as would a
state DRO directing that life insurance benefit payments be made
to a person other than the participant's designee, such as the one
at issue in Wheaton. 642 Thus, Mackey does not imply that ERISA
Plans (other than Spousal Survivor Pension Plans) must follow all
state DROs. Moreover, such an implication would fly in the face of
REACT's explicit purpose of giving a participant's spouse, former
spouse, and other dependents particularly good access to benefits
from Spousal Survivor Pension Plans, as discussed, supra.

639. But see id. at 157-58 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing Mackey).
640. Id. at 147-48.
641. See, e.g., Yonatan Gelblum, Note, Hattem v. Schwarzenegger:
Terminating Preemption Challenges to State Taxation of ERISA's Plans'
Unrelated Business Taxable Income, 60 TAX LAW 215, 232 (2006) (criticizing

the Court's analysis but concluding that the result may have been correct
because the state UBTI tax, which piggybacked on the federal tax, has a
tenuous effect on ERISA plans); see also Mark F. Sommer, Mark A. Loyd, and
Jennifer Y. Barber, 0 Preemption, Where Art Thou?: ERISA's Lost State and
Local Tax Preemption, 64 TAX LAW 783 (2011) (updating and expanding the

Gelblum framework for analyzing whether ERISA preempts state tax laws).
642. However, the DRO in Wheaton did not direct the plan to pay life
insurance payments to a specified person, but directed the participant to so
change the designation. Wheaton, 42 F.3d at 1081-82.
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C. Are DisabilityPlans, Life InsurancePlans,and Pension Plans
that Are Not Spousal Pension Plans Required to Follow Domestic
Relations Orders that Satisfy the QDRO Requirements if the Plan
Terms Do Not Providefor Such Deference?
Six of the seven circuits that have considered this issue have
decided that any ERISA plan, not merely Survivor Spousal
Pension Plans, must follow a DRO that meets the QDRO
requirements, 643 and some cite the Boggs discussion of the
enhanced protection for spouses and dependents provided by
REACT.644 Many, but not all commentators have taken a similar
position. 645 The strongest arguments in favor of this position were
presented in 1994 by Judge Richard A. Posner's majority opinion

for Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Wheaton.646 Thus, the
opinion merits a full and serious discussion. 647

643. Barrs v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 287 F.3d 202 (1st Cir. 2002); Metro.
Life Ins. Co. v. Bigelow, 283 F.3d 436 (2d Cir. 2002); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v.
Pettit, 164 F.3d 857 (4th Cir. 1998); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Marsh, 119 F.3d
415 (6th Cir. 1997); Wheaton, 42 F.3d at 1080; Carland v. Metro. Life Ins. Co.,

935 F.2d 1114 (10th Cir. 1991). The Third Circuit observed in dicta that "every
Court of Appeals" that had addressed that question had held that QDROs
applied to life insurance plans and referenced these cases. Metro. Life Ins. Co.
v. Price, 501 F.3d 271 (3d Cir. 2007); but see Brown v. Con. Gen. Life Ins. Co.,
934 F.2d 1193 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that ERISA preempted such an order
without explanation). Thus, courts in the Eleventh Circuit have ruled with the
majority, such as USAble Life v. Brown, No. 2:08-CV-442-WKW, 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 24633 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 24, 2009).
644. Price, 501 F.3d at 274; Barrs, 287 F.3d at 208-209; Bigelow, 283 F.3d at
441.
645. See, e.g., COMPLETE QDRO HANDBOOK, supra note 399, at 92; J.
JORDEN ET AL., HANDBOOK ON ERISA LITIGATION, 5-109 n.417 (3d ed. 2012)
(listing cases with such holding); Elizabeth M. Wells, State Domestic Relations
Orders Under ERISA and the Code-An Unfortunate Hodgepodge, N.Y.U. REV.
EMP. BEN. 15-7, 15-12-15-15 (2011) (showing how legislative materials and

policy arguments may be used to advocate broad coverage); but cf. GARY
SHULMAN, THE QUALIFIED DOMESTIC RELATIONS ORDER HANDBOOK §§ 18.01,
18-4, 18-5 (3d ed. 2006 & Supp. 2012) [hereinafter QDRO HANDBOOK]
(stating that welfare plans are not subject to the QDRO requirements).
646. Wheaton, 42 F.3d at 1084. The DRO at issue required the participant to
designate his children from a divorced wife as the beneficiaries under an
ERISA life insurance plan. However, at the time of the participant's death his
widow was his designee.
647. For a full discussion of all the arguments presented therein see
Survivor Benefit Entitlements, supra note 472. See generally Teresa S.
Renaker, Employee Welfare and Other Nonpension Benefits Section 9.14Preemption Exception for QDROs and Applicability to Welfare Plans, DIVIDING
PENSIONS AND OTHER EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN CALIFORNIA DIVORCES

(CEB

2007) (providing an excellent review of the then recent case-law in this area);
Albert Feuer, Who Is Entitled to Life Insurance Benefits and Top-Hat Benefits
from an ERISA Plan Following a Divorce or a Marital Separation?, 41 N.Y.
ST. B.A. FAM. L. REV. NEWSLETTER 10, 10-12 (Fall, 2009) and 31 N.Y. ST. B.A.
ONE ON ONE 8, 8-10 (Winter 2009) [hereinafter Feuer Life Insurance Article],
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1535733 (last visited Aug. 13, 2012).
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Judge Posner focused on the interaction of the following
sentence defining a QDRO:
(B) For purposes of this paragraph[(3) which describes QDROs for
QDRO Pension Plans](i) the term "qualified domestic relations order"' means a domestic
relations order(I) which creates or recognizes the existence of an alternate payee's
right to, or assigns to an alternate payee the right to, receive all
or a portion of the benefits payable with respect to a participant
under a plan, and
(II) with respect to which the requirements of subparagraphs
and (D) are met, and
(ii) the term "domestic relations order"' means ... 648
with the following
Preemption.

(C)

ERISA exclusion from the General ERISA

(b)(7) Subsection (a) of this section [the General ERISA Preemption]
shall not apply to qualified domestic relations orders (within the
meaning of section 206(d)(3)(B)(i) of this title), qualified medical
child support orders (within the meaning of section 609(a)(2)(B)(ii)
of this title). . . .649
Judge Posner's Wheaton decision
analysis as follows:

summarized

his linguistic

We conclude that the literal reading of ERISA as amended by the
Retirement Equity Act, a reading that establishes an exception to
preemption for qualified domestic relations orders pertaining to all
ERISA plans, not just pension plans, makes more practical sense
then a flexible reading that gives weight to the history of the
provision and to the fact that the provisions that surround the
definition of qualified domestic relations orders, including the
antialienation provision, are limited to pension plans, though the
definition is not.650
This explicit disregard for the traditional statutory interpretation
rules651 reflected Judge Posner's underlying concern that if QDROs
are not applicable to life insurance plans, Congress would have
648. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(B), 29 U.S.C. §1056(d)(3)(B) (emphasis added).
649. ERISA § 514(b)(7), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(7) (emphasis added).
650. Wheaton, 42 F.3d at 1084 (emphasis added).
651. See, e.g., United States v. Great N. Ry., 287 U.S. 144, 154-55 (1932)
("In aid of the process of construction we are at liberty, if the meaning be
uncertain, to have recourse to the legislative history of the measure and the
statements by those in charge of it during its consideration by the Congress.");
King v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 220-21 (1991) ("Given the examples
of affirmative limitations on reemployment benefits conferred by neighboring
provisions, we infer that the simplicity of subsection (d) was deliberate,
consistent with a plain meaning to provide its benefit without conditions on
length of service").
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made it more difficult for a divorcing spouse to change a life
insurance designation than a pension plan designation, which can
be changed with a QDRO. This seemed so prima facie absurd to
Judge Posner that he dismissed the possibility.
Judge Posner disregarded the possibility that Congress
believed its declarations that pension benefits were so important
that spousal survivor provisions and divorcing spouse designation
access was needed for those plans with broad participation. In
contrast, Congress may have believed that other pension plans,
such as Top-Hat Plans, disability plans, and life insurance plans
provided less critical benefits. Thus, Congress permitted sponsors
of those plans to decide the conditions, if any, under which those
plans would provide spousal survivor benefits and divorcing
spouse designation access. However, regardless of the
congressional motivation or the wisdom of the congressional
choices, it is the role of the courts to defer to such legislative
choices.
Judge Posner began by observing that the QDRO definition
section cited by the exclusion refers to "a plan" rather than "a
pension plan." 652 This he asserted means the reference is to any
ERISA plan not to any Spousal Survivor Pension Plan. Therefore,
Judge Posner asserted ERISA preempts no DRO meeting the
QDRO requirements. 653 Thus, all ERISA plans, including the life
insurance plan at issue in Wheaton, must follow the designation
terms of such a DRO.654
This linguistic analysis is quite questionable. Judge Posner
failed to explain why an ERISA plan was implied by use of the
word "plan" in a sentence explicitly limited by its first five words
to a paragraph directed at Spousal Survivor Pension Plans.
Moreover, the sentence is contained within a paragraph directed
by its first subparagraph at Spousal Survivor Pension Plans,6 55
which paragraph is in turn in a part of Title I of ERISA explicitly
limited to such plans.656 Such deliberate disregard of the entire
sentence in which the definition is presented violates the longstanding Supreme Court injunction: "[W]e must not be guided by a
single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions
of the whole law, and to its object and policy."657
652. Wheaton, 42 F.3d at 1082-84.
653. Id. at 1083.
654. Id. at 1084.
655. ERISA § 206(d)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3).
656. ERISA § 201, 29 U.S.C. § 1051 restricts Part 2 of Subtitle B of Title I of
ERISA, which consists of ERISA §§ 201-211, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051- 1061 to such
Plans.
657. Dada v. Mukasy, 554 U.S. 1, 16 (2008) (citing United States v. Heirs of
Boisdore, 49 U.S. 113, 122 (1850) (emphasis added)). In the more recent case,
the Supreme Court held that an alien who agrees to voluntarily depart the
country retains the right to reopen proceedings regarding the alien's removal
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The "literal" interpretation must also be rejected because it
violates "a cardinal principle of statutory construction" set forth by
the Supreme Court that "a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so
construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word
shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant." 65 8
If, as asserted by Judge Posner, ERISA § 206(d)(3)(B), 29
U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B), in concert with ERISA § 514(b)(7), 29
U.S.C. § 1144(b)(7), provides that a DRO meeting the QDRO
requirements determines benefit payment obligations for all
ERISA Plans, and ERISA preempts other DROs, then those
provisions determine such obligations for the ERISA plans that
are Spousal Survivor Pension Plans. However, that interpretation
would render superfluous ERISA § 206(d)(3)(A), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1056(d)(3)(A), which provides that (1) QDROs determine benefit
payment obligations for Spousal Survivor Pension Plans, and (2)
no other DROs may determine benefit payment obligations for
Spousal Survivor Pension Plans.659 Moreover, that interpretation
leads to absurd results, such as (1) plans other than Spousal
Survivor Pension Plans, such as Top-Hat Plans, need not suspend
benefit payments while a determination of the DRO's compliance
with the QDRO requirements is being made; (2) plans other than
Spousal Survivor Pension Plans, such as disability plans, need not
provide review procedures for DROs that purport to be QDROs;
and (3) plans other than Spousal Survivor Pension Plans, such as
life insurance plans, may have to pay benefits twice even if their
fiduciaries fulfilled their fiduciary responsibilities in determining
if a DRO was a QDRO and making payments consistent with those
determinations.
Congress explicitly considered and rejected Judge Posner's
interpretation when it enacted ERISA § 206(d)(3)(L), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1056(d)(3)(L). That subparagraph limits the application of the
paragraph (d)(3), which includes the cited QDRO definition
section, to Spousal Survivor Pension Plans. Subparagraph
(d)(3)(L) was enacted together with a similar addition to the
corresponding tax-qualification Code Section as the part of section
1898 of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, "Technical Corrections to the
Retirement Equity Act [which introduced the QDRO Provisions]."

from the country. See also Feuer, Life InsuranceArticle, supra note 647, at 1112 (discussing the purpose of the two provisions interpreted by Judge Posner).
658. TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001). The Court observed the
statute contained a narrow discovery exception to starting time of the twoyear statute of limitations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act. The exception was
limited to cases of a misrepresentation by a creditor. The Court therein
rejected the assertion that a far broader general discovery rule could also
delay the starting time because this would make the language establishing the
narrow exception superfluous. Id.
659. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(A).
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Congress intended, as discussed, supra, that the two added
provisions "clarif[y] that the qualified domestic relations
provisions do not apply to any plan to which the assignment or
alienation restrictions [the Alienation Prohibition] do not apply."6 6 1
Thus, this limitation clarifies that ERISA Plans other than
Spousal Survivor Pension Plans may not follow DROs that satisfy
the QDRO requirements set forth above, unless the plan terms
require such deference, because such plans are ERISA plans, but
not Spousal Survivor Pension Plans. This limitation is consistent
with the preface of REACT, and the Presidential signing
statement, discussed, supra, and the congressional reports that
accompanied the 1984 adoption of the Retirement Equity Act,
which introduced the QDRO Provisions. For example, the Senate
Report referred only to pension plans when it described the
significance of the QDRO provisions. 662
660

D. Are the QDRO Requirements for Domestic Relations Orders
Satisfied if the OrderDoes Not Require the Relevant Plan to Make
the Benefit Payment to an Alternate Payee but Requires the
Participantto Maintain,Make, or Refrain from Making Such
Designation,Such as a Customary RestrainingOrder Issued to
Both Partiesin a Domestic Relations Proceeding?
At least two district courts have clashed over whether if,
arguendo, the QDRO requirements apply to life insurance plans, a
domestic relations order that directs the participant to make or
maintain a designation meets the QDRO requirements. This was
an undiscussed feature of the DROs at issue in each of the six
circuit decisions that held that any ERISA plan, not merely
Survivor Spousal Pension Plans, must follow a DRO that meets
the QDRO requirements. 663 The same issue arises with respect to
the automatic restraining orders often issued to parties at the
start of domestic relations proceedings, as discussed, infra. Thus,
the issue merits a full and serious discussion.
In 2011, an Ohio district court in LaVelle v. LaVelle, 664 held
that a domestic relations order that directs the participant to
make a designation was not effective with respect to an ERISA life
insurance plan. Thus, the participant's second wife, and life
insurance designee was entitled to retain the plan benefits she
received following the participant's death. The participant violated
the terms of a divorce decree, which had been issued five years
660.
661.
662.
2549,
663.
664.
(N.D.

Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1898(c)(4), 100 Stat. 2948 (1986).
Survivor Benefit Entitlements, supra note 466, at 977.
S. REP. NO. 98-575, at 18-23 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2564-69.
See supra cases cited in note 591.
LaVelle v. LaVelle, No. 1:11 CV 600, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74890
Ohio July 12, 2011).
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before the second marriage, and required him to "[m]aintain and
pay the premiums for life insurance upon his or her life currently
in effect and . .. [to] designate the children [who remained minors
at the time of the participant's death] as irrevocable beneficiaries
thereon. . . ."665
The court decided the decree did not meet the QDRO
requirements because it did not identify an ERISA policy or
"expressly recognize a party's right to the proceeds of an ERISA
policy."666 The court did not explain itself further. In contrast, a
New Jersey district court held in 2003 that those requirements
were met with respect to the death benefits from a pension plan in
Smith v. Estate of Smith.66 7 In particular, the court held that the
following language recognized the former spouse's right to the
participant's survivor benefits:
Husband therefore does hereby irrevocably assigns [sic] to Wife the
sum of 50% of his said pension. The E.I. DuPont DeNemours
Company is hereby authorized to pay to Wife 50% of Husband's
pension entitlement, directly to the Wife, at the time Husband
begins to receive the said pension. If, a death benefit is paid in lieu
of the pension then a minimum of 50% of that death benefit shall be
paid to wife.668
The difficulty with a "make or maintain a designation" provision is
that QDROs are beneficiary designations that determine which
beneficiaries and benefits the plan will pay.669 Thus, a DRO that is
a QDRO must create, recognize, or assign under state law the
"right to receive" all or a portion of the benefits payable with
respect to a participant.6 70 In particular, if the plan does not pay
the person designated on the face of the order, the person may
obtain relief under state law from the plan.6 7 1 This is in fact the
case with a classical QDRO applicable to the pension benefits that
are most similar to life insurance proceeds, the survivor benefits of
a pension plan. Such a DRO declares that a specified person has a
right to those survivor benefits.6 72 This is not the case with an
order that a participant designate or refrain from designating a
665. Id. at *11.
666. Id. at *12.
667. Smith v. Estate of Smith, 248 F. Supp. 2d 348 (D. N.J. 2003).
668. See id. at 351(finding that the clause established a right to fifty percent
of the death benefit).
669. ERISA §§ 206(d)(1)(A), (J), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1056(d)(1)(A), (J).
670. ERISA §§ 206(d)(1)(B), (J), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1056(d)(1)(B), (J).
671. ERISA may, however, excuse the plan from its violation of such
payment obligation if the plan fiduciaries had satisfied their fiduciary
obligations when making such payment. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(I), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1056(d)(3)(I).
672. Sample QDROs can be found in section E of IRS Notice 97-11, 1997-1
C.B. 379, which was prepared pursuant to Congress's instructions in section
1457(a)(2) of the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, P.L. No. 104-188.
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specified person as his beneficiary, as is done with the life
insurance DROs. The specified person has no right from the face of
the order to obtain relief under state law from the plan if the plan
administrator follows the plan terms and refuses to pay him or her
the life insurance proceeds. Instead, the person may have recourse
against the participant for breaching an obligation.
In 2007, the District Court of Massachusetts in Unicare Life
& Health Insurance Co. v. Phanor6 7 3 held that a domestic relations
order that directs the participant to maintain a designation was
effective with respect to an ERISA life insurance plan. The court
held that the QDRO requirements were satisfied by an automatic
restraining order ("ARO") issued as standard practice in
Massachusetts divorce proceedings. The ARO provided that it
"PROHIBITS either party to a complaint for divorce or separate
support

from: . . .

(3)

Directly

or

indirectly

changing

the

beneficiary of any life insurance policy, pension or retirement plan,
or pension or retirement investment account, except with the
written consent of the other party or by Order of the Court."674
During the divorce proceeding, which the participant had
initiated, the participant violated the court order and changed his
ERISA life insurance designee from his wife to his girlfriend. He
passed away before the divorce was obtained.
Although, the court conceded that ARO satisfied none of the
specific QDRO requirements67 5 the court found it to be a QDRO
because it held that literal compliance was not needed.67 6 Thus,
the proceeds, which the plan had interpleaded were released to the
participant's widow. The employer argued that the ARO could not
be a QDRO because it created no rights but only imposed an
obligation on the participant.67 7 The court responded that the
courts could do more than hold the participant in contempt, but
could grant equitable relief by imposing a constructive trust on the
proceeds so the specified person would receive the life insurance in
the same manner as they would with respect to life insurance that
is not part of an ERISA plan but is subject to a similar state
domestic relations order.6 78 The court also observed that if the
ARO is preempted the result would be unchanged because it
asserted federal courts have permitted equitable actions against
distributed plan benefits.67 9 However, as was discussed, supra,
673. Unicare Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Phanor, 472 F. Supp. 2d 8 (D. Mass.
2007).
674. Id. at 9.
675. Id. at 11-12. The application of the QDRO requirements was supported
by references to the relevant circuit and Boggs's statements about how the
QDRO provisions protect non-participants in divorce actions. Id. at 10.
676. Id. at 12-14.
677. Id. at 11, 14.
678. Id. at 15-16.
679. Id. at 16 (referring to Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v.
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with respect to the first Supreme Court issue, the Supreme Court
held in both Boggs680 and Egelhoffsi parties who are not entitled
to benefits directly from ERISA plans are not entitled to those
benefits indirectly from the recipients. Thus, such equitable relief
would not be available.
XIV. STATE LAW ISSUES REGARDING COMMUNITY PROPERTY,
ELECTIVE SHARES, STATE COURT AUTHORITY, FOR WHICH COURT
DECISIONS APPEAR TO BE LACKING

In Boggs,682 the Supreme Court held that ERISA preempted
the community property ownership claim of the children of Isaac,
the participant, which they asserted accrued when their mother,
Dorothy, died, before any of the pension benefits had been
distributed. 683 However, Sandra, the participant's second wife, was
entiled to the property in accord with his designations and
pursuant to his lifetime distributions. 684 The children did not try to
enforce the claim based on their mother's community property
devisable interest against the participant's second wife until after
the participant's death.6 85 They then only sought the benefits
distributed by the pension plan. The Court concluded that the
ERISA protection of benefit entitlement applied to these
distributions because ERISA is designed to prevent the diversion
of plan benefit entitlements, regardless of whether the diversion
occurs before or after the distribution.
Under the children's analysis, their mother had a community
interest in the participant's community property, which she
devised to them at her death.6 6 If that devised property had a
value of $100,000 when it was distributed to their step-mother
after the participant's death, they would have claimed to be
entitled to $100,000 from her plus presumably any subsequent
earnings on the $100,000. The Supreme Court rejected such a
claim, and the dissent's proposal that Sandra, the widow, be
permitted to keep the $100,000 she received, but only be required
to pay $100,000 to the extent she had other assets that could be
used to make such payment.6 87
In short, the Court concluded that the participant's pension

Howell, 227 F.3d 672 (6th Cir. 2000)).
680. Boggs, 520 U.S. at 833.
681. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 141.
682. Boggs, 520 U.S. at 833.
683. Id. at 836-37.
684. Id.
685. Id. at 837.
686. The devise was not an immediate payment at her time of death but
"naked ownership in the remaining two-thirds [Isaac received the other third],
subject to Isaac's usufruct." Id. at 836-37.
687. Id. at 870 (suggesting this is what Louisiana law provides).
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benefit was not treated as community property, but as the
participant's separate property (the only alternative under
community property systems). ERISA determines whether
Dorothy, his wife, may affect the benefit distribution to the
participant.68 8 For a plan other than a Spousal Survivor Pension
Plan, she has no such rights unless the plan gives her such rights.
For a profit-sharing plan, she has no such rights unless the plan
gives her such rights. For all other Spousal Survivor Pension
Plans, the distribution must be made in the form of a joint and
survivor annuity unless she consents to another form.
The Boggs Supreme Court stated as discussed, supra, within

Kensinger:
[b]oth parties agree that the ERISA benefits at issue here were paid
after Dorothy's death, and thus this case does not present the
question whether ERISA would permit a nonparticipant spouse to
obtain a devisable community property interest in benefits paid out
during the existence of the community between the participant and
that spouse.689
This is the customary Supreme Court reservation that the Court
would not decide a question that is not before it and presumably
was not briefed.
Upon reflection, there seems little reason for the results to
change if the children's claim had been based on a claim that their
mother had a devisable interest in pension benefits that had been
distributed before her death. The above example illustrates why
this is a difference without a distinction. The ERISA concept that
protects benefit entitlements before and after their plan
distribution, implies the benefit entitlements of Sandra and Isaac's
children should not be affected by whether Isaac died a day before
he withdrew the money, or the day after he withdrew the
money.6 90 If the pension benefits were treated as separate property
while in the pension plan, there is no alchemy that can or should
transmute it into community property immediately following its
distribution, and thereby reduce the participant's ownership
interest in the benefits by fifty percent. Boggs, Free, and McCune
all rejected similar alchemy claims.
However, there seems to be no case law addressing this issue.
Similar questions arise with respect to state elective share laws.
There seems to be no case law on the interaction of these laws
with ERISA benefit entitlements. Suppose such a law entitles the
surviving spouse to elect to obtain one-third of the elective share,
which is defined as the probate estate plus pension assets.

688. ERISA §§ 205(a), (b), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1055(a), (b). These apply only to
Spousal Survivor Pension Plans.
689. Boggs, 520 U.S. at 845.
690. We are assuming there is no applicable QDRO.
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Suppose the decedent owned $300,000 in probate assets and
$1,500,000 in accrued benefits in a Top-Hat Plan, and leaves it all
to Gloria, his girl-friend, when he is married to Wendy. Suppose
under the law, Wendy, the surviving spouse, could elect to receive
one-third of the sum of $1,800,000,691 which is $600,000. However,
ERISA would preempt Wendy's state right to an ownership
interest in any portion of the Top-Hat Plan benefits, except, to the
extent that she was the beneficiary under the terms of the plan,
which she was not. Thus, Gloria would receive at least $1,500,000,
and Wendy would obtain at most $300,000.
Under the extension of the Boggs reasoning described, supra,
the results would not change if the participant had received the
Top-Hat Plan benefits and placed them in what turned out to be
his probate assets at the time of his death.
Nor would any of the results change if the Top-Hat Plan had
instead been a Spousal Survivor Pension Plan. However, many
elective share laws (1) add to the elective estate for pension
benefits from a Spousal Survivor Pension Plan if the spouse has
consented to the participant's waiver of those benefits pursuant to
the terms of such plan, and (2) treat the spouse as having received
such amounts. 692 Thus, under such a law, Wendy will be treated as
though she received $1,500,000, and thus be entitled to no elective
share, and Gloria would be entitled to keep the $1,800,000 she
received as the participant's designee.
Another question arises. Does ERISA produce a result even
closer to the community property treatment, which would treat the
pension benefits as unavailable for any payment of survivor
benefits because such property is not treated as community
property but as separate property? The rationale for such
treatment is that the elective share treatment should disregard
what happens with ERISA entitlements that are governed by
ERISA. In particular, Wendy would be entitled to $100,000, which
is one-third of the participant's probate estate, and Gloria would
be entitled to $200,000 from that estate, together with the
$1,500,000 from the pension plan. This way, Gloria suffers no
reduction in the value of the property, which she is otherwise
entitled to, because of her pension benefit entitlement.
Additionally, Wendy suffers no reduction in her elective share
because she may have consented to the participant's waiver of her
interest in such pension benefits, which consents do not require
any knowledge of the participant's total property unlike the
waivers required by most elective share laws. Such treatment
would be consistent with the Supreme Court's treatment of the
691. The sum of $300,000 and $1,500,000.
692. See, e.g., N. Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW §§ 5-1.1A(a)(4),(b)(1)(B),
(e)(4) (discussing the elective share implications of waivers of Spousal
Survivor Pension benefits).
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community property rights most analogous to elective shares,
namely the community property rights of a surviving spouse, when
the federal entitlement was not to ERISA pension benefits, but to
survivor rights of federal debt obligations, such as those in Free,
discussed supra.

Many state courts take one of two approaches to the QDRO
qualification of DROs with respect to pension plans. 69 3 More and
more insist that no DROs will be issued with respect to pension
benefits that have not been approved as complying with the QDRO
requirements by the plan administrator. The other approach is to
issue successive DROs until the plan administrator approval is
obtained. If done in an informal manner, i.e., without joining the
plan to the domestic relations proceedings, no ERISA issues are
raised. 694 State courts may not impose attorney award orders
against plan administrators for failing to meet the state court's
preferences for assisting a potential alternate payee with the task
of preparing a DRO that satisfies the QDRO requirements.69 5 One
court responded as follows to such an award, before issuing an
injunction against enforcement of the order:
Obviously, a judicial decision assessing attorneys' fees against a
pension plan, regardless of the reason, relates to the pension
plan... . Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a closer or more direct

relationship between a judicial decision and an employee benefit
plan than the assessment of attorneys' fees at issue in this case. 696

The question that arises is what additional conduct by state
courts would lead to similar preemption. Orders to plans or their
administrators to provide information so that a QDRO may be
prepared almost certainly fall in the same category, although
there have been no decisions on point.697 It would also appear that
those state laws that permit the automatic joinder of pension
plans associated with a party to a domestic relations proceedings
are similarly preempted. 698 However, such joinder may not be
occurring as a matter of course.69 9 Again, there have been no
693. It does not appear many consider whether DROs applying to disability
plans or life insurance plans comply with the QDRO rules.
694. But see Jones v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 57 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1228-29 (D.
Wyo. 1999) (describing the difficulties that may arise when comity breaks
down, and the court uses its authority to find that a DRO meets the QDRO
requirements).
695. AT&T Mgmt. Pension Plan v. Tucker, 902 F. Supp. 1168 (C.D. Cal.
1995).
696. Id. at 1175-76.
697. Only federal courts have the authority to issue such orders. ERISA
§§ 502(a)(1)(A), (e)(1), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a)(1)(A), (e)(1).
698. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 2337 (West 2012) (setting forth California's
provisions regarding the same).
699. Retirement Plan Joinder-Information Sheet, JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF
CAL.
1
(Jan.
1,
2009),
available
at
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decisions on point, 700 with the exception of the Supreme Court
summary decision in Campa, which approved such joinder. 701
Although, the post-REACT viability of that decision is
questionable after Boggs held that Campa was moot with respect
to the application of state community property claims to ERISA
benefit entitlements, no federal court seems to have addressed the
joinder issue. This may because for most plans, it is much less
expensive to monitor some domestic relations proceeding in which
often nothing occurs that adversely affects the plan than it is to
challenge the authority of the court to enforce joinder. 702
XV. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR REGULATION ISSUES

Those who practice family law, ERISA, or both need binding
guidance about the most critical features of the QDRO
Requirements. Which plans are covered? Is an automatic
restraining order by a domestic relations court a QDRO? Must
QDROs be directed at the covered employee plans? How must plan
information be conveyed to QDRO applicants? What kinds of plan
benefits are available from the plans? What responsibilities do
plans have with respect to QDRO applications? What is the role of
state courts? The only binding guidance with respect to the QDRO
requirements are the DOL regulations issued in 2010, addressing
the timing and the order of issue of QDROs,703 but none of the
above critical features.
Some but not all of these questions are answered in informal
guidance, but because such advice is not binding, the advice is
often disregarded. IRS Notice 97-11 ("IRS QDRO Guide"), 704
discusses and presents sample language for QDROs pursuant to a
congressional mandate, but disclaims any intention to interpret
the statutory requirements. 705 The DOL prepared a booklet
http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/fl318info.pdf (last visited Aug. 13, 2012).
700. But see In re Marriage of Nasca, 87 F. Supp. 2d 967 (N.D. Cal. 1999)
(holding that removal could not be compelled simply because the California
court's action may be subject to the ERISA General Preemption but not
holding that the state court's actions were not preempted).
701. See generally In re Campa, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 362; CarpentersPension
Trust Fund, 444 U.S. at 1028 and discussion of decision, supra.
702. QDRO in CaliforniaCourt-How to Avoid Joinder,
BOARDS,
MESSAGE
BENEFITSLINK
(last visited
http://benefitslink.com/boards/lofiversionlindex.php/tl491.html
Aug. 13, 2012).
703. 29 C.F.R. § 2530.206 (2010). An excellent review of these regulations
may be found in Elizabeth M. Wells, For Better or Worse Timing of DROs
Under 29 CFR PART 2530.206, N.Y.U. REV. EMP. BEN. (Forthcoming 2012).
704. 1997-1 C.B. 379.
705. 1997-1 C.B. 379-80. The notice was released in response to the
requirement of section 1457(a)(2) of the Small Business Job Protection Act of
1996, P.L. No. 104-188, § 1457(a)(2) (1996). The Notice reports that the DOL
advised the IRS that the discussion and language are consistent with the DOL
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discussing many of those statutory issues, which in the
introduction is described as "general guidance," that is available
online, and is the DOL QDRO Guide mentioned, supra. This
publication is of uncertain precedential value. The DOL QDRO
Guide contains the IRS QDRO Guide and many DOL advisory
opinions upon which only the individual parties described in the
opinion may rely.706 Finally, the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation has also prepared a publication entitled "Qualified
Domestic Relations Orders," which is also available online. 707
("PBGC DOL Guide")70s The PBGC DOL Guide presents sample
QDRO language, which declares in the preface, "None of this
information takes precedence over legislation, regulations, or
specific interpretations or rulings."709
A. Which ERISA PlansAre Governed by the QDRO Requirements,
Is a QDRO Required to Explicitly Direct the Plan to Pay a Specific
PersonBenefits, and Are Automatic RestrainingOrders QDROs?
In view of the discussion, supra, asserting that many courts
have wrongfully directed plans other than Spousal Survivor
Pension Benefits to follow DROs that meet the QDRO
requirements even though their terms do not so require, the DOL
should give serious consideration to whether those court decisions
are correct. Three major ERISA plan types would be subject to
these requirements: life insurance plans, disability plans, and
pension plans that are not Spousal Survivor Pension Plans, such
as Top-Hat Plans.7 10 The DOL has regulatory authority to
interpret the ERISA General Exemption,7 11 so it has authority to
address its application, and to describe which QDRO requirements
apply to those plans. For example, would the temporary
sequestration of benefit payments while the status of a QDRO is
determined be applicable if the plan were a Top-Hat Plan. 712
In view of the discussion, supra, asserting that many courts
have wrongfully held that DROs addressing life insurance plans
views.
706. According to section 10 of the ERISA Procedure 76-1, 41 Fed. Reg.
36218 (Aug. 27, 1976).
707. Qualified Domestic Relations Orders, PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY
CORP., http://www.pbgc.gov/wrlbenefits/qdro.html (last revised Sept. 2009)
(last visited Aug. 13, 2012).
708. The Sample Orders are similar to those in the IRS QDRO Guide, but
this publication emphasizes that a QDRO may not require the PBGC to pay
alternate payees more than the PBGC guaranteed benefits. Id.
709. Supra note 707.
710. Vacation plans, such as the one described in Mackey, 486 U.S. at 825,
would also be covered.
711. ERISA § 505, 29 U.S.C. § 1135; Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978, 43
Fed. Reg. 47,713 (Oct. 17, 1978).
712. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(H), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(H).
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meet the QDRO requirements even though the DROs do not direct
the life insurance plans to make plan payments to a specified
person, the DOL should give serious consideration to whether the
courts are correct. This question is not confined to life insurance
plans. Similar DROs could be prepared directing a participant to
name a designee of a pension plan's survivor benefits. Would they
be QDROs if the plan were a Spousal Survivor Pension Plan to
which the QDRO requirements unquestionably apply?
Many states have statutes similar to the Massachusetts one
described in UnicareLife & Health Insurance Co., 713 which provide
for an automatic restraining order that directed both parties to a
domestic relations order not to change any employee benefit plan
designation, or to withdraw any plan benefits, without the consent
of the court or the other party during the proceeding. 714 The aim is
to prevent either party from changing the status quo while the
proceedings are under way, as the participant sought to do in that
case.
It would be advisable for the DOL to decide whether
automatic restraining orders avoid preemption as QDROs. They
appear to fail to meet any of the QDRO requirements. No
directions are issued to any life insurance plan as discussed,
supra. The DRO does not give the name and mailing address of the
alternate payee.715 The DRO does not specify the amount or
percentage of the payments. 716 The DRO does not specify the
period to which the order applies.7 17 The DRO does not specify the
name of the plan.718 Does the DOL accept the substantial
compliance justifications presented by the Unicare court, which
seem to render the QDRO requirements nugatory? The Court
argued that the (1) the potential alternate payees can be
determined from the other court filings, (2) no payments are
required, (3) the order is effective until withdrawn, and (4) the
plan name could be determined from the participant's policies
owned at the time of the filing?719 Would the result be the same if
pension plan payments were similarly curtailed by the order, as is
the case with some of these statutes? 720 The QDRO requirements
apply to Spousal Survivor Pension Plans, so the issue may not be
avoided by the inapplicability of the QDRO ruleS7 2 1 as may be the
713. UnicareLife & Health Ins. Co., 472 F. Supp. 2d at 8.
714. See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236B.2(b)(5) (McKinney 2011)
(pertaining only to life insurance plan designations).
715. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(C)(i), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(C)(i).
716. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(C)(ii), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(C)(ii).
717. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(C)(iii), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(C)(iii).
718. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(C)(iv), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(C)(iv).
719. UnicareLife & Health Ins. Co., 472 F. Supp. 2d at 12-16.
720. See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236B.2(b)(2) (covering pension except
those that are in pay status).
721. But see ERISA § 206(d)(3)(H), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(H) (providing for

2012]

ERISA's Family Law Provisions

755

case with respect to automatic restraining orders restricted to life
insurance benefits. Does the ERISA General Exemption preempt
all such orders, or perhaps only those applicable to Spousal
Survivor Pension Plans?
B. What Information, and Under What CircumstancesMust an
ERISA Plan ProvideInformation to Assist a PotentialAlternate
Payee Prepare a QDRO?
One frequent concern that is expressed is how may a potential
alternate payee, who may be a spouse, former spouse, or a
dependent obtain the information needed to prepare a QDRO.722
There are usually six basic items: (1) the plan's governing
documents, including, but not limited to, the summary plan
description; (2) a statement of the participant's benefit
entitlements for at least two annual periods, including an
explanation of the entitlement and its determination; (3) a
description of the participant's payment options, and when those
options may be exercised; (4) the names of the participant's
beneficiary designations; (5) the statutorily required plan QDRO
procedures; 723 and (6) model QDRO forms, if any. 724 Additional
information is sometimes needed after the initial information is
reviewed. 725
The DOL QDRO Guide observes that Congress intended
potential alternate payees to have access to "plan and participant
benefit information sufficient to prepare a QDRO," which "might
include the summary plan description, relevant plan documents,
and a statement of the participant's benefit entitlements."726 The
plan administrator may require that the requestor reasonably
establish that the information is being sought in connection with a
domestic relations proceeding, which may be done without
submitting a DRO.727 Applicants and plan administrators will find
sequestration of payments for up to eighteen months while a DRO is being
reviewed for QDRO compliance, and perhaps being revised to be in
compliance).
722. See, e.g., DOL ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EMPLOYEE WELFARE AND
PENSION BENEFIT PLANS, DISPARITIES FOR WOMEN AND MINORITIES IN
RETIREMENT SAVINGS, 3, 7 (2010) [hereinafter DOL DISPARITY STUDY]
(recommending that measures be taken to reduce the obstacles to a nonemployee
spouse
obtaining
plan
information),
available
at
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/publications/2010ACreport3.html (last visited Aug.
13, 2012).
723. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(G)(ii), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(G)(ii).
724. But cf. COMPLETE QDRO HANDBOOK, supra note 399, at 335-38
(providing a more complete information letter).
725. We will not discuss how to determine the plans in which the
participant participates. This is a sub issue of determining the extent of a
participant's assets.
726. DOL QDRO GUIDE, supra note 47, at 2-1.
727. Id.
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no further details in the Guide. Many difficulties may be solved by
good plan and potential alternate payee practices, such as the ones
described in the QDRO Handbook or the Complete QDRO
Handbook.
There are cases in which potential alternate payees do not
obtain the information they believe they need from the plan
administrator to prepare a QDRO. If such an individual is a plan
beneficiary, i.e., a designee under the plan terms, and such
information is needed for that purpose, then they have the right to
compel the plan administrator to provide the information within
thirty days. 728 The difficulty with this remedy is that it is only
available from federal courts, 729 so an action in addition to the
domestic relations proceeding would have to be brought, which
may be expensive, 730 and as discussed, supra, attorney fees often
may not be recovered.
The more serious obstacle to obtaining additional information
is that many potential alternate payees, such as former spouses
and dependents, may not be beneficiaries. This may also be the
case for spouses, if plans other than Spousal Survivor Pension
Plans are considered, such as Top-Hat Plans and life insurance
plans, which need not have spousal beneficiaries. 73 1 As discussed
in Kerbow732 and Boggs, 733 a state community property interest
may not be used to establish a necessary beneficiary relation to
bring an information suit. It would appear that the usual
reticulated statute argument against creating rights not set forth
in ERISA734 would prevent a potential beneficiary from bringing
an action to recover information because Congress failed to create
such a right when it enacted or amended the REACT provisions.
The only complete solution to this information access
deficiency would be an ERISA amendment giving potential
728. ERISA §§ 502(a)(1)(A), 502(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a)(1)(A), 1132(c)(1).
Plan beneficiaries need not be in pay status to obtain the plan information set
forth in ERISA § 104(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(4), although the information is
only available upon request for beneficiaries not in pay status. Similarly, plan
beneficiaries need not be in pay status to obtain the individual benefit
information set forth in ERISA § 105, 29 U.S.C. § 1025, although the
information is only available upon request for beneficiaries not in pay status.
729. ERISA § 502(e)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1).
730. DOL DISPARITY STUDY, supra note 722 (estimating that the expense
could be $5,000 to $10,000).
731. Even spouses may not be beneficiaries for Spousal Survivor Pension
Plans. They could have waived the survivor interest, which does not preclude
them from regaining an interest in a divorce.
732. Kerbow, 421 F. Supp. at 1253.
733. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833.
734. See, e.g., Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985)
(holding no extracontractual damages available under reticulated statute);
Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248 (1993) (holding no monetary damages
may be imposed on non-fiduciaries participating in a fiduciary breach).
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alternative payees the same right to obtain information that is
available to plan beneficiaries. However, the DOL may now
provide potential alternate payees with a greater ability to obtain
information that they may need to prepare QDROs, while easing
the burden on plan administrators, by issuing regulations
describing the information that administrators have a fiduciary
obligation to provide to potential alternate payees. By seeking
public comments before issuing the regulations, the DOL would
best be able to characterize such information, and decide whether
it is appropriate to set fixed deadlines for the provision of such
information. Such regulations would not appear to give the
potential alternate payee the ability to go to court to obtain the
information, but they would provide the DOL with the tools
needed so it could enforce those regulatory obligations. The DOL
could also decide what would be needed to show that one is a
potential alternate payee. Spouses who are beneficiaries have
access in such capacity. For other parties, it would seem adequate
to be a party to a domestic relations proceeding, have a DRO, or be
represented by a state agency, which may itself issue domestic
relations orders.
C. What InternalPlan and Court Rules Govern Claims Pertaining
to a Domestic Relations Order that Is Asserted to Be a QDRO?
It is advisable that the DOL clarify many substantial
questions about the QDRO requirements by issuing and enforcing
regulations pertaining to those requirements, which include claims
rules together with the QDRO procedures that Spousal Survivor
Pension Plans must establish and maintain. 735 Consideration must
be given to both the potential alternate payee and the participant
(and his designee if the participant is deceased when the DRO is
under consideration). If the DOL believes that the QDRO
requirements are applicable to pension plans other than Spousal
Survivor Pension Plans, disability plans, and life insurance plans,
its regulations must address how those requirements apply to such
plans.
There are many comprehensive treatments of the QDRO
requirements, such as the QDRO Handbook or the Complete
QDRO Handbook, in addition to the government's informal
guidance, such as the DOL QDRO Guide. Thus, this discussion
will be restricted to identifying some, but not all, of the major
issues that would benefit from such clarification.

735.

ERISA § 206(d)(3)(G), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(G). As discussed, supra, it

is advisable to make such procedures available even before a potential
alternate payee prepares a DRO. The individuals who requested such a
document would be most likely to try to address its requirements from the
outset and thus save all parties time and expense.
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What is the plan administrator expected to review about a
DRO that it receives pertaining to any of the plan participants or
beneficiaries? Of course, it is the one with the most expertise on
whether the benefit terms of the DRO satisfy the QDRO
requirements, which depend on the plan's terms. To what extent is
the administrator expected to go beyond the face of the DRO and
focus merely on compliance with the QDRO disclosure
requirements73 6 and benefit limits? 737 The DOL QDRO Guide
provides that the administrator need not determine the validity of
the order under state domestic relations law. 738 A DOL Advisory
Opinion held that the administrator is not required to verify the
correctness of the spouse, former spouse, or other dependents set
forth in the DRO.739 The Seventh Circuit held in Blue v. UAL
Corp.,740 that the plan administrator is not even "permitted to look
beneath the surface of the order."741 The court thus rejected a
claim that the plan administrator committed a fiduciary breach by
failing to check whether the DRO included attorneys' fees as child
support. 742 Presumably the plan administrator is expected to ask
for court confirmation that the DRO is in effect, but does not need
to check any further. 743
If one of the primary functions of the plan administrator is to
review the compliance of the DRO with the four disclosure
requirements, it would be useful for the DOL to clarify what
substantial compliance suffices for those requirements. The DOL
QDRO Guide expands language from the REACT Senate Report
about the requisite compliance 744 to the following:
In many cases, an order that is submitted to a plan may clearly
describe the identity and rights of the parties, but may be
incomplete only with respect to factual identifying information
736. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(C), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(C).
737. ERISA §§ 206(d)(3)(D), (E), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1056(d)(3)(D), (E).
738. DOL QDRO GUIDE, supra note 47, at 2-8.
739. U.S. Dep't of Labor Advisory Opinion 92-17A (Aug. 21, 1992); but see
Owens v. Auto. Machinists Pension Trust, 551 F.3d 1138 (9th Cir. 2009)
(rejecting a challenge by the plan, rather than by the participant of the QDRO
compliance of a DRO, and holding that a woman who lived with the
participant could be his dependent if they were never married).
740. Blue v. UAL Corp., 160 F.3d 383 (7th Cir. 1998).
741. Id. at 385.
742. Id. It is not clear why this would be a QDRO compliance issue if the
award. ERISA
attorneys' fees "related to" the child support
§ 206(d)(3)(B)(ii)(I), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii)(I).
743. But see Brown v. Cont. Airlines, 647 F.3d 221 (5th Cir. 2011) (holding
that administrator may not check if the divorce was a sham; such divorces
were presumably obtained to qualify to receive lump sum distributions from a
severely underfunded pension plan before benefits would be reduced in a plan
termination).
744. S. REP. No. 98-575, at 20 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2547,
2566.
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within the plan administrator's knowledge or easily obtained
through a simple communication with the alternate payee or the
participant. For example, an order may misstate the plan's name or
the names of participants or alternate payees, and the plan
administrator can clearly determine the correct names, or an order
may omit the addresses of participants or alternate payees, and the
plan administrator's records include this information. In such a
case, the plan administrator should supplement the order with the
appropriate identifying information, rather than rejecting the order
as not qualified. 745
However, there is a strong disagreement as to whether the statute
permits so much or even more substantial compliance. 746
Unicare747 discussed, supra, is an extreme example of how little
compliance some courts require. However, many of these disputes
will vanish if the QDRO requirements are found not applicable to
life insurance plans, because it appears that in many of those
cases, the divorcing spouses do not seem to consider the QDRO
requirements when the divorce papers are prepared.
What is the role of the participant in the review of a DRO,
who must be notified of the submission of a DRO that is claimed to
be a QDRO?748 If the administrator is not supposed to look beyond
the surface of the DRO, it would seem that the participant can do
little more than show whether the DRO at issue is superseded,
which is a simple task. Should the participant be expected to
challenge the plan determination that the DRO satisfied the
QDRO benefit requirements? 749 Presumably this is the major
responsibility that the plan is expected to fulfill. Should the
participant be expected to challenge whether the QDRO
requirements apply to the Plan?
Most litigated disputes about compliance of DROs with the
QDRO requirements do not appear to be between participants and
potential alternate payees, but between potential alternate payees
and the person designated by the deceased participant, 75 0 when it
is most difficult to change a DRO to meet the QDRO requirements.
DOL QDRO GUIDE, supra note 47, at 2-9.
746. See Stewart v. Thorpe Holding Co. Profit Sharing Plan, 207 F.3d 1143
(9th Cir. 2000) (noting a good exchange between the majority and the dissent
about the degree of substantial compliance that the QDRO requirements
permit).
745.

747.

UnicareLife & Health Ins. Co., 472 F. Supp. 2d at 8.

REES, QUALIFIED DOMESTIC RELATIONS ORDERS: RECENT CASE
LAW AND DEPARTMENT OF LABOR GUIDANCE, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY
MATERIALS (July 2006).

748. SUSAN
749.

See, e.g., Files v. ExxonMobil Pension Plan, 428 F.3d 478 (3d Cir. 2005)

(permitting the alternate payee to begin receiving a separate interest pension
when the participant was neither employed nor receiving a pension, which
violates ERISA § 206(d)(3)(D) and (E), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(D) and (E)).
However, no one challenged the QDRO compliance on that ground. Id.
750. See, e.g., REES, supra note 748.
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Does this mean notice of the DRO submission that would
otherwise go to the participant, should go to the participant's
designee? Again, what would be the role of the designee in the
review process?
There are questions about the ERISA provisions that provide
for a sequestration of payments otherwise due for up to eighteen
months while the QDRO compliance of a DRO is determined." 1
The DRO may be modified during the sequestration period to
bring it into compliance with the QDRO requirements. It is
advisable to provide guidance with respect to what both the plan
administrator and the applicant are expected to do and when they
should do it, if the DRO is rejected, but the potential alternate
payee wishes to modify the DRO. 752 For example, it is quite easy
for a potential alternate payee to file an automatic restraining
order to obtain an immediate sequestration even though it does
not satisfy the QDRO requirements. What, if anything, is the
alternate payee expected to do, during the sequestration period to
show that a modification that attempts to comply with the QDRO
requirements will be made within a reasonable period? Similarly,
what, if anything is the plan administrator expected to do with
respect to providing plan information in a timely fashion to a
potential alternate payee who wishes to modify a DRO to comply
with the QDRO requirements? Finally, under what conditions, if
any, does a successive DRO filing start a new 18-month
sequestration period, and to what extent, if any, must it differ
from earlier filings?
If, arguendo, the sequestration procedures are clarified, there
would seem to be no need for ERISA plans to interplead even
when there is a question about compliance with the QDRO
requirements because if the plan fiduciary follows those
procedures, it has no risk of a double payment obligation. 753 This
policy also encourages plan administrators to develop the factual
record that may be needed to determine the participant's
designation under the plan terms. The courts have shown
increasing irritation at plan administrators who interplead when
there is no question about the failure of a DRO to meet the QDRO
requirements. Recently, one court imposed attorney fees against
the interpleading administrator after criticizing such behavior.
"This conduct in litigation unnecessarily imposes a burden on Lois,
Gwendolyn, and Julius: each had received a considerable sum in
life insurance benefits, but not enough of a king's ransom to spend
a fortune defending the case. MetLife's conduct is irresponsible,
751. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(H), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(H); see also DOL QDRO
GUIDE, supra note 47, at 2-11 (describing the duties of plan administrator
during the QDRO determination process).
752. Cf. DOL QDRO GUIDE, supra note 47, at 2-11.
753. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(I)(ii), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(I)(ii).

2012]

ERISA's Family Law Provisions

761

and borders on bad faith." 754
The First Circuit also suggested that it may not permit a plan
administrator to interplead if the administrator has the
information needed to decide who is entitled to a survivor
benefit.75 5 On the other hand, the party whose QDRO position was
rejected may believe its position is convincing. Thus, he or she may
decide to undertake the expense needed to interplead before the
benefit payments are scheduled to begin.756
It is also advisable for the DOL to describe how plans are
expected to process a benefit claim based on a DRO that is claimed
to meet the QDRO requirements or a benefit claim that may be
challenged by such a DRO. Unlike other benefit claims, the plan
administrator is not permitted to decide all issues. As discussed,
supra, the plan administrator may not look beyond the surface of
the DRO. It is advisable to apply the same prudential exhaustion
doctrine otherwise applicable to benefit claims to the issues for
which the administrator is responsible.757 In this way, the court
will have the advantage of the claim fiduciary's review of the
DRO's compliance with the QDRO benefit requirements, which is
within the fiduciary's area of expertise.
It is advisable for the DOL to describe the conditions, if any,
under which participants or potential alternate payees may be
charged fees for QDRO determinations. The Department of Labor
currently permits defined contribution plan administrators to
charge reasonable fees, if those plans are adequately described in
the plan summary plan description. 75 8 This policy raises several
questions. Are fees permitted for defined benefit plans? There are
usually more questions about whether the plan permits the
desired form of payment with defined benefit plans, than defined
contribution plans. If the DOL gives clear and binding guidance
about QDROs and QDRO determination procedures, would plans
754. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Leich-Brannan, 812 F. Supp. 2d 729, 739
(E.D. Va. 2011) (holding that participant's commitment to keep former wife
beneficiary of all life insurance policies did not constitute a QDRO; thus, the
court could not enforce commitment).
755. Forcier v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 469 F.3d 178, 182 n.4 (1st Cir. 2006)
(citing Travelers Indem. Co. v. Israel, 354 F.2d 488, 490 (2d Cir. 1965))
(analyzing the reverse exhaustion doctrine that prevents insurers from using
interpleader to transfer "part of their ordinary cost of doing business" under
such circumstances). See generally McLaren Inv. and Ret. Comm. v.
Whitehead and Gignac, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77329 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 28,
2009) (analyzing the case law and issuing an order to show cause why reverse
exhaustion is not required before court considers dispute about beneficiary not
related to a DRO).
756. See, e.g., Estate of William Kensinger, 674 F.3d at 133.
757. ZANGELEIN ET AL., supra note 165, at 358-78.
758. U.S. Dep't of Labor Field Assistance Bulletin 2003-3, U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR (May 19, 2003), http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/regs/fab-2003-3.htm1 (last
visited Aug. 13, 2012) [hereinafter FAB 2003-3].
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incur any significant processing expenses in determining whether
a DRO is a QDRO? Finally, is it any more appropriate for a plan to
charge a processing charge for a QDRO determination than for
processing a benefit claim when there is a question about a
beneficiary designation? The claims regulations prohibit
processing charges for all benefit claims.759
It is advisable for DOL regulations to address the role of the
courts and the consequence of a court overruling a claim denial
based on a DRO asserted to be a QDRO. Plan administrators have
the initial responsibility for determining whether a DRO meets the
QDRO requirements, 760 but the courts can overrule them.
Moreover, the courts have full authority to determine compliance
with the QDRO requirements regardless of whether the plan
fiduciaries paid the benefits to the wrong party by following the
sequestration rules76 1 or otherwise met their fiduciary
responsibilities. 762 In wrongful payment cases, however, the person
entitled to those benefits may only recover such benefits from the
party who was wrongfully paid the benefits if the administrator
satisfied the appropriate fiduciary rules.
Finally, it is advisable for the DOL to correct its error about
the authority of state courts.763 ERISA gives both state courts and
federal courts jurisdiction over actions by a plan participant or
beneficiary "to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his
plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify
his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan." 764 The
terms of Spousal Survivor Pension Plans must provide that
benefits are paid in accord with the applicable requirements of any
DRO that is a QDRO. 765 Thus, if a participant or beneficiary seeks
to obtain a determination that a DRO satisfies the QDRO
requirements or seeks to obtain benefits pursuant to such a DRO,
state courts and federal courts both have jurisdiction.766 Moreover,
if there is a question about what is below the surface of the terms
of the DRO, which is outside the responsibilities of the plan's
claims fiduciary, a state court is probably better able to resolve
such a question than a federal court. State courts are simply more
knowledgeable about state law than federal courts that may sit
within the same geographical area. Moreover, unlike federal
759. Cf. 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(b)(3); U.S. Dep't of Labor Advisory Opinion
94-32A (Aug. 4, 1994) (presenting this position, but was overruled without any
discussion by FAB 2003-3, supra note 758).
760. DOL QDRO GUIDE, supra note 47, at 1-13.
761. ERISA § 206(d)(3)()(ii), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(I)(ii).
762. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(I)(i), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(I)(i).
763. DOL QDRO GUIDE, supra note 47, at 1-13.
764. ERISA §§ 502(e)(1), 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(e)(1), 1132(a)(1)(B).
765. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3) (A).
766. See, e.g., Jones, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 1230-32 (reviewing and approving the
state court's jurisdiction to decide QDRO compliance).

2012]

ERISA's Family Law Provisions

763

courts, state courts may address QDRO compliance concerns
expressed by a plan administrator about the DRO. Thus, they
more efficiently resolve those concerns.7 67 Furthermore, as
discussed, supra, most state courts prefer to have DROs presented
to them whose QDRO compliance has been approved by the
pension plan, rather than being forced to decide whether the plan
administrator correctly made such decision. 76 8 If such
determinations are needed, most litigants with the blessing of the
state courts remove the decisions to federal court. Thus, there are
few QDRO decisions from state courts. It should be noted that if
the QDRO requirements are applicable to pension plans other
than Spousal Survivor Pension Plans, disability plans, and life
insurance plans, then the DOL is correct that the state courts
would lack authority to decide whether DROs pertaining to such
plans comply with those requirements because there is no ERISA
provision incorporating those requirements into the plan terms.769
XVI. CONCLUSION
The "principal object of the statute [ERISA] is to protect plan
participants and beneficiaries," 77 0 is implemented in large part by
adherence to a "core ERISA concern" of paying benefits in accord
with the plan terms, 771 and the preemption of state laws that
"govern[] the payment of benefits." 772 Thus, state family law is
preempted except to the extent that plan terms provide for
deference to such law. Such preemption is consistent with the long
and general practice of the federal courts giving Congress the
primary responsibility for setting the balance of federalism
between federal law and state family law, 773 and with the context
in which both ERISA and REACT were enacted.
Congress mandated that the terms of a pension plan that
Congress required to provide spousal survivor benefits, must also
provide that (a) benefits be determined in accord with the
applicable requirements of a domestic relation order that is a
QDRO, and (b) the requirements of other domestic relations orders
767. See e.g, id. at 1227-28 (providing an example of such resolution).
768. Questions may be raised by a potential alternate payee whose DRO
was held to violate the QDRO requirements by the plan administrator, or by a
participant who believes that a DRO was incorrectly approved by the plan
administrator.
769. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(A), is such a provision for
Spousal Survivor Pension Plans.
770. Boggs, 520 U.S. at 845.
771. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 147.
772. Id. at 148.
773. See generally Ann Laquer Estin, Sharing Governance: Family Law in
Congress and the States, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POLY 267, 321-23 (2009)
(summarizing the decisions pertaining to ERISA and non-ERISA pension
plans).
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be disregarded. 774 Congress gave sponsors of other pension plans,
disability plans, and life insurance plans the discretion to decide
the extent, if any, to which they wished such plans to defer to
domestic relations orders and other state law. For example, the
terms of such plans could provide for deference to domestic
relations orders that comply with requirements similar to the
QDRO requirements. Those requirements apply only to the
pension plans required to provide spousal survivor benefits.77 5 It
would be useful for the Supreme Court to confirm that plans other
than these plans may disregard domestic relations orders unless
their respective plan terms provide for such deference.7 76
The state family law addressed by ERISA is not limited to
domestic relations orders. ERISA preemption prevents state
community property law, state revocation of designation laws, and
state elective share laws from being used to determine ERISA
benefit entitlements except, to the extent, the terms of those plans
require deference.
ERISA benefit entitlements are not limited to the right to
receive benefit payments from an ERISA plan,777 but include the
right to prevent a superseded (state family law or federal commonlaw) ownership claim from being used to wrest the benefit away
from the person with the benefit entitlement.77 8 It would be useful
for the Supreme Court to confirm this benefit retention right.779
The DOL could substantially improve family law practice
with respect to ERISA plans by preparing and promulgating
regulations, 780 (1) describing which plans are subject to the QDRO
requirements, (2) describing the responsibilities of the fiduciaries
of those plans with respect to the provision of information needed
to prepare domestic relations orders complying with the QDRO
requirements, and (3) clarifying how these orders may be reviewed
by ERISA plans and the courts.
The suggested Supreme Court decisions and DOL regulations
774. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(A); but see Kennedy, 555
U.S. at 300 n.10 (suggesting that a benefit waiver in a domestic relations order
may be followed if the plan terms permit).
775. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(L), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(L).
776. But see Kennedy, 555 U.S. at 302 (citing Wheaton, 42 F.3d at 1084)
(illustrating the QDRO requirements). However, Wheaton held that life
insurance plans must follow domestic relations orders that satisfy the QDRO
requirements.
777. But see ERISA § 205(c)(6), 29 U.S.C. § 1055(c)(6) (discharging a plan
from the obligation to pay spousal survivor benefits if the plan fiduciaries
acted properly in paying such benefit to another person).
778. Boggs, 520 U.S. at 833; Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 141.
779. Cf. Kennedy, 555 U.S. at 300 n.10 (declining to express a view on the
issue of whether common-law waivers may be enforced against a designee
after, but not before, the designee receives her or his benefit entitlement).
780. The DOL authority stems from ERISA §§ 206(d)(N) and 505, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1056(d)(N) and 1135.
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will reduce litigation about ERISA family law issues by
eliminating disagreements about the law, and will improve
conformity between ERISA practice and the ERISA law.

766
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